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A NOTE ON DATES 
 
All dates in the main text of this thesis use the New Style dating format with the year 
beginning 1 January. During the eighteenth century the Old Style calendar was still in 
use. When an Old Style date has been used in a Primary Source I have inserted the 









The battle of Malplaquet, fought in 1709 during the War of the Spanish Succession, 
was the largest battle of the eighteenth century. The War of Spanish Succession 
commenced in 1701 after the death of Carlos II of Spain, when the throne was 
offered to the French Bourbon grandson of Louis XIV, who became Philip V of Spain. 
The Maritime Powers of England and the Dutch Republic, along with Austria, 
opposed this and fought for the Austrian Archduke Charles to succeed to the throne. 
The conflict was to last until 1714 and the major Allied commanders, the Duke of 
Marlborough and Prince Eugene of Savoy, fought numerous engagement against the 
French forces, with great success, as victories were secured at Blenheim (1704), 
Ramillies (1706) and Oudenarde (1708). Malplaquet was Marlborough’s fourth major 
battle of the war and 190,000 men fought in the action. It was also the bloodiest 
 battle of the war. Historians estimate the total casualties at around 32,000.1 It is 
puzzling then that so little has been written about the battle. Malplaquet is explored 
in most of the books focusing on Marlborough as a general. However, these often 
seem to be cursory examinations and are hardly sufficient for a battle on such a 
scale. One explanation for why Malplaquet has been somewhat downplayed is that it 
arguably represented the nadir of Marlborough’s generalship and, therefore, it has 
                                                     
1 R. Holmes, Marlborough: Britain’s Greatest General, (London, 2009), p.433. 
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not proved a popular topic among historians who wish the preserve his legacy as 
‘Britain’s greatest general’.2  
 
Hilaire Belloc wrote the last major English language work on Malplaquet in 1911. 
Belloc viewed Malplaquet as a stunning success, ‘It is with justice that Malplaquet is 
counted as the fourth of those great successful actions which distinguish the name 
of Marlborough, and it is reckoned with justice the conclusion of the series whose 
three other terms are Blenheim, Ramillies, and Oudenarde.’3 This view appears at 
odds with the losses sustained by the Allies compared to the French, who managed 
to withdraw the bulk of their forces intact. 
 
Even scholarly articles have paid little attention the battle. Ó Hannrachàin’s article 
‘The Battle of Malplaquet’ 11 September 1709’, in spite of the promising title only 
focuses on the Irish contribution to the battle and even this is largely limited to the 
officers who took part and their conduct. Even as purely a study of the Irish 
involvement it appears inadequate, there is no mention, for example, of the combat 
between Irish troops in English and French pay described by Robert Parker.4 The 
article is littered with examples of the heroics of Irish troops, and particular 
attention is made to compare this to the French Guards who fled during the battle. Ó 
                                                     
2C. Barnett, Marlborough, (London, 1974), pp.236-240; I.F. Burton, The Captain-General: The Career of 
John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough, from 1702-1711, (London, 1968), pp.151-161: D. Chandler, 
Marlborough as Military Commander, (London, 2000), pp.252-273; J.R. Jones, Marlborough, 
(Cambridge, 1993), pp.175-184: Holmes, Marlborough, pp.422-434. 
3 H. Belloc, Malplaquet, (London, 1911), p.22. 
4 D. Chandler, The Art of Warfare in the Age of Marlborough, (Staplehurst, 1990), p.120. 
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Hannrachàin also appeared to suggest that the French were on the verge of victory 
but became undone by Boufflers’ fear of being enveloped.5  
 
As a case study for warfare during the period Malplaquet is extremely interesting: it 
had combined arms combat, effective use of artillery, bravery in the face of fire, 
heroic leadership (both Villars and Eugene were wounded), cavalry engagements as 
well as frontal and flank attacks. The campaign also included a major siege in Tournai 
and thus serves as a microcosm of warfare during the period. This thesis will provide 
an in depth look at the operational history of the 1709 campaign, it will explore the 
formulating of plans for the campaign before focusing on the decisions and actions 
the Allied forces took. While looking at this the thesis will analyse Marlborough’s 
conduct during the campaign with particular attention paid to the siege of Tournai 
and the battle of Malplaquet and its subsequent impact.  The thesis will also study 
the experience of battle at Malplaquet for the three major arms that took part: the 
infantry, cavalry and artillery, in order to assess the impact of the decisions made by 
the Allied high command on the common soldier as well as analysing the 
performance of the Allied troops compared to their French counterparts.   
European Warfare 
Prior to focusing on the 1709 campaign in detail it is important to analyse the 
general historiography of European warfare during the period. In The Art of Warfare 
                                                     




in the Age of Marlborough David Chandler stated his belief that eighteenth century 
warfare was a much-neglected period of history.6 He agreed with J.U. Nef’s 
argument that ‘no age is more in need of re-examination than the 100 years which 
began in England with the outbreak in 1642 of the Civil War.’7 He believed that while 
Marlborough, Eugene and De Saxe, have all had their careers analysed extensively it 
is vital to have an understanding of the military background they came from. He 
argued that the era between 1688 and 1792 laid the tactical foundations for the 
succeeding, Napoleonic, period of warfare.8  
 
Chandler’s thesis was that warfare was ‘limited’ in nature due to pragmatic and 
ideological reasons. He stressed that conflicts such as the War of the Spanish 
Succession and the Nine Years War were much less devastating than the Thirty Years 
War and argued that this was due to humanitarian concerns for the well-being of 
solider and civilians. He also believed that the seasonal nature of campaigning, 
crushing logistical difficulties and the difficulty of provoking a field battle meant that 
sieges were preferred. This was aided, he contended, by sieges being predictable, 
economical in casualties and resources as well as offering a tangible bargaining chip 
when it came to making peace.9 Nef argued that warfare became less serious 
between 1640 and 1740 due to a ‘growth of the will to peace amongst western 
                                                     
6 Chandler, The Art of Warfare, p.11. 
7 J.U. Nef, War and Human Progress, (Harvard, 1950), p.147. 
8 Chandler, The Art of Warfare, p.11. 
9 Ibid., p.13. 
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people’. 10 He argued that this had far reaching consequences for civilisation 
including having a positive effect on the growing industrialisation of society.  
 
Hew Strachan’s European Armies and the Conduct of War largely supported this view 
and introduced further economics based reasons for the limited nature of warfare in 
the period. He argued that mercantilism meant that warfare moved to Europe’s 
peripheries and noted that conflict was the single most costly state activity, which in 
turn led to calls for greater representation in the period.11 As a result of the growing 
expense of warfare and the lack of workers in society states were forced to recruit 
from an increasing pool of mercenaries.12 Strachan insisted that the large armies 
operating during the eighteenth century were unwieldy, and supported Maurice De 
Saxe’s view that armies should have a maximum of 34,000 infantry and 12,000 
cavalry. Furthermore, he argued that the use of such large, blunt armies caused 
massive casualties during the era.13 The Battle of Malplaquet witnessed over 
200,000 troops taking the field, far exceeding De Saxe’s ideal, and therefore serves 
as a useful case study in addressing the claim that the large forces on display were 
counter-productive from a command and control point of view. Accordingly this 
thesis will assess how effective Marlborough was at directing his force by looking at 
the experience of the Prince of Orange’s troops on the Allied left wing. 
                                                     
10 J.U. Nef, ‘Limited Warfare and the Progress of European Civilization: 1640-1740, The Review of 
Politics, vol.6, no.3, (1944), pp.275-314, p.312. 
11 H. Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War, (London, 1983), p.10. 
12 Ibid., p.9. 




Chandler chose to review the era mainly by looking at the tactical developments in 
warfare. However, his work appears limited in detail when compared to Nosworthy’s 
study on tactics. The latter argued against the idea that units were simply ‘neutral 
elements, to be governed and manipulated in the upcoming battle purely by the 
orders received on that occasion.’ 14  He believed that this approach, devolving 
warfare into a game of chess, distracts from the minor processes important to 
winning a battle. He instead attempted to study the doctrine of armies and argued 
that, given the technology available, eighteenth-century tactics probably presented 
the optimal solution to the problems faced during battle.15 Chandler wrote in detail 
about one of these doctrinal developments, platoon fire. He argued that it was the 
most effective firing system of the era, and that it went a long way to explaining the 
superior performance of Anglo-Dutch infantry compared to their French 
counterparts.16 David Blackmore’s recent work Destructive and Formidable: British 
Infantry Firepower 1642-1765, extensively charts the development of British fire-
systems. He maintained that the platoon fire employed by British troops had 
advanced from that described by Chandler as part of an ongoing process of 
improvement within the British ranks.17 However, he does agree that the system was 
far superior to that of the French, a view supported by Nosworthy.18 The evolution of 
                                                     
14 B. Nosworthy, The Anatomy of Victory: Battle Tactics 1689-1763, (New York, 1992), p.xiii. 
15 Ibid., p.xv. 
16 Chandler, The Art of Warfare, pp.117-8. 
17 D. Blackmore, Destructive and Formidable: British Infantry Firepower 1642-1745, (London, 2014), 
p.90. 
18 Ibid., p.94; Nosworthy, The Anatomy of Victory, p.344. 
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platoon fire and the extent to which the system played a key role in fire fights 
between Allied and French infantry, or was theoretical and not overly practical amid 
the chaos of battle, is an interesting debate and is addressed in chapter three. The 
extent to which the improvement in the performance of French infantry at 
Malplaquet can be ascribed to the adoption of platoon fire, or whether it was down 
to other factors such as holding an entrenchment, will also be analysed. 
 
Nosworthy and Chandler both ascribed the comparatively poor performance of 
French cavalry during the War of the Spanish Succession (as compared to the Nine 
Year Wars) to a reversion to the ‘German fashion of firing their carbines before 
closing with the enemy’, in contrast with the tradition in England of closing rapidly 
with cold steel.19 The effectiveness of cavalry during the period has been the subject 
of debate amongst historians. Jeremy Black, while accepting that cavalry played a 
major role in some battles, such as Blenheim and Rossbach, argued that cavalry as a 
force was much less useful than it had been in previous eras. He attributed this 
decline to an increase in infantry firepower.20 Blackmore supported this view and 
stated that confidence in their firing system allowed the British infantry to engage 
and defeat French cavalry forces without having to form square, thereby, improving 
tactical flexibility.21 Similarly, Michael Howard used the term ‘elegant anachronism’ 
to describe cavalry as an outdated force.22 Chandler, however, argued that cavalry 
                                                     
19 Chandler, The Art of Warfare, pp.51-53; Nosworthy, The Anatomy of Victory, p.344-5. 
20 J. Black, Warfare in the Eighteenth Century, (London, 2002), p.170. 
21 Blackmore, Destructive and Formidable, p.94. 
22 M. Howard, War in European History, (Oxford, 1976), p.16. 
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remained the force of decision on the battlefield as without a cavalry breakthrough a 
victory could never be truly complete, as a rout would not occur thus allowing a 
defeated force to escape intact.23  
 
Historians, writing about the seventeenth century, have also debated the usefulness 
of cavalry. Parrott argued that cavalry was the decisive arm in warfare post-1632. 
However, he stated that it was most useful when used to get around the flanks of an 
already engaged infantry arm and that any attempt to pair cavalry with infantry for a 
combined arms approach hindered the effectiveness of the more-mobile arm.24 
Parrott was discussing Gustavus Adolphus’ tactics during the Thirty Years war. It 
would appear possible, however, to level the same criticism at Marlborough’s 
consistently utilised tactic of combining infantry and cavalry as a shock force in the 
centre of a battle.25 English cavalry doctrine differed little from the shock tactics of 
Cromwell’s cavalry, which in turn were based on Gustavus’ Swedish model.26 Roberts 
described this as an imperfect solution to cavalry use on a changing battlefield.27 
Malplaquet witnessed a significant cavalry clash at the end of the battle and, 
therefore, it serves as a useful case study for analysing the performance of cavalry 
on a contemporary battlefield, as well as the effectiveness of infantry in combatting 
the threat of encroaching cavalry forces. This will be explored in chapter three. 
                                                     
23 Chandler, The Art of Warfare, p.54. 
24 D.A. Parrott, ‘Strategy and tactics in the ‘Thirty Years War’’ in C.J. Rodger (ed.), The Military 
Revolution: Readings on the Military Transformation in Early Modern Europe, (Oxford, 1995), pp.227-
247, p.236. 
25 Chandler, The Art of Warfare, p.55. 
26 J. Falkner, Marlborough’s War Machine 1702-1711, (Barnsley, 2014), p.107. 




A slightly different framework for reviewing the era is in exploring how decisive 
battle could be in the early-eighteenth century. A decisive battle can be defined as a 
victory that results in rapid and sustainable gains following the action. Parker argued 
against conflict becoming more decisive at the end of seventeenth century and 
instead insisted that ‘wars eternalised themselves’ in spite of seemingly decisive 
battles such as Rocroi, Poltava and Ramillies. He ascribed this to an increase in army 
size, prodigious firepower and new methods of fortification.28   Chandler, however, 
argued that more aggressive commanders could restore decision to the battlefield, 
and cited Marlborough as the prime example.29 Strachan agreed that some 
commanders retained a preference for battle throughout the period, but believed 
that the defensive still held a significant advantage.30 Jeremy Black, in response to 
Parker, argued that battle could be decisive and pointed out that ‘Turin (1706) drove 
the French from Italy, French victories at Almanza (1707) and Brihuega (1710) won 
Spain for the Bourbon dynasty, and Poltava (1709) was followed by the Russian 
conquest of Livonia.’31 Childs stated that warfare was constrained by the 
‘unimaginative and conventional approach of military minds’, seemingly implying 
that a different approach to warfare could result in greater results.32 Perhaps the 
                                                     
28 G. Parker, The Military Revolution, Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800, 
(Cambridge, 1988), p.43. 
29 Chandler, Marlborough as Military Commander, p.141. 
30 Strachan, European Armies, p.11. 
31 J. Black, ‘Britain as a Military Power, 1668-1815’, The Journal of Military History, Vol.64, No.1, 
(2000), pp.159-177, p.167. 
32 J. Childs, The Nine Years War and the British Army 1688-1697: The Operations in the Low Countries, 
(Manchester, 1991), p.326. 
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most convincing treatment of the subject came in Ostwald’s article “The ‘Decisive’ 
Battle of Ramillies, 1706: Prerequisites for Decisiveness in Early Modern War”.33 He 
stated that historiography has not moved on from Churchill’s faith in battles’ 
potential for decision and points out that of Marlborough’s four battles only two can 
really be deemed decisive. He argued this was the case for Blenheim due to the 
nature of the theatre, but in the Spanish Netherlands it was rare for battle to be 
decisive. He asserted that Ramillies was an exception to this. He pointed out that this 
was due to the fortresses gained after the battle being in a state of disrepair and that 
the allies benefited from the poor morale of the Spanish troops defending them.34 
Furthermore he maintained that the advance stalled upon confronting more 
formidable fortresses, therefore, showing that the limitations of the period could 
only rarely be overcome by battle.35 The 1709 campaign and the resultant fighting at 
Malplaquet were not decisive in regards to the war and the reasons behind this will 
be explored in chapters one and two. 
 
Marlborough  
The person of Marlborough has dominated the British scholarship around the War of 
the Spanish Succession. The most expansive biographical treatment of the Duke is 
undoubtedly Winston Churchill’s four-volume Marlborough His Life and Times, 
published between 1933 and 1938. Churchill’s work largely defined scholarship on 
                                                     
33 J. Ostwald, ‘The ‘Decisive’ Battle of Ramillies, 1706: Prerequisites for Decisiveness in Early Modern 
Warfare’, The Journal of Military History, vol 64, no.3, (2000), pp.649-677. 
34 Ibid., p.667. 
35 Ibid., p.677. 
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the subject throughout the twentieth-century. It is a work that is unlikely to be 
matched in terms of detail due to the unprecedented access he received to the 
Blenheim Papers. The historical orthodoxy he created, of Marlborough as a heroic 
figure and inspirational statesman is yet to be fully challenged.36 Many biographies 
of Marlborough have dispensed with studying the man and focused instead upon his 
military campaigns. David Chandler’s Marlborough as Military Commander has 
influenced the orthodoxy surrounding the Duke’s career as a soldier. Chandler’s 
work is certainly expansive, however, he sometimes appears to be far too lenient 
when dealing with Marlborough’s reputation. An example of this is how he 
attempted to portray Marlborough as a battle-seeking general. Chandler implied 
that he was ahead of his time in this respect. However, somewhat contradictorily, in 
his final assessment of Marlborough he stated that his ‘attritional’ strategy in France 
could have worked without the distraction of the Spanish peninsula.37 As Ostwald 
writes, ‘In one page Marlborough is transformed: from a decisive battle-seeker too 
often forced into sieges by his allies, he changes into a conventional strategist who 
recognized the potential for victory through attritional siege warfare.’38  Chandler 
paints a picture of Marlborough as an infallible military commander.39 Correlli 
Barnett’s Marlborough is a very readable analysis of the Duke’s campaigns but 
largely repeats Chandler’s views.40 It must be noted that this consensus within the 
                                                     
36 W. S. Churchill, Marlborough His Life and Time, (4 volumes, London, 1933-1938). 
37 Chandler, Marlborough as Military Commander, pp.323-4. 
38 Ostwald, ‘The ‘Decisive’ Battle of Ramillies, 1706: Prerequisites for Decisiveness in Early Modern 
Warfare’, p.653. 
39 Chandler, Marlborough as Military Commander, pp.325-327. 
40 Barnett, Marlborough, pp.262-264. 
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literature may be due to the inaccessibility of the Blenheim Papers until recently. 
This meant that commentators largely had to draw information from the same 
narrow selection sources or rely upon Churchill’s work for details of the campaigns. 
Undoubtedly this has contributed towards many accounts of his career being 
extremely similar and makes it difficult to challenge embedded historical views of 
Marlborough’s generalship. J.R. Jones, writing in the 1990’s, is one example of a 
historian who relied upon the readily available correspondence of Marlborough. He 
largely subscribed to Chandler’s views but is slightly harsher when it comes to 
analysing the Duke’s battlefield skills. One example of this is how he noted that by 
the time of Malplaquet (1709) the French appear to have worked out Marlborough’s 
battle-plans, a factor contributing to the high casualties during the battle. He argued 
that this resulted in Marlborough adopting a far more conservative operational 
strategy during the 1710 and 1711 campaigns, as he shifted away from his decisive 
battle doctrine.41 Ivor. F Burton’s The Captain-General: The Career of John Churchill, 
Duke of Marlborough from 1702-1711 also presented a more-balanced account of 
the Duke’s conduct during war of Spanish Succession, as opposed to merely 
repeating the views espoused by Churchill and Chandler. However, despite levelling 
more criticism at Marlborough than most, he does conclude that Marlborough was a 
formidable general: ‘the experienced and dedicated professional rather than the 
brilliant amateur’.42 Marlborough’s generalship during the 1709 campaign will be 
explored in chapters one and two, to attempt to understand how effective his 
                                                     
41 Jones, Marlborough, p.183. 
42 Burton, The Captain-General, p.199. 
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operational and tactical manoeuvres during both the campaign and battle were, and 
whether he truly was a battle seeking general or was content with the strategy of 
reducing French fortresses. 
 
An illuminating study of how Marlborough attempted to combat the logistical 
difficulties of early-modern warfare can be found in I.P. Phelan’s article 
“Marlborough as Logistician”. Phelan argued that too often the historiography 
surrounding the subject has placed an emphasis on Marlborough’s tactical and 
strategic skill at the expense of recognising his ability as an organiser and supplier of 
troops. He believed that this is due to the ‘isolation’ of the twentieth century general 
from the discipline of logistics. Recent commentators have, as a result, been more 
inclined to attribute the skills of a modern commander to Marlborough (manoeuvre 
being a prime example), when in reality mastering logistics was vital to any 
successful early-eighteenth century operation, and was an area in which 
Marlborough thrived.43 The piece is an interesting response to the all-to-often 
narrow studies of Marlborough’s campaigns.  
 
A more general, but influential, work on logistics is Martin Van Creveld’s Supplying 
War. In this he explored the magazine system and its effect on warfare throughout 
the period. He praised Marlborough’s march to the Danube, claiming that it was the 
logistical equal of Napoleonic marches. He argued that the reason that such marches 
                                                     
43 I. P. Phelan, ‘Marlborough as Logistician’, Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, vol. 
67, no. 272 (1989), pp.-253-257 vol. 68, no. 273 (1990), pp.36-48. 103-119, p.118. 
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were a comparative rarity was due, ‘not to their impracticability but to their 
ineffectiveness in an age when the state’s main strength consisted in its fortresses’. 
He argued that Europe’s population was sufficiently dense and agriculture was 
sufficiently developed that it was ‘perfectly possible to feed an army as long as it 
kept on the move’44. Due to escalation in army size, during the Thirty Years War, 
forces had become too large to remain in one place. As a result, any siege conducted 
was a race against time, which in turn led to the development of Louvois and Le 
Tellier’s magazine system.45 Finally he argued that while a burden, logistics in the 
eighteenth-century was not the initiative crushing deadweight some would believe. 
Indeed Van Creveld can only cite the French failure in 1705 to besiege Landau as an 
example of a commander blaming logistics for his inability to carry out a plan.46 
Marlborough was clearly an ambitious general with regard to logistics, he was not 
afraid to take risks to achieve results, as the march to the Danube showed. However, 
his Allies were often reluctant to share the same risks and the effect of this on the 
1709 campaign will be explored when looking at the abortive plan to attack the 
Channel coast in chapter one. 
 
 Jamel Ostwald, contributed an essay titled, ‘Marlborough and Siege Warfare’ to the 
historiography.47 Previous studies of Marlborough’s campaigns have often focused 
                                                     
44 M. Van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton, (Cambridge, 1977), p.33. 
45 Ibid., p.39. 
46 Ibid., p.37. 
47 J. Ostwald, ‘Marlborough and Siege Warfare’ in J.B. Hattendorf, A.J Veenendaal, Jr., R. van Hövell 
tot Westerflier (eds.), Marlborough: Soldier and Diplomat, (Rotterdam, 2012), pp.123-142. 
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heavily on his four major battles, therefore, it was enlightening to see attention shift 
towards the Duke’s performance when fighting the predominant form of eighteenth-
century warfare. Ostwald argued that Marlborough was an adept of the ‘vigorous’ 
method of conducting a siege, rather than the ‘efficient’ method espoused by 
engineers such as Vauban. Marlborough was a successful siege commander, but this 
often came at the expense of many lives. Ostwald concluded that Marlborough was 
an average commander during sieges but not a ‘master’ due to his lack of early-
career experience compared to his Dutch counterparts. He was more suited to 
leading the covering army and allowing his more experienced allies to conduct the 
siege.48 Ostwald’s Vauban Under Siege expanded further on the scientific versus 
aggressive approach to siege warfare.49 As will be explored in chapter one, the siege 
of Tournai took up a large part of the 1709 campaigning season and thus the conduct 
of Marlborough, and that of his troops and engineers, will be analysed in order to 
see how effectively he performed when commanding a siege. 
 
The idea that his Dutch counterparts held Marlborough back from fulfilling his 
strategic objectives is a common view held by the Duke’s biographers.50 
Unfortunately, revisionist works are few and far between. Douglas Coombs’ The 
Conduct of the Dutch is essential to the historiography but is more a history of Anglo-
                                                     
48 J. Ostwald, ‘Marlborough and Siege Warfare’, p.143. 
49 J. Ostwald, Vauban Under Siege: Engineering Efficiency and Martial Vigor in the War of Spanish 
Succession, (Leiden, 2007); C. Duffy, The Fortress in the Age of Vauban and Frederick the Great, 1680-
1789, (London, 1985); Fire and Stone: The Science of Fortress Warfare, 1660-1860, (London, 1996). 
50 Chandler, Marlborough as Military Commander, p.322. 
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Dutch political relations during the war and British public opinion, rather than being 
a thorough study of the Dutch contribution to the war effort on a campaign-by-
campaign basis. Coombs’ argued that the British were fickle in their affections, 
‘When its [the Dutch Republic’s] conduct seemed to be in keeping with what was 
required from a good ally it came into favour; when it did not it speedily fell out of 
it.’ This was problematic, Coombs argued, as there was no single British policy on 
fighting the war, the conduct required of a good ally was constantly evolving, ‘at one 
time it would be to participate wholeheartedly on a war waged primarily at sea; at 
another to fight great land-battles’. He pointed out a similar discrepancy in the 
British attitude to peace talks.51 In his article “The Augmentation of 1709: A Study in 
the Workings of the Anglo-Dutch Alliance” Coombs reassessed the attempt to raise 
troops for the 1709 campaign, an episode that he stated had been the victim of ‘ill-
judged attempts to impose upon them the conventional pattern of Dutch 
backwardness, delay and obstruction.’ Furthermore, he called for ‘a wholesale 
reassessment of the history of the alliance’ in response to reputable English 
historians accepting a clearly biased version of events. Unfortunately a revisionist 
view has not been forthcoming in the fifty years since.52 While it is beyond the scope 
of this thesis to provide such a thorough history of the Grand Alliance, Dutch 
pressures certainly influenced Marlborough throughout the campaign and this will 
be analysed to see the impact it had on his conduct. 
                                                     
51 D. Coombs, The Conduct of the Dutch: British Opinion and the Dutch Alliance During the War of the 
Spanish Succession, (The Hague, 1958), p.382. 
52 D.S. Coombs, ‘The Augmentation of 1709: A Study in the Workings of the Anglo-Dutch Alliance’, The 




Popular accounts of Marlborough’s campaigns largely focus on the battles of 
Blenheim and Ramillies. Oudenarde and Malplaquet are somewhat 
underrepresented in this form of history perhaps due to Oudenarde arriving after 
the operational failure in losing Ghent and Bruges, and Malplaquet being very much 
a pyrrhic victory (if it can be termed a victory). Examples of popular accounts include 
Charles Spencer’s underwhelming Blenheim: Battle for Europe, which draws many 
ideas from Churchill’s work. The same can also be said for Hussey’s Marlborough: 
Hero of Blenheim.53 James Falkner has written five books on Marlborough’s 
campaigns, largely coinciding with the three hundred year anniversary of the 
events.54 They are similar to those published by Chandler and provide little in the 
way of new research.  One of his works, Marlborough’s Sieges, does attempt to 
explore a different facet of Marlborough’s generalship, but it falls well short of the 
other studies of siege warfare by Ostwald mentioned earlier.55 These books are 
mainly narratives of events, written for a popular audience, and draw heavily upon 
from the scholarship of Chandler and Churchill. As a result the works suffer from the 
same problems as scholarly historiography: an Anglo-centric view, unsupported 
criticisms of the Dutch war effort, and a view of Marlborough as an infallible 
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commander. This thesis will attempt to challenge some of these orthodoxies in order 
to present a more balanced view of Marlborough as a commander. 
   
The Army  
Studies of the British Army during the period are few and far between and those that 
exist often deal with campaign history. Interest in the subject appears, however, to 
be growing. Blackmore provided an excellent history of the development of British 
infantry tactics throughout the eighteenth century compared to their counterparts in 
other European armies.56 Falkner, breaking away from his campaign-driven 
narratives, has recently produced Marlborough’s War Machine, 1702-1711, in which 
he credits Marlborough for the improved performance of British troops during the 
war.57 He detailed how the army was recruited, fought and was supplied during the 
War of the Spanish Succession, which should hopefully lead to a renewed interest in 
the historiography of the British army and the development of more scholarly 
studies of the subject on a par with Lynn’s, all-encompassing, treatment of the 
French army in Giant of the Grand Siècle.58 Duffy’s The Military Experience in the Age 
of Reason is an engaging short account of the wider characteristics of European 
armies, what set them apart from each other and what they had in common. 
Unfortunately, however, the usefulness of the book does suffer from the breadth of 
the topic and the time-period he covered, with most of his case studies centred on 
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the mid-to-late eighteenth century.59 Scouller’s The Armies of Queen Anne, despite 
being written almost fifty years ago, still stands out as the foremost work on army 
structure and organisation with detailed chapters on governmental control of the 
army, the internal hierarchy, establishments and troop strengths amongst others. 60  
However, Scouller was not able to study the Blenheim Papers and as a result it 
sometimes appears that the model he describes is representative of a theoretical 
ideal of army structure as opposed to what actually occurred during operations.61  
 
John Childs’ series of books on the political and social history of the British army of 
the later Stuarts forms an integral part of the historiography surrounding the 
subject. His work on the army of William III especially stands out, and it is a great 
shame that he has never completed a similar piece on the Marlburian army. 
Nevertheless some of the points argued in The British army of William III, 1689-1702 
can be carried over to British forces during the War of the Spanish Succession. His 
work is far less intensively focused on the organisation and structure of the army 
(although this forms an important part). Instead it looks at the experience of officers 
and men during the period and at areas such as civil-military relations and military 
law.62 Furthermore, it sheds some light upon the political nature of the army and the 
British standing-army debate. It is indeed a valuable work. His later piece, The Nine 
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Years War and the British Army 1688-1697: The operations in the Low Countries at 
first appears to be just a campaign narrative but offers far more than that to the 
historian. Childs effectively dealt with how the army operated in the field and how 
events were influenced by factors beyond campaign strategy.63 It provided an 
excellent example of how to blend political, social and campaign history into one 
insightful package, and this thesis will attempt to do this within the narrow lens of 
the 1709 campaign. 
 
One area that has also been rarely covered is the difficulties the Allies had in 
recruiting soldiers. However, Burton’s article on the supply of troops for the war in 
Spain is far wider in scope than the title suggests. For a start he provided compelling 
estimates for the actual size of battalions in the field. He also showed the level of 
attrition the army had to deal with was somewhat amplified by naval commitments 
and multi-theatre warfare.64 Finally, he proved that some of the charges of 
corruption levelled at early modern officers are slightly exaggerated, in this case he 
argued that the Almanza scandal (1708), where it was discovered that the 
government paid for 29,395 troops of which only 8,660 fought in the battle, was 
more due to an inability to recruit forces for the peninsula and an over-ambitious 
grand strategy than to ‘scandalous conduct’ on the part of recruiting officers.65  
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The historiography surrounding the British Army of the period is  missing a grand-
overarching work taking in aspects such as administration and supply, command, 
recruitment and army composition, civil-military and social relations, as well as its 
doctrine and motivation for fighting. Childs’ series probably comes closest to 
achieving this in the preceding period and Scouller’s work, though dated, is of 
immense value to the historian. Unfortunately, however, nothing has been written 
with the same depth and breadth of Lynn’s Giant of the Grand Siècle a colossal 
modern study of the French army from 1610-1715, which analysed the topics listed 
above commendably.66 Lynn’s The Wars of Louis XIV, is also absolutely vital for 
understanding the War of the Spanish Succession from the French perspective.67 
Older contributions such as Sturgill’s Marshal Villars and the War of the Spanish 
Succession provide much needed biographical insight into Marlborough’s greatest 
enemy.68 Unfortunately, however, in general English language translations of French 
studies on the war are few and far between. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
fully cover all of the elements missing from the literature listed above, however, it 
will analyse the experience of the individual soldier during the battle of Malplaquet, 
framed within the case study of a long and casualty heavy campaign. The thesis will, 
through personal memoirs and letters, attempt to show how decisions made by 
commanders on the strategic and operational level impacted the troops fighting 
during the campaign.  
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The bulk of this thesis lies within the borders of what modern historians would term 
the operational and tactical levels of war. While it may be tempting to categorise 
warfare into strategic, operational and tactical it is important to remember that each 
level influences the others. Tactical reality is a limiting factor in operational art while 
this planning must also be linked with overall strategic war aims.69 To study one or 
even two levels of war without having a firm grasp on the influence of the others 
would result in an incomplete study. To address this issue this section will explore in 
brief the strategic and geopolitical situation of Europe in 1709, outside of the 
Flanders theatre. 
 
Colin S. Gray held the somewhat Clausewitzian view that, ‘Strategy is a bridge 
between military power and political purpose.’70 He believed policy must always 
dominate military power. The extent of this link will vary, but without a political aim 
driving it forward, a strategy will be neither coherent nor workable. It is, therefore, 
essential to analyse whether a divide existed between Britain’s foreign policy and 
her military capacity. Furthermore, it is important to judge whether there was a clear 
strategic aim upon the commencement of the 1709 campaign, or if the conflict in 
Flanders was being extended due to a lack of imagination when pursuing the war in 
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other theatres. Marlborough, apart from the 1704 march to the Danube and a failed 
attack on the Moselle in 1705, fought exclusively in Flanders. Despite this the Duke 
had considerable influence in multiple theatres. The British political parties also 
played a large role in deciding the prevailing strategy with which to conduct the war 
against France. The British political system was a far from a stable place with 
consistent shifts in pre-eminence between the Whigs and the Tories. Indeed, the 
rivalry between the Whigs and the Tories was one of the key reasons why 
Marlborough was stripped of the command of British forces in 1712.71 Both parties 
appear to have been in favour of the war, if for different reasons. Bough argued that 
the Tories were supportive of the war effort due to the perceived danger of France 
gaining exclusive access to the trade of the Spanish Empire combined with the 
increased ability of France to cut British trade links to the Mediterranean. 72 This 
meant that, in spite of their hatred of Williamite continental policy the Tories would 
generally support the conflict, at least until this perceived threat subsided.73 The 
Whigs, on the other hand, saw a war with France as an essential pre-requisite to 
maintaining a ‘balance of power’ as well as ensuring the continuing liberty of Europe 
from the threat of universal monarchy, personified by Louis XIV.74 
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Seeing the war as a primarily commercial conflict, Tory policy throughout appears to 
have subscribed to Corbett’s view of ‘limited war’ whereby the nation would 
primarily use maritime power to fight a continental enemy, operating on the 
peripherals away from the enemy’s main strength, so as to not force the continental 
power to defend itself by mobilising to fight an ‘unlimited’ conflict.75 Certainly Tory 
actions support this. As Lyons argued, throughout the war the party attempted to 
open distant fronts away from the Flanders theatre. As early as 1702 Admiral George 
Rooke made an attempt to capture Cadiz, during the period when the Tory party was 
at the forefront of domestic politics. Furthermore, Lyons maintained that the pursuit 
of this Tory policy pre-1704 enabled Britain to become ‘a member of the first rank of 
European powers, owing to its political assertiveness and increased financial and 
military might’. He did, however, stress that Nottingham’s policy differed from that 
of his counterpart Rochester in that it was balanced and combined naval operations 
with those on land, albeit in Italy, Spain and the Americas as opposed to Flanders. 76 
 
Childs on the other hand, discussing the Nine Years War, is scathing in dealing with 
Tory maritime policy. He argued that the naval option was ‘strategic nonsense in 
terms of winning the war’.77 He viewed maritime strategy as a concession to the 
country gentry to ensure continuing funding for the war in Flanders.78 He further 
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pointed out that after the failure of the 1694 Brest expedition maritime operations 
ceased and this bore ‘considerable fruit’ in the concentration of resources for the 
1695 campaign in Flanders.79 Bough, however, argued that Williamite continental 
policy was a Dutch imposition on British ‘blue-water’ thinking, and that the object of 
the maritime strategy was not to win the war but to achieve a relatively favourable 
outcome and reduce the financial burden of warfare on the landed classes. This 
meant gaining a relatively favourable settlement in Europe while retaining 
acquisitions made overseas. He argued that this was the reason why Britain, 
between 1688 and 1815, emerged from warfare stronger than ever (if with an 
increased national debt) while European powers generally emerged weakened, if not 
in total destitution.80  
 
Chandler was even more hostile to Tory ‘blue-water’ thinking than Childs. He 
distanced Marlborough from ‘blue-water’ thought and maintained that his views 
were a continuation of Williamite policy.81 Furthermore, he blamed the Tory-inspired 
intervention in the Iberian Peninsula for the failure of an attritional strategy in 
Flanders, arguing that Spain acted as a ‘counter-attraction’ negating Allied efforts to 
‘bleed the French white’ in the Spanish Netherlands.82 Lyons pointed out that 
Marlborough realised that a Mediterranean presence was ‘crucial to divert French 
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attention’.83 This suggests that the Duke’s own strategic views were a synthesis of 
Whig and Tory ideas on how the conflict should be fought. Indeed, in his own 
correspondence he at times occupied himself with the Spanish theatre, at one point 
even suggesting that he or Prince Eugene should command there.84 Marlborough’s 
support for maritime efforts can also be shown by his absolute support for the 1707 
combined forces assault on Toulon,85 as well as his pre-occupation, following 
Blenheim, on hiring 8,000 Prussians to serve in North Italy during 1705.86 Chandler’s 
Whiggish interpretation of Marlborough’s generalship appears therefore to be far 
too narrow, and it could even be said that his distancing of Marlborough from events 
in Spain and ‘blue-water’ policy was an attempt to disassociate the Duke from a 
course of action that simply did not work. It appears that Marlborough 
wholeheartedly supported a ‘Double Forward Commitment’, whereby the Army and 
Navy were both fully supported. 87 
 
For the British the Iberian Peninsula was the second most resource-intensive theatre 
of the war.88 Spain had seen notable Allied successes early in the war. 1704 had 
witnessed the British capture Gibraltar, which they held for the remainder of the 
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war. Barcelona and Valencia were taken in 1705. In 1706 the Allies briefly occupied 
Madrid. The Allies faced a major issue in Spain. Philip V was far more popular than 
Charles III. This was shown in 1706 when the people of Madrid organised passive 
resistance, which forced Charles to withdraw from the city. It can be argued that this 
action marked a turning point.89 The retreat from Madrid handed the initiative to the 
Bourbons. A year later at Almanza (25 April 1707) the Allies suffered a decisive 
setback. Lord Galway’s 15,000 man army was heavily defeated by the Duke of 
Berwick’s 25,000 strong Franco-Spanish force.90 In 1708 an attempt was made to 
recover by the Allies when Galway was recalled to Britain and Marlborough’s 
protégé, Stanhope, was given command over British troops in Spain. Stahremberg 
was also brought in to take command of Imperial reinforcements. Unfortunately for 
Stanhope’s operations, there was a notable diminution in the size of the Allied force 
as Marlborough held back 6,000 troops under General Erle for use in a planned 
cross-Channel raid.91 The descent never materialised. In 1708 Stanhope did not 
attempt a significant offensive in Spain. Instead he attacked the lightly defended 
Mediterranean islands of Minorca and Sardinia. He captured both after relatively 
bloodless sieges yet on the mainland the war continued to go poorly for the Allies.92  
The exposed garrisons of the Allies were attacked by Bourbon troops. Tortosa was 
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taken in July followed by Denia in November. Another blow to Allied hopes came 
when the town of Alicante fell in December.93 
 
Spain in 1709 was a strategic cul de sac for the Grand Alliance. Philip V had the 
support of the populace, therefore, any attempt to remove him would have required 
the use of exceptional force. The Allies seem to have realised this during the peace 
talks of 1709. The condition inserted whereby the Allies demanded Louis XIV use 
force to remove Philip V seems to have recognised that he was firmly entrenched in 
Spain and would be difficult to expel. Allied caution appears to have been wise. 
Philip’s forces had been growing in size and quality every year since 1705.94 The logic 
of maintaining a British presence in the theatre is hard to justify. One factor behind a 
continued involvement in Spain is that placing Charles III on the throne was a clear 
British war aim. British politicians were therefore extremely reluctant to abandon 
the theatre as they feared it would encourage French resistance on other fronts.  
 
In spite of all the evidence to the contrary Marlborough appears to have seen 
promise in a 1709 campaign on the Iberian Peninsula. His spies had reported that the 
French had considerably weakened their presence in the theatre in order to 
reinforce Flanders. Thus, it seems he felt that the time was ripe for another Iberian 
offensive. Significantly, however, in the same letter Marlborough stated that only 
Imperial reinforcements should be sent to Spain. He wanted British troops to 
                                                     
93 H. Kamen, Philip V of Spain, The King who Reigned Twice, (London, 2001), p.61. 
94  Lynch, Bourbon Spain 1700-1808, p.31. 
29 
  
concentrate entirely on Flanders.95 This opinion could well have stemmed merely 
from a desire to have his best troops by his side, although it appears more likely that 
Marlborough was expressing his frustrations over the Austrian war efforts.96  
 
In fairness to the Allies it is important to note that fighting a war in Spain was 
something neither the Dutch nor Austrians wanted. Intervention in the theatre was a 
British-driven exercise. They had sought an alliance with Portugal in order to defeat 
the Franco-Spanish via the backdoor while, at the same time, gaining favourable 
trade rights from Pedro II.97 Marlborough’s suggestion to send Imperial troops into 
Spain despite the unpromising strategic position was unlikely to have been an 
attempt at turning the situation around but was rather borne out of a hope that he 
could keep some French troops pinned down. During the early part of 1709 he was 
clearly worried about the scale of French build-up in Flanders and probably believed 
that a trickle of Imperial reinforcements in the area could stop any further French 
troops moving into the Spanish Netherlands.98 Clearly the Duke had decided that the 
war would be won and lost in the Spanish Netherlands. His letter to Sidney 
Godolphin, his major ally in domestic politics, on 31 January stated, ‘if we received 
an affront in this country [Flanders], no success in other parts can make amends for 
it.’99 The 1709 campaign in the Iberian Peninsula was uneventful, Galway attempted 
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an invasion of Estremadura but was defeated on the Portuguese border. Bourbon 
forces, rather than following up on the success of the previous year, avoided any 
aggressive action in order to encourage a peace settlement.100 
 
With the exception of the 1704 campaign very little has been written, by British 
historians at least, on the German theatre of the war. This is most likely due to the 
Marlborough-centric view historians have taken when discussing the war. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting that the German theatre appeared to be but a 
sideshow in British strategic thinking.101 Marlborough had shown in 1704 that it was 
logistically possible to maintain a major force in the area. Furthermore the French 
border along the Rhine and Moselle was considerably weaker defensively than 
Flanders.102 Additionally a significant proportion of Allied troops had been hired from 
German princes and thus it would be relatively easy to concentrate troops in the 
theatre.103 It appears, however, that Marlborough’s experience in the Moselle valley 
during the early part of the 1705 campaign convinced him that Germany was not a 
theatre through which to achieve a breakthrough. During 1705 he had been easily 
countered by Villars’ defensive posture in this theatre, resulting in a stalemate.104 
Marlborough was subsequently forced to withdraw due to a lack of supplies.105 The 
failings of the early part of 1705, combined with Marlborough’s success when 
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switching to Flanders later in the campaign appear to have convinced the Duke that 
the bulk of campaigning should take place along the northern French border. During 
1709 the German theatre was fairly quiet, with an Austrian invasion of Franche-
Comté being defeated in August at Hüningen after crossing the Rhine at Basel.106 
 
Savoy-Piedmont, on France’s southern flank, was a theatre that offered much but 
delivered little. Prior to 1706 the French invasion of Piedmont was a cause of great 
worry to the Allies. Piedmont was strategically significant to Louis XIV. He was 
determined to prevent Milan falling to the Habsburgs. Situated between France and 
Milan, Piedmont was vital to guaranteeing communications throughout the Bourbon 
territories. To secure this link the French attempted to occupy Savoy-Piedmont. This 
was not a merely diversionary campaign, as previous French invasions of the area 
during the Nine Years War had been.107 Consequently, throughout the early years of 
the war, maintaining Savoyard independence was seen as vital in order to prevent 
French hegemony over North Italy. To strengthen Savoy handsome subsidies were 
being consistently paid to Victor Amadeus, the Duke of Savoy.108 The French invasion 
of Savoy in 1703 proved successful. In May 1706, Turin, one of the few remaining 
Savoyard strongholds, was besieged.109 The siege was eventually broken on 7 
September 1706 when an Imperial-Savoyard army led by Victor Amadeus and Prince 
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Eugene defeated the French outside the walls. The battle of Turin was arguably the 
most decisive of the war. Savoy was freed of French influence and no further 
incursions occurred. Furthermore, with Bourbon forces in the area routed, Milan and 
Mantua passed into Habsburg hands soon after.110 
 
Following the battle of Turin British politicians could turn their attention to the 
offensive. This was part of the reason why they had paid such extensive subsidies to 
Victor Amadeus. Since the 1690’s British strategists had believed that a thrust into 
Southern France through Savoy could bring Louis XIV to his knees. They believed that 
any attack would be even more successful if backed by French Protestants in the 
Cévennes.111 The abortive attack on Toulon in 1707 was an attempt at employing a 
strategy of ‘descents’ on the southern coast of France.112 The assault on Toulon was 
ultimately unsuccessful and the Duke of Savoy’s ineffective leadership has often 
been blamed for this. However, one contrary opinion is that Prince Eugene held 
more responsibility for the failure of the attack. Victor Amadeus appeared to have 
been very respectful towards his illustrious relative and largely deferred to his 
judgement on military matters. Eugene was unsure of the operation from the start 
and felt that the troops employed in Toulon would be better employed elsewhere. 
Furthermore, when in front of Toulon he appears to have been unable to 
comprehend the advantage the fleet gave him when dealing with superior French 
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land forces. This culminated in a somewhat humiliating withdrawal by the Allies, 
although the embarrassment was lessened by the scuttling of the French fleet.113  
 
1708 was a more successful year for the Grand Alliance in the Savoyard theatre. 
Victor Amadeus captured Exilles and Fenestrelle and reclaimed the Vaudois valley.114  
For the rest of the war, however, an expedition as extensive and ambitious as the 
assault on Toulon would not be attempted again. In early 1709 Marlborough 
believed that France’s southern front was her weakest. In spite of this, however, his 
correspondence clearly shows that he had little faith in the Duke of Savoy’s desire to 
press his advantage. On 26 January, for example, he wrote ‘we can expect little or no 
assistance from the Duke of Savoy, though H.R.H. could never have a more 
favourable opportunity of doing us very great service while the enemy have drawn 
their greatest strength from all parts this way.’115  Marlborough was correct in this 
assumption as for the remainder of 1709 Victor Amadeus refused to take the field. 
 
Flanders then became the main theatre of the war due to the three major members 
of the Grand Alliance all having an interest in the theatre. The Dutch wanted a 
guarantee of their territorial integrity in response to an aggressive neighbour by the 
restoration of a barrier in the Spanish Netherlands, as well as effective civil rule over 
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the area to facilitate their commercial interests.116 The British wanted to prevent 
French control of Flanders as it brought with it the threat of trade strangulation and 
a potential invasion, an objective linked to continued French support of the Stuart 
claimant to the throne, a position which was untenable to British politicians.117 
Additionally the area had long been under Habsburg control.118 Warfare in Flanders, 
however, had a long tradition of becoming a grinding stalemate. France had won 
numerous victories in the theatre during the Nine Years War without decisively 
winning the conflict.119 Additionally, the Eighty Years War between the Spanish and 
the Dutch rebels had dragged on for generations without a clear outcome. If the 
British aim was to defeat France quickly then Flanders was far from the ideal 
battleground. The theatre was more suitable for waging an early modern form of 
attritional war and the impact of this will be explored within the context of the 1709 
campaign.  
Economic Reality 
It will not be possible, due to the limits of this thesis, to delve into great detail into 
the finances of the Alliance, however, a revealing aspect of British attitudes to the 
war and the strategy they attempted to implement are the economic concerns of 
Marlborough and Godolphin. As early as 6 January 1709 Godolphin was worried 
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about financial matters, ‘But I am much afrayd our supplys will be more backward 
this year, than they were the last. There is only the land tax passed hitherto and the 
money does not come in upon that so fast as it used to doe in former years.’120 
Likewise, Marlborough appeared concerned with how levy money was being spent. 
Levies were subsidies paid by the Allies (mainly Britain and the Dutch) in order for 
largely German princes to contribute troops to the war effort. In his letter to Lord 
Raby, discussing the augmentation of Prussian troops, he stated ‘I was sorry to see 
any mention in that letter of levy-money, since both England and Holland have 
agreed not to allow any such thing.’121 It appears then that Britain was beginning to 
grow tired of financing her Allies’ war efforts. By 1709 they were almost completely 
funding the Austrians, and were providing bread and forage for Imperial troops in 
winter-quarters.122 It appears, however, that Marlborough and Godolphin’s cost-
cutting measures were not entirely successful. The Grand Alliance needed troops 
and Britain would often give into the financial demands of the supplier.123 The 
spiralling costs of the conflict are shown in the funds voted by Parliament at the start 
of each year. General war expenditure in 1701 was £3,313,025 by 1704 this had risen 
to 3,893,630, and in 1706 it was £4,961,837. The consensus is that 1704 and 1706 
represent the epoch of British success during the conflict. However spending 
continued to grow, 1707 was a frustrating year for the Allies yet cost Parliament 
£5,771,776. The 1709 campaign was even more expensive, costing £6,369, 905 and 
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was again relatively unsuccessful. By 1711 war expenditure had reached an 
astonishing £12,663,952.124 Given the increasing cost of the war, and the somewhat 
limited success of its later years it, it would appear that the forces driving British 
strategy had underrated French resilience. This is a mistake they should not have 
made, as during the Nine Years War, France had been able to carry on fighting in 
spite of economic collapse between 1696 and 1698.125 
Primary Sources  
There have been numerous printed editions of Marlborough’s memoirs and by far 
the most wide-ranging of these is George Murray’s, Letters and Dispatches.126  This 
five-volume work collects a vast range of letters from Marlborough’s campaigns, 
from matters of grand-strategy to military miscellany. The sheer versatility of the 
correspondence printed has meant that this is the foremost source of primary letters 
used by twentieth-century historians of Marlborough.  Snyder’s The Marlborough-
Godolphin Correspondence is a three-volume work with a more specific purpose.127 
He focuses on the letters between the two men and Sarah Churchill. This results in a 
very detailed look at how warfare was conducted on a strategic level and the 
developments of domestic politics during the period. The same can be said for Hoff’s 
collection of letters between Marlborough and Heinsius, the Dutch Grand 
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Pensionary. 128 Both works lack day to day tactical and operational detail, but do 
provide an excellent source of information when dealing with matters concerning 
the Allied high command. These collections have proven very useful to this study and 
are widely available, however, they cannot compare in scale to the relatively 
recently opened Blenheim Papers in the British Library, which only become available 
in the 1990’s. This contains information pertinent to all levels of warfare, with details 
on how the army functioned on campaign, letters from Marlborough to his leading 
generals and all correspondence that went through his secretary Cardonnel.129  
 
There are other primary sources from the period. The selection of Lord Orkney’s 
letters printed in The English Historical Review provide firm insights into some of the 
key actions of the war. Not least his letters providing details of the battles of 
Blenheim and Malplaquet are very useful when studying the events and have been 
used extensively. Orkney is understandably a proponent of Marlborough as he would 
have benefited from his patronage, however, he was not averse to criticising his 
commander when he believed that a mistake had been made.130 Other soldiers, 
generally from the higher levels of command, published accounts of the war. David 
Chandler collated a collection consisting of the memoirs Robert Parker and Mėrode-
Westerloo. Parker was a great admirer of Marlborough, which he claimed was not 
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influenced by any form of patronage he received in a possible case of protesting too 
much, while Mėrode-Westerloo offered a unique perspective on proceedings having 
fought for both forces during the period, although his critiques of Marlborough need 
to be treated with caution due to the personal antipathy that appears to have 
existed between them.131 De La Colonie, who commanded a battalion of Bavarians 
alongside the French, produced one of the most useful memoirs of the period. It is 
rich in detail and is often insightful when pointing out the flaws in French battle 
plans. Richard Kane and John Blackadder authored further accounts, although 
Blackadder sometimes appears to have only written his work to express his 
devoutness.132 All of these provide key insights into the conduct of battles during the 
period although the view of the common infantryman is largely missing. The lesser 
ranks are, however, represented with memoirs from Corporal Matthew Bishop, 
Private John Marshall Deane, and Sergeant Millner providing further detail.133 Peter 
Drake’s and Donald McBane’s memoirs are very interesting reads and often 
informative especially when describing combat, but their claims must be looked at 
extremely critically as the works seem to lean towards the dramatic at times.134  One 
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source that has not been extensively cited in this thesis are the memoirs of the Duke 
De Saint-Simon. The memoirs are rich in detail describing the political intrigues of 
the French Court, but being mostly situated in Versailles during the campaign his 
account of events are mostly second hand in nature. Moreover, Saint-Simon’s 
account of Malplaquet is very biased against Villars, against whom he seems to have 
borne a grudge, and he attempts to pin the blame for the defeat on his ‘bad 




As has been made clear in the review of the secondary literature surrounding 
Malplaquet, the battle is in vital need of reassessment, especially when compared to 
the extent that Blenheim and Ramillies have been covered by historians. 
Furthermore, in assessing the historiography it appears that, while much has been 
written on the strategic and operational level of warfare during the era as a whole, 
there has been no real attempt made to explore the experience of individual 
combatants at various levels on the battlefield. John Keegan’s work, The Face of 
Battle has been extremely influential in establishing this as an area of study.136 
Indeed it has been credited with invigorating what has been termed ‘new military 
history’.137 One of the best examples of creating a history taking into account all 
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levels of warfare is Peter Englund’s Poltava.138 This work provides a balance between 
traditional campaign history, as well as a newer ‘face of battle’ model. It is a multi-
faceted study of all aspects surrounding Poltava (1709) and this is a framework that I 
hope to work from, a top to bottom approach to writing history. It is similar to the 
synthesis in historical writing implemented by John Childs, studying the conduct of 
an army when fighting, while at the same time not neglecting analysis of higher level 
events.139 Chapter one will examine the course of events during 1709, the plans, 
sieges and manoeuvres leading up to the battle of Malplaquet. Chapter two will 
provide an analysis of the manoeuvres immediately prior to the battle, before 
providing an overview of the battle itself and its impact, before reviewing the 
remainder of the campaigning season. Chapter three will focus on the experience of 
battle from the perspective of the common soldier. Malplaquet will be looked at 
using Keegan’s ‘face of battle’ model in order to attempt to shift the debate away 
from the ‘great-captain’ historiography that has dominated the era. In dealing with 
the strategic and operational levels of warfare this study will draw heavily on the 
wide range of published sources and first-hand accounts of participants in the 
events. In terms of researching the experience of combat the limited amount of 
sources available on the battle of Malplaquet are simply not enough to give a 
rounded view. To achieve a comprehensive analysis of the conditions experienced on 
the battlefield, this paper will draw upon sources from a variety of actions 
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throughout the age of horse and musket centred as far as possible on those that 




CHAPTER ONE: THE 1709 CAMPAIGN PRE-MALPLAQUET 
Introduction  
This chapter will explore Marlborough’s conduct during the 1709 campaign, which 
began late in the year due to the ongoing peace talks, from the preliminary planning 
stages through to the eve of the battle of Malplaquet. It will begin by analysing 
Marlborough’s preferred plan, which was an attack along the Channel coast. The 
risks and benefits associated with this method of advance will be explored in order 
to evaluate why it was never implemented. The political tensions within the Allied 
high command will also be analysed in order to see what impact this had on forcing 
Marlborough to abandon this plan. The chapter will then go on to discuss the actions 
the Allies eventually decided to take, centred on the siege of Tournai. The 
operational implications of the siege will be examined in order to analyse why the 
decision was made and what the Allies hoped to achieve from investing the town. 
Marlborough’s conduct at the siege of Tournai will be then be explored, in order to 
see if he really was a master of siege warfare as historians, such as Chandler, have 
argued.140 Once Tournai fell the Allies found themselves in the middle of an 
operational crossroads. The chapter will weigh-up the options available to the 
Marlborough, in order to analyse whether the eventual decision to assault Mons was 
the most profitable venture that he could have engaged in or whether he was 
pressured into the venture by his political Allies. Finally the chapter will look at the 
actions Marlborough took in order to avoid Villars’ nearby army in order to reach 
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Mons and will analyse whether this was achieved merely by luck or due to his ability 
to out-manoeuvre enemy forces, as heralded by Chandler.141 
 
Prelude - Domestic Politics & Peace Discussions 1708-9 
The winter of 1708 was one of the coldest ever experienced in Europe and the 
relationship between Queen Anne and Sarah Churchill appears to have grown just as 
frosty. Anne was ‘subjected to almost ceaseless bullying by Sarah’. 142  At the same 
time Marlborough made the first of three requests to be appointed Captain-General 
for life in March 1709, with the intention of protecting his political and military 
position. This was an ill-timed manoeuvre and appears to have significantly impacted 
Marlborough’s relationship with Anne, who had lost her husband in October 1708.143 
Marlborough’s request appears to have been a response to the growing difficulties 
in domestic politics he was experiencing and was an attempt to cement his position 
in the face of Tory opposition.144 
 
After the fall of Harley in 1708 Marlborough had been forced to become ever closer 
to the Whig Junto.145 This further weakened his relationship with Anne, who was 
incensed by Whig demands that she remarry immediately following Prince George’s 
death. Anne refused Marlborough’s request, which was without any precedent in 
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English history.146 Pressure on Marlborough at home had certainly increased by 
1709. The Tories had sought every opportunity to discredit the Duke, making much 
noise in praise of their own Major General Webb’s victory over the French at 
Wynendaele in late 1708.147 Marlborough, then, was in a much more tenuous 
position domestically at the start of the 1709 campaign than he had been during any 
previous year of the war. He could feel the powers of his office, and that of 
Godolphin’s, waning due to their association with the Whigs.148  
 
Marlborough’s difficulties, however, pale in comparison to what was happening in 
France. While the Maritime Powers had sufficient corn reserves to meet the winter 
shortage France was in the throes of famine. Attempts to alleviate the shortage by 
shipping supplies from North Africa were blocked by Allied squadrons operating in 
the Mediterranean. This also meant the French were not able to supply or pay the 
army, prompting a flood of desertions. Mounting a successful defensive campaign in 
1709 seemed unlikely.149 With the ancien regime at its lowest ebb, peace appeared 
to be closer than ever. This scope of thesis is too limited to go into great detail over 
the 1709 peace talks. Mark. A. Thomson’s Louis XIV and the Grand Alliance, 1705-10 
offers reconstruction of events and provides a good insight into why they failed. The 
salient points are that the French ambassador Torcy accepted everything the Allies 
demanded: ‘He yielded much to the Dutch and to the Habsburgs; he eventually 
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relinquished any demands for an establishment for Philip; he met England’s wishes 
about the Protestant succession’.150 The Allies however pushed too far. ‘No peace 
without Spain’ proved to be the undoing of the negotiations. Louis XIV could not 
accept articles four or thirty-seven of the Allied preliminaries which stated that if 
Philip V did not give up Spain within two months then the war would be renewed or 
Louis would have to use French arms to expel him, which he could never agree to as 
he would be making war on his own grandson.151  Louis instead ‘issued a 
proclamation to his subjects stressing the enormity of the Allies’ conditions.’152 
Marlborough and Eugene realised, after the fact, the mistake the negotiators had 
made. They had thought that it would only take a word from Louis for Philip to give 
up his throne, yet the latter had become much more independent than when the 
war began. In spite of this with Louis out of the war conquering Spain would have 
been a much simpler task than otherwise. Yet by pitching their terms too high the 
Allies had dragged the costly multi-theatre war on for another, unnecessary, year.153 
Furthermore, Louis’ proclamation served as a rallying cry for the people producing a 
response, Holmes argued, on par with the support for the 1792-3 Revolutionaries.154 
The failure of the peace negotiations meant that Marlborough had to commence 
campaigning in 1709. 
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Figure 1 A map of Northern France and the Spanish Netherlands showing the positions of the towns of Ypres, 
Tournai and Mons (Source: J. Falkner, Marlborough’s War Machine, 1702-1711, (Barnsley, 2014), p.ix.) 
Planning 
Marlborough’s initial plan for the 1709 campaign appears to have been to take 
advantage of his superior numbers, achieved due to the French need to heavily 
garrison their ‘great towns’, as well as the superiority the Grand Alliance had 
achieved at sea by this point.155 By using this advantage Marlborough wished to 
march towards Ypres and breach the French defences near Dunkirk. This would be 
covered by a feint inland by a considerable force. Once the defences had been 
pierced the army would launch an offensive along the River Somme to Amiens and 
from there towards Paris. The offensive would be supplied by sea.156 As this was 
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going on a detachment of troops would be landed in Picardy, bypassing key 
fortresses in the area. Marlborough hoped that this plan would force Villars into 
giving battle.157 
 
Godolphin was supportive of the plan to march to the Channel coast, indeed it was 
he who appears to have broached the idea.158 He believed that this would alleviate 
the supply problems faced by Marlborough’s force: ‘if you find it practicable to 
march the whole or a part of your army to the sea coast, wee could certainly furnish 
you with bread from time to time for 40,000 or 50,000 men for a month, at very little 
warning[...].’ 159  Godolphin further explained that an assault on the sea coast would, 
if successful, allow Marlborough to march into an area better stocked for forage than 
that surrounding Lille, which had been stripped bare by French forces throughout 
the winter and spring.  
 
Marlborough was clearly worried about his own supply situation at this point of the 
campaign, ‘I am sorry to find that stockes fall, that will incorage France.’ 160 To 
further compound his misery he believed that the French forces were adequately 
provisioned for the coming campaign, having spent the months of peace talks 
restocking their depots. On 20 June he described his thinking to Godolphin: ‘There 
people are in great misery, but by what we hear from Paris, all the monys that thay 
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have wil be imployed for the subsisting of their armies.’ He expanded, ‘And I think it 
is plain by the intrenching of Monsieur de Villars’ arm, that thay will be on the 
defensive, which they would not do, were they not sure of subsistence.’161  
 
This situation would have deeply troubled Marlborough especially considering his 
experience when operating under similar conditions in 1705. During his abortive 
attack through the Moselle valley, an effort to exploit the strategic advantage gained 
after Blenheim by invading France via a less fortified route, Marlborough’s force had 
been effectively stifled by a well-supplied defensively positioned French force led by 
Villars and the failure proved to be his last offensive outside of Flanders.162 
Marlborough clearly did not appreciate being out-thought by Villars and it is highly 
likely that a desire to secure adequate forage to avoid a stalemate would have 
informed the thinking behind his plan. Additionally, Marlborough would have seen 
the secure supply route offered by a march along the sea coast as beneficial for any 
attempt to exploit a victory.  
 
Marlborough desired a battle, but he knew that without proper exploitation a victory 
was worthless. After Blenheim the forces of the Grand Alliance had advanced all of 
the way to the Moselle taking Ulm, Ingolstadt and Bavaria as a whole.163 The 
exploitation after Ramilles had been even more impressive, with the whole of the 
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Spanish Netherlands falling, and the victory at Oudenarde had led to the fall of 
Lille.164 In June 1709, however, Marlborough doubted that similar successes would 
follow a victory if a different plan was chosen, ‘If we be so fortunate as to have an 
occasion of beating them, we could not for want of forage and provisions enter into 
France but by the sea coast […].’165 
 
The plan to march on the Channel coast was certainly bold by the standards of the 
time. On reflection, however, it may have been too ambitious. Essentially, 
Marlborough’s aborted 1709 plan was the same as the one he had proposed prior to 
the siege of Lille the previous year, whereby Major-General Erle, with his 11 
battalions on the Isle of Wight, was to launch a descent against Abbeville in order to 
secure a naval base in France.166  On that occasion his plan had met with unanimous 
resistance from the Dutch Deputies and Prince Eugene, ‘It will be impossible owing 
to the objections of our Allies, to take our joint measures for seconding General 
Erle’s design upon Abbevill till we are masters of Lille’.167 Marlborough had been 
forced to delay the plan until Lille had been taken. However, he still advocated 
adopting it once the matter had been resolved, ‘Now after all this project must 
depend on our success at Lille; and then shall it be thought practicable, and can be 
executed, we must certainly reap a very great advantage by it, by joining them with a 
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good body of troops in the spring and carrying the war into the heart of France.’168 
Eventually Lille took far too long to take to make the plan for a descent practicable. 
Furthermore Webb’s troops had been called into action to defend Ostend from a 
French attempt to cut Allied supply lines and, therefore, resources were no longer 
available to launch such an attack.169  
 
Marlborough’s plan was once again voted against in the council of war in 1709. 
Goslinga, one of the most prominent of the Dutch Deputies, described the second 
council when this took place: 
‘The Duke voted for the siege of Ypres, the Prince [Eugene} for that 
of Tournai. Our people, as well as Count Tilly, ranged ourselves 
with the Prince. The principal reasons which led us to this choice 
were, first, the extreme weakness of the garrision [of Tournai]; 
second the importance of the place; third the convenience and 
security of the convoys; and, fourth, the lay of the land [around 
Tournai], which made the raising of the siege by a battle almost 
impossible; and finally the protection of the Brabant, which we 
could cover while making the siege.’170  
 
Chandler argued that the plan the previous year had been rejected due to appearing 
too unconventional for the Dutch to abide. He also criticised Eugene: ‘For all his 
bright genius, Eugene never fully understood the possible interaction of land and sea 
forces- as the fiasco before Toulon in 1707 had already shown […].’171 The Allies 
showed the same caution in refusing to adopt the 1709 proposal.172 In making this 
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judgement, however, Chandler appears to have been far too dismissive of the 
dangers involved in following such a bold plan. Amphibious operations in the 
eighteenth-century were notoriously difficult. This was due to a lack of experience in 
undertaking such operations, which enhanced the technical problems involved in 
communication between land and naval forces during the era. One of the key issues 
that has been cited as a reason for notable failures in combined operations was the 
difficulty in obtaining accurate intelligence on an intended target.173 This was less of 
an issue for the naval forces. Operations would usually be targeted at areas where 
naval dominance had been achieved. Furthermore, pilots and sailors would have had 
a good knowledge of the coast in their area of operations and, therefore, could 
ensure that any attack took place in a suitable location.174 As Britain had been at war 
with the French on-and-off for twenty years by 1709 it is highly probable that the 
area around Abbeville would have been sufficiently scouted by the Royal Navy and 
thus would have been a suitable area for Marlborough’s proposed landing.175 
However, sailing along a coast is very different from knowing the conditions inland. 
For the Army, which would have had to conduct the landing, the lack of intelligence 
was a severe disadvantage. Sources of information, such as prisoners of war, were 
unreliable and the forces would often be committed without a good idea of the 
layout of the ground they were attacking. Furthermore, once the army had landed, it 
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would have to attempt to take a fortified town to act as a base from which it could 
be reinforced and to harass the surrounding countryside. If the element of surprise 
failed an amphibious force could find itself outgunned once it moved out from under 
the effective range of naval firepower, due to the logistical difficulties of unloading 
artillery.. Taking even a minor fortified point could, therefore, be a major task.176  
 
In addition, as McLay has pointed out, the campaign would have to be led by the 
right man, ‘the leaders of combined operations had from the outset to establish and 
maintain a cohesive joint operational momentum of the land and sea forces. 
Moreover, it was rare for these commanders to be afforded a unitary command 
structure […] it was customary for them to have to accommodate a Council of War of 
diverse opinions.’177 The long list of failures during the period points to how difficult 
a task this was, with the seven successful descents of the Nine Years War and the 
War of Spanish Succession generally being in relatively weak areas such as 
Mediterranean Islands or Ireland, with perhaps Gibraltar (1704) an exception, and 
the eight failures included two directed at France: Brest (1694) and Toulon (1707).178 
Marlborough himself may have been able to achieve a successful amphibious 
operation, as he had in Ireland in 1690.179 However, there was no guarantee that his 
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deputies would have been able to match this and indeed it had proven beyond even 
Eugene at Toulon.180  
 
Clearly then, a descent on Abbeville would have been operationally difficult, but it 
appeared to have also presented a major personal risk in the event of failure. 
Marlborough and Godolphin’s positions at home in 1709 were weakening and, as 
had been stated, Marlborough’s influence on the Queen was waning. In this 
environment one major embarrassment could have had a major negative effect on 
his position as the leader of British and Allied forces in Flanders. Given the risks and 
history of failure of combined operations, especially at Toulon only two years before, 
it would have been very risky for Marlborough to put his reputation at stake for a 
descent on Abbeville. 
 
Alternatively, an assault on Ypres could still have been made without attempting a 
descent on Picardy and a subsequent attempt to link up with this force via a march 
along the coast. Burton has pointed out that this was still Marlborough’s preference, 
as is evident from Goslinga’s description of the council of war. However, he argued 
that this was now not due to wishing to use Ypres as a base for a further campaign 
along the coast. He believed that this strategy would require a preliminary battle to 
defeat the French field army or at least drive it from the strong position that it had 
occupied around La Bassée and along the length of the Scarpe. Given the late start to 
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the campaign, he argued that any plans for such a preliminary battle had been 
abandoned in favour of a siege strategy. 181  
 
Godolphin encouraged Marlborough to pursue decisive operations, ‘if your army bee 
superior to the French in number as well as quality, which I hope they will bee, 
because they must needs be obliged to leave great garrison in their great towns, I 
should hope, in that case, you would avoid as much as possible not to amuse 
yourselves in any siege, but either march into France, or at least send a good 
detachment towards to sea coast […].’182 Godolphin evidently wished for a rapid, 
dramatic campaign that would bring France to its knees and, therefore, force Louis 
XIV to accept a disadvantageous peace at the next round of negotiations. However, 
Godolphin, while he had a good grasp of strategy, was not an operational general. 
He was well informed but he was not present on the ground. An advance into France 
would have been very difficult to achieve, as garrisons operating out of Tournai and 
Ypres would have played havoc with the long supply lines that the Allies would have 
been forced to utilise. Offering continual supply from across the Channel could have 
worked in theory but such an enterprise would have been at the mercy of the wind 
and the strong French-backed privateering element still operating out of Dunkirk. 
Such an advance would have also been reliant on achieving a significant victory over 
the French field army. Marlborough had secured victories over the French at 
Blenheim, Ramilles and Oudenarde, but a further victory was by no means certain. 
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Godolphin’s thoughts also appear to have neglected one of the key factors in early-
modern warfare. It was almost impossible to bring an enemy to battle if they did not 
wish to fight, as shown during the 1705 campaign in the Moselle and Marlborough’s 
incredibly frustrating 1707 campaign during which, as the French official history put 
it, ‘without a major action and without the spilling of blood, M. le Duc de Vendôme 
succeeded in disconcerting the vast projects of the enemy, and also in fulfilling all 
the objects that the King prescribed for him […].’183. Despite Villars’ constant 
requests, Louis XIV was by 1709 very risk averse and would not countenance battle. 
The chances of Marlborough being able to induce the French to battle were also 
lessened by the strength of the position that Villars had taken up. The French had 
constructed a great line of strong defences running from the fortress of St. Venant, 
thirty miles from the Channel, to Douai on the Scarpe.184 Godolphin may also have 
had another reason for proposing this plan, as his own position in government was 
under severe threat, it is possible that he was encouraging Marlborough to pursue a 
decisive battle due to his own desperation, as he may have viewed a quick victory as 
the only way that he could keep his grip on power. 185 
 
The strength of the French defences meant that a frontal attack against the line was 
impractical. Throughout his career Marlborough never attacked an enemy in such a 
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position, as the campaigns of 1705 with the refusal to assault Villars’ position on the 
Moselle, and 1711 when confronted with the Ne Plus Ultra Lines show.186 
Marlborough expressed his frustration to Godolphin on 20 June 1709, partly blaming 
the weather for making it impossible for him to attack Villars’ force before the lines 
had been completed, ‘We have rain every day, which gives us the spleen, and is of 
great advantage to the Marishal de Villars, since it gives him time to finish lin[e]s, 
which he is working at the head of his army.’187 A few days later it was clear that 
Marlborough had given up hope of achieving success through a frontal attack due to 
the strength of the entrenchments.188 The only practicable option was to attempt to 
turn the flanks of the French position. The fortress of Tournai protected the inland 
flank and Ypres covered the Channel side. One of these positions would have to be 
taken. Of the two targets Ypres appears to have presented the more valuable long-
term strategic target for Britain given her long-standing commercial and military 
interests on the Channel coast. 
 
The Dutch reasons for being opposed to the siege of Ypres and instead following 
Eugene’s idea of attacking Tournai seem to have been due to the anticipation of 
further peace talks. Ypres could have been used by the Allies as a base to attack 
Dunkirk and thus oust the privateers who operated in the port. The Dunkirk 
privateers were certainly a nuisance to both Dutch and British shipping in the 
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Channel. However, for the Dutch, who it should be remembered had fought three 
naval wars with the English in the previous century, the thought of Britain 
maintaining a base in Dunkirk as a permanent possession, as they had between 1658 
and 1662, was perhaps a greater threat.189  Goslinga stated, ‘I believe, however, that 
his principal motive [for besieging Ypres] was to get nearer the sea, and once Ypres 
was taken to begin another siege on the coast, preferably that of Dunkerk, in order 
to put it in the hands of England […].’190 The barrier being proposed by the Dutch 
was not only a defensive measure against further French aggression, it was also an 
attempt to create a commercial hegemony over the Spanish Netherlands. The British 
feared this would end free trade in the area and either wished for a continued 
French presence in the port, albeit with its fortifications destroyed, or the 
establishment of an English outpost. The worst case scenario for the British was 
Dunkirk and Ostend being added to the Dutch barrier.191 It is understandable then 
and perhaps a wise decision to avoid a potential fracturing of the Grand Alliance for 
the Dutch to have sided with Eugene’s plan of moving inland to attack Tournai. 
 
Attacking Tournai rather than Ypres, however, appears to have been an operational 
mistake by the Grand Alliance. Ypres was acknowledged as a weak point by the 
French, and presented a much softer target. As Chandler pointed out, ‘Tournai, 
although isolated and undermanned, was a very strong and reasonably-supplied 
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fortress of modern design.’  Furthermore it had a garrison of 7,000 men commanded 
by the competent Marquis de Surville-Hautfois.192 Marlborough, however, appears 
to have been confident of an easy victory at Tournai. Writing to Galway on 4 July 
1709 he described how he caught the French by surprise by marching on Tournai, a 
manoeuvre that will be discussed in detail later, and as a result: ‘This [the 
investment] they so little expected that there are but twelve weak battalions and a 
regiment of dragoons in garrison, which is not thought sufficient to make a vigorous 
defence both of town and citadel, so that we flatter ourselves, though the place is 
very strong in of itself, of an easy conquest.’193 In contrast, the French appeared to 
have been confident that Tournai would hold out for an extended period of time. 
The court at Versailles believed that the siege would take so long that the allies 
would be unable to exploit any potential victory prior to the winter. Louis wrote to 
Villars on 2 July 1709: ‘We count for much that by your wise dispositions and the 
precautions that you have taken, all the vast project of the enemy has been reduced 
to the single enterprise of the siege of Tournai […].’194  
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Figure 2 Map showing Villars' defensive line linking St Venant to Douai and Marlborough’s investments of Tournai 
and Mons. (Source: D. Chandler, Marlborough as Military Commander, (London, 2000), p.249.) 
The Siege of Tournai  
The decision to assault Tournai was made on 24 June 1709. Marlborough had 
travelled to Lille on 16 June 1709 and had ordered his field army to make for the city 
in order to assemble on the plains outside. Positioned at Lille the Allies could have 
still attacked in either direction, therefore, Villars would have remained unaware of 
the decision that had been reached. At this point Marlborough was clearly worried 
about how he would sustain his army now that shipping supplies from the Channel 
coast was not an option: ‘to form the army as soon as possible on the plains of that 
place [Lille], from whence we have a dismal account of the scarcity of the forage on 
the ground, besides that the French ravage and destroy the little there is before 
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them to distress us the more when we approach them.’195 The slow moving siege 
train was missing from this muster. Marlborough had previously ordered his siege 
train to advance to Menin. Only ten miles separate Menin from Ypres, whereas it is 
around thirty miles to Tournai. Marlborough stated in his correspondence, shortly 
after the fact, that this was an intentional ruse in order to encourage Villars to 
reinforce his garrison at Ypres at the expense of Tournai: ‘The bringing of our 
battering canon to Menin has had the success we wished, for the French toke it for 
granted that we intended the siege of Yprers, and accordingly put 16 battalions in 
that place, and drew to their army ten battalions from Tournay.’196 This scenario is 
not implausible as Marlborough was not averse to attempting to trick his opponents 
by clever manoeuvring, however, it may also be the case that he had ordered his 
siege train to Menin in order to facilitate the siege of Ypres that he had desired.197 
 
Whatever the reason for moving the siege train to Menin it is clear that the Allies 
benefited from reduction of the Tournai garrison. This move by Villars had the effect 
of reducing the garrison to 7,000 men, which was some thousands fewer than would 
be required to mount a full defence of the town.198 In comparison to two of the 
other sieges conducted by the Allies during the latter years of the war this was 
indeed a less than formidable garrison. During the protracted 108 day siege of Lille, 
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which had taken place in the previous year, the French garrison led by Boufflers had 
numbered 16,000 men,199 while when besieging Bouchain in 1711 the Allies faced 
5,000 men in a much more compact fortress than Tournai, with the added difficulty 
of having a vast French field army in close proximity.200  
 
The reduction of the garrison should have aided the Allies in the ensuing siege. As 
well as moving the siege train to Menin further manoeuvres by the Allied field army 
appear to have been designed to keep Villars unaware of its true intentions. On 24 
June the Allied force advanced from Lille with six days rations toward the Lines of La 
Basseé. Villars evidently believed either that he would face a frontal attack, or more 
likely believed that the Allies would attempt to turn his left flank. His subsequent 
manoeuvres appear to support this. The troops taken from Tournai were relocated 
to his field army and the fortresses of Saint-Venant and Aire on the Channel coast 
and he personally led 500 men to Béthune, also positioned on his left flank.201 
 
On the night of the 26 June events came to a head. In order to cover his true 
intentions, and to prevent Villars from potentially intersecting his line of march, 
Marlborough ordered Orkney to: 
‘march wth. a strong detachment and make a motion towards 
Douay ; which occasioned Monsr. Villars to look about him, he 
knowing that our bores had just before been cutting roads for our 
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armys marching. Soe that he could think no less but we ware 
coming to attack them there and at that time.’ 202   
 
It was at this point that Villars strengthened his line and reinforced the flanks to 
avoid the Allies from turning his position. However, Orkney’s movement was a feint 
and the rest of Marlborough’s force advanced to Tournai. As Deane wrote: 
 ‘June the 15th [26 June N.S.] at taptoo time we ware ordered to 
strike our tents the which being done the whole army marcht all 
that night; but they that lay on the left so near Tournay [within a 
league] soon accomplished our Genlls. Designe [General’s design], 
and the army marching from the left they soon invested it; and the 
rest of the army on the right marching 5 hours before they came to 
there ground[…].’203  
 
Marlborough was clearly pleased by the success of his manoeuvring: ‘we have 
resolved on the siege of Tournay, and accordingly marched last night, and have 
invested it when thay expected our going to another place, [so] that thay have not 
half the troops in the town thay should have to defend themselves well[...].’204  
 
The manoeuvre had indeed been a success. Villars had begun reforming his army at 
La Gorgue intending to cover a siege of Ypres while the Allied forces had been able 
to advance unimpeded to Tournai,205  he thus appears to have been caught out, but, 
it would seem that he was not too downhearted by the Allied success. It would have 
been extremely difficult for him to have guessed in which direction the Allies would 
strike and in his opinion the siege of Tournai, which he felt could hold out until 
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October, was preferable to having to defend Ypres. His view was that he had 
defended his weaker flank effectively and forced the Allies into a long arduous siege 
that would take up much of the rest of the campaigning season.206 
 
The Allies decided that sixty battalions of foot, seven of whom were British, and 60 
squadrons of horses should undertake the siege, out of a total force of 152 
battalions and 245 squadrons.207 The besieging army started to dig trenches before 
Tournai on 30 June.208 Marlborough had left his heavy artillery in Menin in order to 
move swiftly on Tournai. However, this was not particularly novel by standards of 
the time as armies often invested towns before waiting for the siege train. By 1 July 
1709 the artillery was being shipped up the Scheldt to Tournai.209 
 
The town of Tournai eventually surrendered on 29 July 1709. Marlborough was by 
this point clearly frustrated by the amount of time being taken up by the siege in an 
already short campaign, and hoped the citadel would follow soon. This is evident 
from his letter to the Queen of the same date: 
‘The governor of Tournay having yesterday in the evening hung out 
a white flag and desired to capitulate for the town, hostages were 
thereupon exchanged on both sides; but it being very late before 
those from the town arrived at our quarters we deferred entering 
upon the treaty for the surrender till this morning. We are now 
going to assemble in order to settle the articles; in the mean time I 
thought it my duty to lose no time in acquainting Y.M.[Your 
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Majesty] with this good news by express, and hope it may not be 
long before it is followed by that of the surrender of the citadel.’210  
 
Marlborough’s desperation to end the siege quickly was understandable. Valuable 
months of campaigning had been lost due to the hard winter and the protracted 
peace talks in the spring. Additionally, the difficult winter also meant that the 
magazines were running low of supplies. Marlborough recognised this fairly early on 
in the campaign, as he wrote to Godolphin on 24 June, ‘It is not to be imagined the 
missery the poor country people are in, and as all the wheat is killed everywhere that 
we have yett seen or hear of, I know not how we shall be able to keep the field in the 
month of October.’211 Marlborough had a very short campaigning season in which to 
attempt to achieve decisive results. 
 
The siege of the town itself had not taken long. The artillery train of 180 cannon and 
50 mortars were placed in batteries and began the bombardment on 13 July, while 
sorties from the garrison were beaten off on both the 20 July and 21 July.212 Allied 
attacks would have been consistently launched once the bombardment had begun. 
Marlborough was notably impatient when it came to siege operations, relying on 
vigour and fire-power as opposed to the highly technical art of operation that 
Vauban had espoused. Marlborough valued speed although these rapid assaults 
often proved more expensive in terms of casualties.213 On the night of the 26 June a 
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breakthrough was achieved as Marlborough’s three prongs launched themselves at 
the defences of the town. Deane described the ensuing action, ‘On the 15th [26 July 
N.S.]at dusk in the evening our bombardeers and cannoneers and cohorns [small-
handheld mortars] and hand granades was workt to a miracle, and fiercer fighting 
was never heard since that sort of musick was invented, & abundance of men was 
killed on both sides espetially of the enemy who manfully stood itt.’ 214 Deane goes 
on to explain that the Allied troops were beaten off three times before successfully 
taking the sluice. Further successes followed during the next evening with Allied 
troops taking a hornwork and counterscarp. 215 With his position weakened, and the 
possibility of a general storm of the town to come, the garrison commander offered 
terms and a capitulation was agreed.   
 
The surrender of the town, however, proved to be a false dawn for Marlborough’s 
hopes of a quick resolution to the siege. The Marquis de Surville-Hautfois’ defence of 
the town had been little more than a token effort. He recognised that he did not 
have enough troops to mount a meaningful defence and was content to withdraw 
his troops into the more compact citadel.216 The citadel at Tournai was very modern 
and Surville had retreated with an intact force of 5,000 men, into a place described 
by Deane as: ‘an invincible strong place for mines.’217 Furthermore, the advantage 
Marlborough had been able to gain by attacking three separate, widely spaced, areas 
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of the town required greater numbers in order to achieve local superiority and 
spread the French garrison thinly. With the smaller perimeter of the citadel the 
French would have found it far easier to rush troops to endangered sectors, negating 
any advantage that the superior numbers of the besieging army would have given. 
 
Soon after the surrender of the town, Marlborough moved his camp to Orchies, 
situated three hours march away from Tournai, leaving the command of the siege in 
the hands of his Dutch engineers.218 It appears that this was done in order to make it 
easier to provision his forces and also to secure a stronger defensive position, with 
his right flank anchored on Pont à Marque and his left on Rumegies. Clearly he felt a 
detachment of troops under his command that had previously been part of the 
besieging army would be better utilised aiding Prince Eugene’s covering army. By 
moving his camp to Orchies it is evident Marlborough felt that his time would be 
better spent away from the day-to-day minutiae of the siege to instead focus on a 
more operational role, keeping an eye on Villars’ manoeuvres, protecting the 
trenches of the besieging army, and ensuring a steady supply of forage to his men.219 
This appears to have been a fairly sensible move. Marlborough’s intelligence 
network was effective and he was very much aware of Villars’ movements, as his 
letter to Boyle on 8 August 1709 demonstrates: ‘The Maréchal de Villars has been in 
continual motion since we made this march [to Orchies]. He has recalled the 
Chevalier de Luxemboug with the corps he commanded between Valenciennes and 
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Mons: he is likewise fortifying the passage of the Scarpe, and had his quarters last 
night at Wazieres near Douay.’220 Given Marlborough’s efforts the previous year in 
successfully defending the Allied trenches at Lille from no fewer than three French 
armies, and his efforts at Bouchain in 1711 in doing the same against a field army of 
110,000 men, the manoeuvring required to prevent a covering army from interfering 
with the siege was a facet of warfare in which he was adept.221 It is, therefore, 
understandable that he would choose to leave the vicinity of the siege to take up this 
role. Additionally, it was very rare in early-modern warfare for a town to withstand a 
siege. Therefore, it is understandable that Marlborough would have felt the 
continuing assault on the citadel did not warrant his personal attention. Yet in 
moving his camp he did surrender effective control of proceedings, which was to 
create difficulties.222  
 
As early as 5 August, only a few days after the fall of the town, negotiations for the 
surrender of the citadel were in progress. Surville offered to observe a ceasefire until 
5 September and then give up the citadel, unless it had been relieved before that 
period. Marlborough was agreeable to this proposal and allowed a messenger to 
pass through the lines to seek validation for the agreement from Versailles.223 Villars, 
however, believed that it would be preferable to force the Allies to expend 
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ammunition and lives on taking Tournai and advised Louis not to consent to the 
ceasefire. Louis in turn offered a counter-proposal that a full ceasefire on the 
Flanders front would be observed during the period.224 Marlborough wrote, ‘I came 
hither this morning with the Prince of Savoy to expect the result of the project I sent 
you by the last post for the surrender of the citadel. The gentleman […] brought us 
another proposal for a cessation of arms as well between the armies as the citadel to 
the 5 September, when it should be delivered up [...].’ Marlborough, however, 
clearly believed that this was a step too far, ‘We told him we had no authority to 
make any such treaty, and thereupon sent him back to the citadel, and shall carry on 
our attacks with all possible vigour, in hopes of being masters of it at least within the 
time it was to have surrendered.’225  
 
French counter-mining was a source of particular frustration to the Allies throughout 
the siege of the citadel. Mention of this however, is notably played down in 
Marlborough’s own correspondence, further strengthening the view that he was 
leading the siege operations in name only and was delegating much of the 
responsibility to his Dutch engineers such as Des Rocques and Du Mée.226 One of 
Marlborough’s letters in which French mining operations were explicitly mentioned 
paid far more attention to a successful discovery of a French mine rather than the 
damage done when another was exploded: 
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 ‘We continue to push on the siege with all the caution that may 
be. Yesterday a new battery of fifteen mortars began to fire at M. 
Schuylembourg’s attack. Our miners had the good fortune the day 
before to discover a mine under this battery, out of which they 
took eighteen barrels of powder, the enemy deffering to spring it 
till we should begin to fire. On Tuesday they sprung a mine which 
did us some damage.’227  
 
John Wilson’s diary provides a graphic account of the difficulties encountered by the 
engineers and infantry in this subterranean war,  
‘for in my opinion, of all the horrid schems of war, this of bringing 
of mines and sapping to finde out was the most dreadfull, for it was 
with great reluctancie that even the boldest men in the Army then 
on this service have turned their backs and given way. Nay even 
those who had seen death in all its shapes above ground was struck 
w’th horror to stand (as he supposed) on top of a mine in danger of 
being blown up every minute. And those who went under ground 
into the sapps had a co-equall reluctancie, if not more, they being 
in danger every minute either of being suffocate or buried in the 
rubbish in the like nature.’228  
 
In one letter, however, Marlborough expressed dismay at the effect the French 
mining was having on his troops’ morale, yet he again played down the physical 
damage done, ‘We are obliged to carry on our attack with great caution, to preserve 
our men from the enemy’s mines, of which they have already sprung several with 
little effect.’ The Allied troops were struggling to deal with the innovative measures 
employed by the French engineers underground, ‘Our miners have discovered one of 
their galleries at each attack, but dare not advance to make the proper use of this 
discovery because of the enemy’s continual fire of small shot under ground.’ The 
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Allies responded by rolling bombs into the tunnels to dislodge the small artillery 
pieces. However the difficulties continued. 229 As a further measure the French 
would sometimes fight over a mine that had been discovered before withdrawing to 
detonate a deeper mine in the midst of the seemingly victorious Allied troops.230 
 
Given the nature of the fighting the engineers suffered considerable casualties 
during the siege of Tournai. In early-modern sieges this was certainly not 
uncommon. Specialist sappers were relatively few in number and would be dressed 
distinctively. They would often wear armour on their head and shoulders to protect 
themselves from sniper fire from the fortress, which contrasted with the 
unarmoured infantry who wore the tricorne or grenadier hat. This had the effect of 
making the engineers a target to be picked out by enemy troops.231 At Tournai, 
however, the danger to sappers was increased due to the frustrations of many 
infantry officers at the success of French counter-mining, which was then vented on 
the engineers, often in the form of physical violence.232 The frustrations appear to 
have been, somewhat, warranted and Schulemberg was particularly scathing in his 
criticism of the performance of both the engineers and lower-ranking sappers on the 
ground, ‘Mr. Du Mee has few engineers and what is worse not one of them is good, 
the miners cause me more trouble than I can possibly say, the sappers make so 
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many mistakes that I must personally go check everything they do, which requires 
me to be in the trenches all day long.’233  
 
John Blackadder also complained about the slow nature of the siege, ‘The progress 
of the besiegers was much retarded by being obliged to adopt the slow and 
laborious method of sapping; the enemy having wrought all the ground into mines, 
which rendered it unsafe to approach from the hazard of explosion.’ He went on to 
express the difficulties faced by the troops and the scale of damage that fighting 
underground inflicted on the Allied force, which is somewhat downplayed in 
Marlborough’s correspondence::  
‘In counter-mining, it frequently happened that adverse parties 
met and fought with their shovels, spades and pick-axes. In these 
subterraneous attacks the besiegers had to contend with new and 
appalling dangers. They were sometimes crushed by the falling in 
of the earth, or destroyed by the springing of the mine […]. Above 
400 were killed in a single explosion.’234  
 
With this type of fighting and scale of casualties it is unsurprising that the engineers 
quickly became scapegoats. The subterranean fighting carried on throughout the 
period that Tournai was under siege and the French continued to have the upper 
hand. Even as late as 29 August, just five days before the garrison surrendered, the 
Allies were still suffering considerable casualties from the mining.235  
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In order to encourage the troops in the face of such fighting Marlborough regularly 
travelled from his camp at Orchies in order to inspect the besieging force. He 
conducted a five-day tour of the besieging troops between 14 and 19 August in order 
to strengthen the resolve of his men.236 However, In the face of such stubborn 
resistance and effective counter-mining the siege dragged on. In his letter to Boyle of 
19 August Marlborough was despairing of success, ‘I am returned this evening from 
Tournay in order to begin the review of the army to-morrow, and am sorry to tell 
you that as the siege goes on, I dare not give any guess when we may be masters of 
the citadel.’237  
 
Marlborough may have been in a stronger position to give an estimate of how long 
the siege would take had he been more direct in the conducting of siege operations, 
rather than leaving it to his deputies. It is clear that the Duke was uncomfortable 
commanding the day-to-day process of conducting a siege, and his move from 
Tournai to Orchies once the town had been taken shows this. Marlborough’s 
apprenticeship prior to the War of the Spanish Succession, mainly served in Ireland, 
did not prepare him well for the sophisticated fortress belt that Vauban had erected 
in Flanders. This was also true for his most trusted, mainly English advisors, such as 
Cadogan. The English engineer establishment was only created in 1696, and was 
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staffed mainly by Huguenot exiles, who were placed with the artillery rather than in 
a single administrative unit.238  
 
The view expressed here that Marlborough was not proficient in conducting the 
actual siege operations does run contrary to the myth that the Duke was a master of 
all aspects of warfare, which was espoused by Parker, one of Marlborough’s 
subordinates, and reasserted by Chandler.239 During the siege of Tournai 
Marlborough certainly underestimated the time that it would take to take the 
fortress, which had an impact on the time he had left in the campaigning season to 
exploit the victory. However, the fact that he recognised that subordinates where 
more accomplished than him in this particular facet of warfare does show that he 
was a leader who could acknowledge his own shortcomings as a commander and 
take measures to negate the impact of these.  
 
It is important to note, however, that moving his camp to Orchies and delegating to 
his subordinate and often more experience Dutch colleagues, should not 
disassociate Marlborough from some of the notable failures that took place during 
the siege operation. The example mentioned earlier of infantry officers assaulting 
engineers is a situation that should have been dealt with promptly but he does not 
appear to have been done so. This is a criticism of Marlborough’s proficiency at siege 
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warfare, the officers and engineers under his command struggled to work together 
as a cohesive unit. Schulemberg’s despair at the performance of his sappers is hardly 
an isolated incident from the period. Marlborough himself criticised his own sappers 
during the sieges that followed the victory at Ramilles in 1706 and at the siege of 
Lille in 1708. This was thus an ongoing problem that the Duke does not appear to 
have made any meaningful attempt to fix.240   
 
Furthermore, Marlborough should have made sure that the infantry officers listened 
to the advice of artillery officers rather than ignored them and thus they wasted 
powder and shot by firing at unsuitable targets. This was made clear in a letter from 
Goslinga to Heinsius which, while not openly critical of the Duke, does reflect on his 
inability to ensure effective cooperation between the infantry and artillery even 
after almost ten years of continuous siege warfare: 
‘The good of the service demands that we appoint a general of 
artillery; subordination is not very great in this corps, but it is above 
all necessary in order to prevent further squandering of our 
munitions; we have preached this need over and over to the 
[infantry] generals, and they follow it as long as we are there, but 
once we leave, things return to how they were before. Each 
general, low-ranking or high, competent or ignorant, acts as if they 
were generals of artillery. If the colonel [of artillery] or his 
subalterns don’t obey them, the generals quarrel and accuse them 
of sparing ammunition at the expense of the lives of soldiers; they 
even say such things in the troops’ presence, which can only have a 
very bad effect on their morale. These reasons will convince you, as 
they have me, that we must fill the vacancy [...].’241 
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 As Albermarle noted during the siege, ‘order and good conduct are lacking’, and 
Marlborough as the officer in charge of the siege must bear responsibility for these 
failures.242  
 
Perhaps the most inexcusable moment during the siege came during the night that 
Marlborough moved his camp from Orchies, when in the confusion siege operations 
continued without a single general present to provide direction.243 The Allies were 
fortunate that a major sally was not launched that night. While distancing himself 
from the daily operations of the siege in order to allow the expertise of his Dutch 
colleagues to shine through was perhaps wise given his inexperience, it does not 
negate the view that these are all examples when Marlborough could, and indeed 
should, have taken a more active role in ensuring that the besieging army operated 
in a cohesive manner rather than succumb to inter-service infighting. 
 
The siege of Tournai was quickly turning into a costly operation for Marlborough, in 
terms of both time and casualties. Fortunately for the Allies, Surville’s garrison was 
experiencing severe supply issues, despite Villars’ reduction of the garrison prior to 
the siege commencing.  The garrison had been using a tunnel from the church in the 
town of Tournai in order to bring in rations. This supply route was discovered by the 
Allies and blocked up on 15 August, and the troops also managed to sever some of 
the pipes that were supplying the garrison with water on the same day. Deane 
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hoped that this would force the French forces to capitulate as the attacking troops 
were by this point disheartened and believed that the mines were making the 
fortress impregnable.244  
 
Marlborough, writing on 25 August, despaired of the lack of progress being made 
and, although he still believed that the citadel could be taken by storm, he appears 
to have recognised that the garrison surrendering due to supply issues was by now 
more likely.245 On the 31 August the chief engineer of the defending forces offered a 
parley. His terms, however, were rejected by the Allies. As Marlborough stated, ‘We 
considering what had passed, and the certaine knowledge of their want of 
provisions, would allow them no other capitulation but that of prisoners of war.’246 
The reaction of the garrison was to declare that they would now fight to the death. 
Marlborough however recognised their desperation and believed that they would 
surrender within seven or eight days. The difficulty of the French supply position was 
confirmed to the Allies the same day. Desperate to preserve what little supplies he 
had, and wary of the fate that men who had turned their coat to join France would 
face upon surrendering, Surville ordered those deserters in his ranks to attempt to 
save themselves by any means necessary.247 Finally, on 3 September terms were 
agreed and the surviving troops of the garrison were taken as prisoners of war and 
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allowed to return to France under the condition that they not take up arms again 
until an equivalent number of Allied prisoners had been exchanged.248 
 
Blackadder estimated that over 4,000 of the Allied forces became casualties during 
the siege, while Chandler put the number at 5,400. 249  The siege lasted 69 days. Lille 
in comparison had twice the garrison of Tournai and had held out for almost twice as 
long with Allied casualties estimated at 15,000. At Bouchain Marlborough suffered a 
similar amount of casualties as at Tournai, but, he had sacrificed lives for speed even 
more so than usual, with the siege lasting only 30 days.250 What is clear is that the 
siege would have been even more costly and lasted longer had the French garrison 
been properly provisioned. In the face of counter-mining the Allies had made little 
headway against the citadel. This was despite the imposing superiority in firepower 
the Allies had possessed, somewhat squandered due to the lack of coordination 
between the artillery and infantry arms, which one source in the garrison stated was: 
‘the most frightful artillery ever seen before a place’.251 The Comte De Mérode-
Westerloo in particular put the eventual surrender of the town down to good 
fortune, ‘We would not have won it so cheaply had not the garrison been so short of 
powder and other necessaries – and there we might well have lost our entire army, 
no matter how formidable in appearance, had the place been properly 
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provisioned.’252 Nevertheless, in spite of seemingly poor management of the siege 
the Allies were successful in taking Tournai. The counter-mining by the French troops 
was effective. However, the town did not hold out for as long as Villars had 
predicted. The Allies, for their part, now had very little time left in the campaigning 
season in which to achieve a decisive victory.  
 
Investment of Mons 
Churchill wrote that, ‘The fall of Tournai was followed by an explosion of war-fury 
strangely out of keeping with the policy and temper in which the campaign had 
hitherto been conducted.’253 Throughout the campaign, despite his enthusiasm for 
battle, Villars had been forced, by Louis and his counsellors, to operate a safety first 
approach. During the siege of Tournai Villars finally gained approval to fight a battle 
if either Valenciennes or Condé were threatened. 254 This order was extended to a 
general freedom after the fall of Tournai.255 Quite why Villars was finally allowed off 
the leash is open for debate. Certainly giving an aggressive commander the authority 
to venture a battle was a risky move by Louis. The French position at the ensuing 
peace-talks would have been further undermined by suffering a significant reverse. 
This was a calculated risk, however, as the terms offered by the Allies in 1709 had 
been viewed as being overly harsh, hence their rejection when France was already 
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on its knees. It is difficult to see how much further the Allies would have been able to 
push the French in any 1710 peace talks even had they won another victory.  
 
In addition, given the lateness of the season, it is unlikely that the Allies would be 
able to significantly exploit any victory by taking a series of French fortresses. 
Admirers of Marlborough point to the fall of the fortresses in the Spanish 
Netherlands after Ramillies (1706) as an example of a ‘decisive battle’ in early-
modern warfare and as proof that a single battle could allow the victorious army to 
achieve major gains.256 The chances of Marlborough being able to replicate another 
Ramillies and hence make significant gains on the French fortress belt by virtue of a 
single battle, however, were limited. The situation in 1709 was very different to that 
of 1706. For a start, Ramillies had been fought on 23 May 1709, leaving the entire 
summer for the Allies to exploit the victory.257 Tournai did not surrender until 5 
September. Even if they defeated the French field army the Allies would only have 
around a month given the lack of forage due to the hardship of the previous winter 
to achieve decisive gains. Furthermore, the fortresses taken after Ramillies were 
mainly of an older Spanish variety. On those occasions when the Allied advance 
reached a relatively modern fortress with a determined garrison, as at Dendermonde 
in 1706, the pace of gains slowed somewhat.258 In the event of a victory, and 
supposing Mons fell extremely quickly, given the lateness of the season 
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Marlborough’s options would have likely been limited to besieging the relatively 
strong towns of Valenciennes or Bouchain situated 20 and 40 miles away from Mons 
respectively. Given the nature of early-modern warfare he could not simply bypass 
these fortresses without exposing his supply lines to the garrisons.259  
Louis then could gamble. He was already in a weak position prior to the next round 
of peace talks. A further defeat would not really dent this position much further due 
to the lateness of the season, unless of course Villars lost the entire field army, which 
was very rare in early-modern warfare. On the other hand a victory would have 
dented the confidence of, and possibly created rifts within, the Grand Alliance who 
were at this point engaged in tense internal negotiations over the Dutch barrier, 
which could feasibly have escalated considerably if the Allies were confronted with a 
resurgent France.260 
 
With Tournai captured, and unaware of the change in French policy regarding 
offering battle, the Allied high command now had to decide how to proceed for the 
rest of the season. Marlborough, for his part, appeared at this stage reluctant to 
venture a battle. In his letter to Heinsius of 18 August he outlined his opinion, ‘we 
shall neglect no opertunity of undertaking what we can judge practicable […] I think 
our affaires are in so good a posture, and that of the Enemy in so very ill condition, 
that I shou’d think wee ought not to venture, but where in reason we shou’d hope 
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for success […].’ This would appear at odds with the decision Marlborough took at 
Malplaquet, when he attacked despite the formidable strength of the French 
defences. However, it appears that Marlborough’s Dutch advisers, as well as Eugene, 
wished to adopt a more aggressive strategy, as he continued: ‘that the temper of 
your people are such, that thay will not be satisfied unless there be action, we must 
then take our measures agreable to that; for whatever is in my power You [Heinsius] 
may command[…].’261  
 
This letter runs contrary to the view espoused by Chandler, that Marlborough was a 
battle-driven general who was held back by the initiative crushing military 
conservatism of his Dutch allies.262 The letter also appears to show a different 
Marlborough to the man who had marched to the Danube in 1704 in face of 
considerable opposition from the Dutch.263 The Marlborough of 1709, if he was truly 
being pressured into fighting a battle seems to have been a less domineering figure 
in the Grand Alliance. He had already abandoned his preferred plan of attacking 
Ypres earlier in the year, and now appears to have been heavily influenced by the 
Dutch to give battle: ‘I have assured him [Heinsius] that wee will do all in our power 
to bring them to a battel.’264  
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After the fall of Tournai the Allies had a number of options on how to proceed. It was 
far too late in the year to consider an invasion of France, therefore, a more limited 
objective was needed. The Allies could still feasibly have advanced towards Ypres, 
however, the terrain to the north was judged as difficult to campaign in during the 
autumn months. Furthermore, it would be difficult to take the strong fortresses of 
Ypres or St Venant on the Lys in a quick siege, while an advance between the Lys and 
the Scarpe would have to overcome Villars’ defensive line. This had not been 
practicable in summer and would be made even more difficult due to the casualties 
taken at Tournai. Another option was advance on Condé or Valenciennes in the hope 
of taking one in order to facilitate a further campaign down the Sensée towards 
Bouchain and Cambrai in 1710.265 Cambrai was the last bastion of Vauban’s fortress 
belt in the area and the fall of the town could have served as a springboard for an 
offensive towards Paris.266 However, it was likely that only one of these fortresses 
would fall in the time remaining meaning the Allies would face a difficult task in 1710 
campaign of taking the other, while facing an intact French field army.  
 
The reasons why the Grand Alliance abandoned this plan is unclear. Instead it opted 
to attack the strong but strategically relatively unimportant fortress of Mons, 
positioned about 30 miles south-east of Tournai. Situated right on the flank of the 
campaigning area the fortress was not especially vital to maintaining the security of 
Allied supply lines. Neither could it have served as a base from which to launch a 
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wider-campaign the following year, as any advance out of the Mons area could have 
been countered easily by French troops manning positions of the high ground that 
overlooked the valley of the Sambre. As a military target the town lacked value, as it 
did not control a river-junction, which makes the bloodletting that took place over it 
at Malplaquet all the more difficult to comprehend.267  
 
The capture of Mons made more sense from a political point of view, as the town 
would have completed the Dutch barrier in the area.268 Fewer concessions, 
therefore, would have to be required of Louis XIV in subsequent negotiations, which 
would have strengthened the chances of the negotiations being successful. 
However, an advance towards Bouchain and Cambrai would have been likely to 
worry the French more than the loss of a strategically insignificant town on the 
outskirts of the theatre. Furthermore, this viewpoint that Mons was a politically 
important target is somewhat contradicted by the fact that the Dutch also wished to 
include Condé and Valenciennes in their barrier, two towns that the Allies could have 
opted to besiege instead of Mons. Thus the fall of such towns would have conferred 
similar political benefits to that of Mons.269  
 
Once the decision to attack Mons was taken the Allies faced a difficult situation that 
would have to be overcome in order to invest the town. The River Trouille runs 
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through Mons and out to the south of the city. Positioned behind the river was a 
strong French line. This was undermanned at the time, however, if Villars was able to 
reach it and reinforce the position before the Allies crossed the river then it would 
have been impossible for the Allies to surround the town, and the siege would have 
been over before it had started. Villars, operating on interior lines of communication 
had a shorter distance to travel to the town, therefore, if he pre-empted the plan 
then he would be have been well placed to significantly disrupt the Allies. This 
advantage could be alleviated if the Allies were able to take the fortress of St 
Ghislain on the Haine, positioned 5 miles from Mons. If this was taken the Allies 
could cross the Haine and cut off Mons from the west without having to skirt around 
the town and approach it from the east. Accordingly, Orkney was dispatched with a 
small force of twenty squadrons and the entirety of the army’s grenadiers to invest 
the small fortress. He arrived just after midnight on 3 September and was reinforced 
by a further four thousand infantry and sixty squadrons the following day.270 Speed 
was of the essence during this operation. However, the fortress had been reinforced 
by this point and Orkney’s detachment met fierce resistance. Unable to achieve a 
breakthrough, Orkney re-joined the Allied army at Sirault and the march parallel to 
the Haine continued.271 
 
The Allies were extremely fortunate that Villars appeared not to have valued Mons 
as a strategic target. Indeed, as Burton pointed out, this may have been a reason 
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why the Allies selected the town,272 but his view is somewhat unconvincing given 
Villars history of shadowing Marlborough as closely as possible when they faced 
each other on campaign.273 Villars, however, did not pre-empt the Allied advance 
towards Mons, as a result the Allied skirting movement around Mons was successful 
and met with little resistance.274 The Prince of Hesse-Cassel, leading the vanguard of 
his army received widespread praise for his part in the success of the operation.275 
Deane described the fall of the French line outside Mons on 6 September: 
 ‘On the 27th he ordered the Prince of Hess to advance wth. his 
detachments. The which he did, the enemy was there alsoe; and as 
soon as ever they see his forces advance they marcht away with 
great precipitation, not firing one shott; and the Prince of Hess 
marcht wth, his detachments and secured the ligne and some 
partyes, of the enemy, who ware skulking ip and doun towards the 
wing of our army, and falling upon them killed and took above 400 
of them […].’276  
 
The speed at which Hesse-Cassel was able to overcome the French defences outside 
Mons was indeed vital for the success of the Allied manoeuvring as Villars was by 
now closing in on Mons. Indeed on the 7 September he advanced with some 
strength towards Hesse-Cassel’s vanguard. Marlborough rushed his forces forward 
to reinforce the vanguard and Villars’ retired to await further reinforcements. 
Barnett referred to this manoeuvre as a feint. 277   Yet, if he had been able to displace 
the Prince’s small force from the lines on the Trouille, Villars could have occupied the 
defence line and prevented Marlborough besieging the town. It appears more likely, 
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therefore, that it was the speed with which Marlborough was able to reinforce the 
vanguard which convinced Villars not to strike at Hesse-Cassel’s troops, 
nevertheless, by 8 September both armies had reached the area around Mons, the 
impact of which will be explored in the following chapter. 
 
Conclusion  
In conclusion it would appear that Allied planning during the early stages of the 1709 
campaign suffered severely from the nature of coalition warfare. Marlborough and 
Godolphin’s initial plan, to launch a descent on Abbeville while simultaneously taking 
Ypres in order to link up and invade France while being supplied from sea, was 
undoubtedly ambitious and fraught with difficulty. Amphibious operations during 
early-modern warfare suffered due to the difficulty in combining land and sea forces, 
as well as the major issue of the landing force being inevitably outgunned once it 
advanced from under the protection of formidable naval artillery. However, the 
more limited idea of attacking Ypres was clearly practicable. The British favoured 
attacking Ypres and it would have served as a base from which to drive privateers 
out of Dunkirk, thus protecting her naval interests. Furthermore, Ypres would have 
also served as a base for a subsequent 1710 campaign advancing along the relatively 
unprotected coastline. The Dutch, however, were clearly worried about wider-British 
objectives. They did not want the British to establish a base in Ypres, as this would 
be detrimental to their aim of economic hegemony over the Spanish Netherlands. 
Britain and the United Provinces were economic rivals as well as political rivals. 
Faced with opposition from the rest of the council, Marlborough abandoned his 
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plans of an offensive on Ypres.  Despite the three victories he had already achieved 
for the Grand Alliance he appears to have been much more submissive and cautious 
at this point of the war especially when compared to his bold march to the Danube 
in 1704. He was not able to impose his will on the council and as a result an offensive 
in the Ypres area, which had promise, was not implemented. Instead the less 
strategically significant, but incredibly resolute fortress of Tournai was chosen. 
Marlborough’s manoeuvres to reach Tournai before the French could reinforce it 
demonstrated his foremost skill as a general: the ability to out-think and out-
manoeuvre an enemy consistently, as had also been shown during the march to 
Danube and subsequently when passing the Ne Plus Ultra lines in 1711. In this field 
of operations Marlborough was certainly far ahead of his peers, and he has been 
deservedly praised for this. The siege of Tournai was, as a result of this skill, opened 
without resistance from the French field force. Yet, the French were pleased with 
this compromise the Allies had taken. They clearly believed that Tournai would be 
able to hold out for the remainder of the campaigning season, and were relieved 
when Ypres was not assaulted. 
 
The conduct of the Allied forces at the siege of Tournai was notably dissapointing. 
Marlborough’s limited experience of siege warfare during his formative years meant 
that he often delegated control of sieges to his Dutch engineers, which resulted in a 
haphazard approach to the operation as the effective defence of the fortress by 
French forces and the mounting losses faced by Allied forces in subterranean 
warfare resulted in significant tensions arising between officers and engineers. 
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Marlborough, based at the camp at Orchies, was unable to resolve these disputes 
and the siege dragged on. He had anticipated a rapid fall of Tournai so that he could 
press on in the campaigning season but was fortunate the citadel was so poorly 
stocked, otherwise the siege may have been even more protracted than it eventually 
was. His underestimating of French defences certainly had an impact on the siege 
being drawn out and by the time the citadel fell the Allies did not have enough time 
left to launch an effective exploitation. Marlborough, when pursuing siege 
operations, strove to achieve speed but this only was at the expense of casualties, 
which may have been reduced had he taken a more methodical approach to siege 
warfare as espoused by Vauban.  
 
Once Tournai was taken one option available for the Allies was to attack one of the 
fortress on the Senseé. If successful this could have facilitated a campaign towards 
Cambrai, the last town in Vauban’s fortress belt, the following year. The reasons for 
not pursuing this are unclear. Mons was a militarily unimportant target as it was 
positioned on the edge of the theatre, it was not situated on a vital river line, and 
any further advance from the town could be easily countered by the French 
establishing a defensive position on the high ground to the west of the fortress. 
Politically, especially, for the Dutch the assault on the town makes more sense. It 
would seem that Marlborough was, by this point in the war, sensitive to Dutch public 
and political opinion, reflecting his lack of control over the council. His letter to 
Heinsius, when he stated that he would give battle if it was deemed necessary by the 
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Dutch, supports this view.278 Ultimately, as will be seen in the next chapter the 
decision to besiege Mons would have serious consequences for many of the Allied 
field army. The Allies appear to have settled on besieging Mons due to the wider 
problem of not having an agreed plan for conducting the campaign, and this would 
lead directly into a pyrrhic victory at Malplaquet. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE BATTLE OF MALPLAQUET 
Introduction 
The battle of Malplaquet took place on 11 September 1709, and was the most costly 
action fought by the Allies during the War of the Spanish Succession. The Allies 
suffered an estimated 25,000 casualties during the course of the battle with the 
French sustaining about 12,000 dead, wounded or taken prisoner.279 To put these 
figures in context the battle of Blenheim (1704) had cost the Allies an estimated 
12,000 men with the French suffering about 34,000 casualties of whom 14,000 were 
taken prisoner, while at Ramillies (1706), the Allies had suffered only around 3,600 
casualties with the French losing 18,000 men including 6,000 taken prisoner.280 It is 
important to note that the bulk of the casualties sustained by the French during 
Blenheim and Ramillies would have been incurred during the rout that followed the 
Allied breakthrough.  
 
Malplaquet was viewed as a victory for the Allies, albeit a pyrrhic one. Marlborough 
wrote to the Duchess after the battle, ‘I am so tired that I have but the strength 
enough to tell you that we have had this day a very bloody battle; the first part of 
the day we beat their foot, and afterwards their horse.’ The Duke clearly viewed the 
battle as a success, although this was not a victory he wished to have to face more 
than once, as he continued: ‘God almighty be praised, it is now in our powers to 
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have what peace we please, and I may be well assured of never being in another 
battle[...].’281 This chapter will seek to explore why this victory was so costly to the 
Allies, and whether the result of the battle was worth the sacrifice. It will begin 
where the previous chapter finished with an outline of the events immediately prior 
to the battle. This will be followed by a summary of the events that took place during 
the course of the battle, noting that the following chapter will go into more details 
on the tactics used and the experience of the individual soldier. Finally, this chapter 
two will explore the remainder of the 1709 campaigning season and the reasons why 
Mons was besieged post-battle. 
 
Planning and Manoeuvre 
After the decision to besiege Mons had been taken, the Allied army marched for two 
days to reach the River Haine just to the east of Mons. The army arrived on 5 
September. Villars, now resolved to give battle unbeknownst to the Allies, marched 
his force from the defensive position he was holding and crossed the River Scheldt at 
Valenciennes before marching to the area of Quevrai, twelve miles south-west of 
Mons. Both armies were now operating in a quadrilateral area bounded by rivers: 
the Haine in the North, the Trouille to the east, the Scheldt to the west and the 
Sambre to the south-east. 282 Mons was positioned in the north-eastern corner of the 
area  Marlborough’s army was situated to the west of Mons, having reached the 
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town first, and was positioned to block any approach by Villars from that direction. 
The area between the armies was dominated by dense woodland, 12 miles in length, 
which represented a formidable obstacle for an eighteenth-century army.  A limited 
number of relatively narrow gaps allowed access through the woods but they were 
littered with small villages and hamlets which presented further difficulties. Villars 
marched his forces forward aggressively, crossing the Hogneau on 7 September. He 
positioned his 80,000 strong force to the rear of the woodland, 8 miles away from 
the Allied positions with the dense treeline to cover his movements.283 In eighteenth 
century warfare flanks which rested on a forest were generally deemed secure, 
therefore in response the Allies split their force between Marlborough and Eugene 
each covering one of the major gaps in the area. The Trouée de Boussu, which linked 
the Haine in the North to the woodland, was covered by Eugene and the Trouée De 
D’ Aulnois, which linked the wood of Taisnières to the wood of Laniere, was covered 
by Marlborough. This latter area contained the village of Malplaquet.284 Villars’ force 
was at this point fairly stretched out, but the nature of the terrain meant that he 
could contest any Allied march westward. The Allies, due to their rapid manoeuvre 
from Tournai, also benefitted from the good defensive country and could, therefore, 
effectively block any attempt by Villars to contest the siege of Mons. The situation 
was one of stalemate, yet from an operational view the Allies appeared to hold the 
advantage. Their main objective was to besiege and take Mons. As they were 
positioned between Villars and the fortress they could have dug in, constructed a 
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line of circumvallation covering the gaps, and proceeded with the siege,285 strategy 
response that had proved effective when confronted with a similar situation during 
the siege of Lille in 1708. The siege could then have been conducted relatively 
unopposed, as Villars would have been unable to intervene unless he was willing to 
sustain heavy casualties, which at this point in the war France could ill-afford to 
incur. There would have been some risk to the Allies if the siege was protracted as 
the communications to the supply depots in the North were not as strong as desired. 
However, Marlborough had been able to conduct sieges from more difficult 
positions before, such as at Lille, by utilising his skill at manoeuvre warfare when 
surrounded by French armies, and would do so later at Bouchain in 1711 when 
significantly outnumbered by Villars’ force.286 
 
Figure 3 Position of the Armies prior to Malplaquet. (Source: W.S. Churchill, Marlborough: His Life and Times 
Volume IV, (London, 1938), p.133). 
It appears, however, that Marlborough and Eugene’s primary objectives had now 
advanced beyond merely capturing another French fortress.  The Allies, it seems, 
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wanted to entice Villars into an attack. They believed that if drawn into open battle 
the French army could be defeated in the field, thus paving the way for more fruitful 
peace talks than those that been held the previous spring. This is clear from the 
manoeuvres conducted by Marlborough and Eugene. If their ambitions halted at the 
seizure of Mons then they would have done as suggested earlier: dug in at both 
passes and dared Villars to attack strong entrenchments. However, on the 8 
September Eugene’s force fell back from the gap at Boussu and joined with 
Marlborough at Aulnois. This action left the road to Mons open to Villars.287 The 
Allies clearly wished that he would march through this gap to try to cut them off 
from Mons. If Villars advanced Marlborough and Eugene could attack his troops and 
try to drive him back into the Haine, thereby destroying the last major field army of 
France. However, this plan underestimated Villars, who was too experienced a 
commander to fall for such a ruse. Instead he merely occupied positions on the edge 
of the Boussu gap before marching the rest of his army south to face the combined 
Allied force at the gap at Aulnois. He advanced into this gap the following day and 
began to dig considerable lines of defences facing the bulk of the Allied army. While 
this was going on the Allied army stood by and watched, while attempting to impede 
the French with only a light artillery bombardment.288  
 
By now it was clear that the French would not advance to meet the Allied forces. 
Therefore, every hour the French had to dig in made the Allied hopes of securing a 
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decisive victory through an attack, as Eugene and Marlborough somewhat 
optimistically hoped to do, less likely. Given this situation it appears to have been a 
mistake for the Allies to spend an entire day on 10 September watching the French 
dig in while merely exposing the defenders to a relatively small cannonade. 
Chandler, one of the most prominent of Marlborough’s admirers, does not dwell on 
why it was that Marlborough did not attack, when the French defences were only 
half complete but it is clear that he thought it was a mistake:  
‘It is true that the Mons detachment of 1,900 men was still on the 
road, and that Wither’s 19 battalions and 10 squadrons […] still had 
to make an appearance, but Eugene had joined his colleague, the 
guns were in position and the Allies clearly enjoyed numerical 
advantage over the French, whose positions were still only half 
complete; but another day passed with only the exchange of 
artillery fire whilst detailed reconnaissances of the French position 
were carried out.’289  
 
Certainly, if the Allies were insistent on attacking then not doing so on 10 September 
was a mistake on the part of Marlborough and Eugene. They may have gained 
10,000 extra troops by waiting a day but the advantage the French had received by 
having an extra day to dig in appears to have been greater. The Earl of Orkney, with 
the added benefit of hindsight, recognised this:  
‘I really believed, since we had not attacked all Tuesday, there 
would be no battle at all. For indeed as we have found and seen 
since, I don’t believe ever army in the world was attacked in such a 
post […] I am fully convinced that there was an absolute necessity 
for us to attack them, and, though it had been better to [have] 
done it early [on] the Tuesday, yet people judge twenty battalions 
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that came up that night were well worth staying for one day 
longer.’290 
 
The French adopted a purely defensive plan. They positioned troops in the woodland 
at either side of the gap, which was seen as impassable, and thus they reckoned the 
main Allied thrust would come through the centre. The redoubts constructed in the 
centre arched back considerably from the positions in the woods, which meant that 
cannon stationed in the woods would be able to enfilade attacking infantry. This 
grapeshot, combined with the resolve and musket fire of troops positioned in the 
central redoubts, would weaken the Allied attack and cause confusion. The French 
cavalry could then advance through gaps in the defending infantry formation and 
deliver the coup de grâce to drive off the attacking forces.291 The French also took 
advantage of the Allied delay to dig in further and develop an extensive line of 
redoubts that would have to be breached in order for Marlborough and Eugene to 
achieve the war-winning victory they appear to have, under pressure from the 
Dutch, desired. 
 
The Battle of Malplaquet 
The Allies assaulted the French positions on 11 September 1709, taking up their 
positions prior to eight a.m. A morning fog covered the build-up of troops, but this 
had lifted by the time Eugene began his attack on the right flank, toward the waiting 
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redoubts of the French forces.292 The Allied plan appeared to be to assault both 
French flanks in order to oblige Villars to weaken his centre. A main thrust by 
Orkney’s infantry and majority of the cavalry would then be launched through the 
weakened French centre. The day, however, got off to a bad start for the Allies. In 
the woods to the north of the gap Eugene’s forces, led by Schulemberg and Lottum, 
met with fierce French resistance when attacking a strong defensive position set up 
within a small triangular shaped area of woodland, which allowed French troops to 
subject the attackers to enfilading fire. The fighting was desperate, and at one point 
Orkney had to divert some troops from his centre in order to see off a French 
counter-attack in the area. After three hours of fighting and very heavy casualties 
the Allies succeeded in taking the redoubts on the French left.293  
 
On the French right, however, the Allies fared worse. The Prince of Orange attacked 
at 8 a.m. with 30 Dutch battalions. The assault was initially successful in taking the 
two French lines, before being driven back by a French-counter attack. A second 
attack was launched but this was again unsuccessful. During the course of these 
attacks Dutch forces had advanced through enfilading cannon-fire. Incredibly heavy 
casualties ensued, with the Dutch suffering 5,000 losses within thirty minutes of 
opening the attack.294  
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Some admirers of Marlborough claimed that he never ordered such a full-blown 
attack. They state that the attack was meant as a feint and the Prince of Orange, 
unhappy with his subordinate role, had decided on an all-out attack. However, there 
is no real evidence for this view. Marlborough was in command, and ultimately 
responsibility for sending the Dutch into such a heavily defended area in limited 
numbers (only 30 battalions to the 97 used to attack the French left flank) must rest 
with the Duke.295 Eventually, it was decided that no more attempts would be made 
on the formidable defensive positions on that side of the field for the remainder of 
the battle.296  
 
The attacks had largely been costly. However, the attack on the French left had 
achieved its objective as Villars had been forced to transfer 12 battalions from his 
lines in the centre in order to reinforce the 77 already combating the Allied attack in 
the woods. Furthermore, once the French had been driven from this position, they 
were forced to draw yet more battalions away from the centre to combat any 
further attack from the successful Allied troops. This significantly reduced the 
number of troops facing Orkney’s infantry in the centre as in total Villars had 
removed 62 battalions from his centre to combat the Allied right-flank leaving his 
defences in this area almost completely unprotected. 297 
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Concurrently to these events, Marlborough had attempted a bold flanking 
manoeuvre through the heavy woodland on the right flank of Eugene’s line of 
advance. This force was made up of late-arriving reinforcements from Tournai and 
consisted of 19 battalions and 10 squadrons led by General Withers. Its mission was 
to outflank and roll up the French redoubts, thus significantly aiding the infantry 
battle Eugene’s force was engaged in, centred around the triangle of woodland on 
his right flank. This was an innovative move and if successful could have resulted in 
much lower casualties on the right. However, it was also very ambitious as the 
woodland to the left of the French position made it very difficult to maintain 
command over the infantry and cavalry. The attack, however, was not successful. 
Wither’s force took two hours to traverse the forest and when they reappeared on 
the French right flank the fighting there had already been brought to a successful, if 
bloody, conclusion and consequentially his command took a very limited direct part 
in the action. However, indirectly the presence of so many troops massed on his left 
flank, did force Villars to further reinforce that flank thus aiding Allied attempts to 
break through in the centre.298 In this sense the innovative approach was successful 
although the troops used may have been put to better use in reinforcing the hard-
pressed Dutch on left flank, as Chandler believed had originally been intended 
before a change in orders was issued due to Withers late arrival.299 
 
                                                     
298 Ibid., p.261. 
299 Ibid., p.256. 
100 
  
Around midday Orkney’s 15 battalions duly advanced and captured the French 
redoubts in the centre. Resistance was minimal and the mainly-British infantry then 
occupied the French trenches allowing their own cavalry to pass through the gaps. A 
major cavalry battle then developed between the two relatively untouched forces, 
with the French consistently gaining the upper-hand before being driven back by the 
firepower of Orkney’s infantry.300 Had the Allies achieved a breakthrough in this area 
they could have rolled up the flanks of the remaining French forces. Boufflers, who 
had taken over command after Villars was wounded by a musket-ball and thus quit 
the field, recognised the danger and began withdrawing his infantry forces. This 
retreat was successful. Covered by a rear-guard action by the French cavalry the bulk 
of the Army escaped to fight another day. The battle was over, with the majority of 
the French force quitting the field, at about 3 p.m.301  
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Figure 4 The Battle of Malplaquet: Showing the advance of Orkney's troops that turned the tide of the battle and 
the heavily defended triangle of woodland on the French left flank, which Villars had to reinforce over the 
course of the battle. (Source: J. Falkner, Marlborough's War Machine, 1702-1711, (Barnsley, 2014), p.xv.) 
Aftermath 
The 25,000 casualties suffered by the Allies at the battle of Malplaquet was a high 
price to pay for victory, especially over a town as strategically insignificant as Mons, 
and compared to the French losses of 12,000.302 Marlborough and Eugene began the 
manoeuvring around Mons intending to draw Villars’ into a trap and defeat his army 
in its entirety. However, they had attacked Villars in a strong defensive position and 
by the evening of 11 September had lost one-fifth of their army, including many 
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veterans. The decision to attack the French in such a strong position was a definite 
mistake. Throughout his career Marlborough avoided battle when confronted by 
difficult positions such as that he experienced at Malplaquet. It is quite possible that 
in his frustration at how the campaign had gone to date, with his plan to assault 
Ypres being abandoned, the difficulties experienced during the siege of Tournai, and 
under pressure from his Dutch allies, Marlborough had decided to throw caution to 
the wind to secure a war-winning victory, despite the fact that exploitation would be 
difficult given the lateness of the season. His decision may have also been motivated 
by his weakening position at home and pressure from his economically crumbling 
Dutch allies. However, it was a mistake he should not have made.  
 
Malplaquet was called a victory by the standards of the day. The Allies had won the 
field and Marlborough appears to have believed that he had won the war, ‘I hope it 
[the battle] will conduce to the putting a speedy and happy issue to the war, to the 
general satisfaction of the Allies.’303 He was to be mistaken. The French held a 
different view of the strategic situation post-battle, Boufflers summed it up, ‘The 
enemy losses were three times ours, and they won no advantage other than the 
occupation of the field of battle; and I think I can assure your majesty that this 
unfortunate victory will not bring them one extra yard of territory when they decide 
to make peace. On the contrary the enemy will now respect Your Majesty’s troops 
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and be perhaps more subdued, however puffed they are now with the advantages 
due only to their good fortune […].’304  
 
Malplaquet then was a bloody battle fought over an insignificant strategic objective. 
Not only was the idea of giving battle flawed but Marlborough’s conduct can be seen 
as lacklustre. His decision not to attack on the 10 September and instead wait for 
reinforcements was a costly mistake especially considering the relatively minor role 
these troops played in proceedings. Delaying the attack for a day allowed the French 
defenders to build up redoubts and meant that Allied troops advanced into well-
prepared positions, with the Prince of Orange’s battalions on the left especially 
suffering devastating losses. The plan to assault the French flanks in order to weaken 
the centre was one that had been used by Marlborough at Blenheim and Ramillies. 
Again it was successful. Villars was forced to move most of his central infantry to 
combat the victorious, if bloodied, Allied right flank in the wood of Sars. However, 
far from representing a grand-tactical vision, this method was successful merely due 
to the Allied army outnumbering the French. It was an attritional battle-plan rather 
than an inspired one. Orkney’s fifteen battalions were able to secure the French line, 
yet, the Allied cavalry were unable to beat off their French counter-parts in sufficient 
time to cause a rout of the retreating forces.   
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Marlborough explained the reasons behind not following the French retreat, 
centring on the heavy losses his troops had sustained due to the attritional nature of 
the fighting: 
 ‘As to out not pressing them in there retreat […] it is good you 
should know the treu reason the Prince of Savoye and I had, for it 
was that we had not foot, and we feared our being beaten back if 
we had pursued them any farther, our foot of the right being at a 
great distance, and our Dutch foot of the left, which was the 
nearest, we were afraid to make them advance, thay having been 
twice repulsed.’305  
 
Chandler, for his part, stated that ‘[Marlborough’s] plan had been generally good’, 
although he admitted that the Allied command and control process at Malplaquet 
left much to be desired. He blamed this not on Marlborough’s ability as a 
commander but because, ‘there were paradoxically too many men to permit the full 
exercise of his generally superb battle control.’306 However, little sympathy can be 
given for his view as Marlborough was commanding an army of veterans with a 
superb officer corps, Orkney and Cadogan for example had fought consistently by his 
side since 1702, as had many of the other generals present at Malplaquet.307 By 1709 
the Allied army should have been a smoothly functioning machine and responsibility 
for the losses suffered on the left flank must surely rest with Marlborough. If the 
Duke had doubts about the Prince of Orange’s ability to lead his troops effectively 
then he could have taken measures to ensure that a more experienced commander 
was supervising him, especially considering that the most experienced military 
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commander of the age, Prince Eugene, was present at the battle and appears to 
have been considerably underused.  
 
Chandler once again appears to excuse Marlborough stating that he would often not 
reveal the full extent of his plans to his officers, especially if their role was secondary 
in the battle, in order to ensure they attacked with vigour. Even if the Prince of 
Orange’s role was secondary, which is debatable given that the plan appears to have 
been to focus on the flanks in order to strip troops from the French centre, this lack 
of transparency backfired as Orange, clearly not recognising this, launched a second 
attack on the French positions on the left which once again resulted in heavy Dutch 
casualties.   
 
Admittedly Marlborough’s force was larger than any he commanded in previous 
years, but this does not excuse the fact that he wasted the lives of his veterans 
against a strongly fortified position to win a battle that did not need to be fought, 
especially so late in the year. Moreover, the attritional nature of the action is 
extremely at odds with the image of Marlborough as an expert in manoeuvre 
warfare. Indeed he recycled a plan that he had used with considerable success at 
Blenheim and Ramillies, in a very different situation namely attacking a strong 
defensive position. Moreover, the resulting loss of life and escape of the French field 




The lack of inspiration shown during the battle of Malplaquet combined with the 
inability to seize the initiative and attack on 10 September suggests an off-form 
general desperate to secure a decisive victory, but not willing to take the necessary 
risks to achieve such a feat. If Ramillies was the high-point in Marlborough’s career 
as a general then Malplaquet surely represented the nadir. This is perhaps reflected 
in his letter to Godolphin eleven days after the battle, where he laments the fact that 
peace was not achieved earlier in the year and mourns the loss of life endured by his 
army, ‘In so great an action it is impossible to get the advantage but by exposing 
men’s lives; but the lamentable sight and thoughts of itt [the Battle] has given me so 
much disquiet […] for to see so many brave men killed with whome I have lived these 
eight years, when we thought ourselves sure of peace.’308 
 
Post-battle 
The 1709 campaign post Malplaquet was somewhat of an anti-climax. The lateness 
of the year meant that there was not really any time to make any bold operational 
manoeuvres. Furthermore, the Allies did not have the advantage of the wintry 
conditions of the previous campaigning season, which had turned the ground hard 
and allowed for an extended campaign with the Allies not entering winter quarters 
until 5 January 1709.309 Instead, they would be faced post-October by wet rather 
than cold conditions typical of  Flanders in autumn, which made campaigning 
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difficult. Marlborough clearly anticipated this as he planned to enter winter quarters 
no later than the end of October.310   
 
Marlborough’s primary objective for the remainder of the campaign, having 
captured Mons, was to take the town of Maubeuge, which would have opened up 
the line of the River Sambre and, therefore, facilitate a potential assault on Quesnoy, 
Valenciennes and if successful possibly Bouchain the following year,311 and it is 
worth noting that the taking of Bouchain in 1711 left Cambrai as the only fortress 
between Marlborough and Paris. Therefore, the taking of Maubeuge could have 
been a considerable coup if followed up by a successful 1710.312 However, taking 
two fortresses in the time left in the year was extremely ambitious, and 
Marlborough was dispirited by the chances of success. He wrote, clearly feeling the 
impact of years of campaigning on his body: ‘My feaverish and aguish distemper is 
turned to loosenesse, by which I had to be cured. At present it disperitse mee. I 
should after the battle have preffered the siege of Maubeuge but it was wholly 
impossible til we were first masters of Mons.’313   
 
Faced with few options, and unable to besiege Maubeuge with the Mons garrison to 
his rear and thus threatening his supply lines, the Allies settled down for a rather 
predictable siege of Mons. There has been some debate as to whether the Dutch 
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leadership wished to pursue the siege given the casualties endured by their troops 
on the left flank at Malplaquet, but it is clear that in Marlborough’s mind the siege of 
Mons was essential.314 Malplaquet had been fought to enable Mons to be besieged. 
Correspondence from the front had stated that Malplaquet was a victory, if hard-
won: ‘We [The Allies] have had this day a very murdring battel. God has blessed us 
with a victory, we having first beat their foot and then their horse.’ Had Mons not 
been besieged that battle would have been seen as a defeat, as Villars would have 
succeeded in his objective of stopping the town being invested. This would have had 
an extremely negative impact on the reputation of Marlborough at home, especially 
considering the damage that had already been done by his request earlier in the year 
to be granted the Captain-Generalcy for life.315 In order to maintain his grip on his 
position at home and that of supreme commander of the Grand Alliance 
Marlborough duly opened the trenches before Mons on the night of the 25 
September.316 
 
In order to reinforce his depleted army Marlborough brought in 30 battalions who 
had previously been involved in garrison duty. Boufflers, now in command in the 
theatre in place of the wounded Villars, dissipated much of his force to strengthen 
the garrisons in the area surrounding Mons. The remainder of the army, which had 
withdrawn behind the River Rhonelle, began to build an extensive defensive position 
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west to east from Valenciennes along the line of the Sambre, in order to defend 
Maubeuge in the event that Mons fell quickly.317 Boufflers was also able to send 
three battalions through the Allied cordon of Mons and into the town itself on 19 
September.318 It was clear to both sides that another pitched battle would not be 
fought during the remainder of 1709.  
 
Mons was taken relatively quickly, on 20 October 1711, after a siege costing the 
Allies 2,000 men, much less expensive in terms of time and casualties than Tournai 
earlier in the year.319 However, despite the relatively quick fall of the town, 
Marlborough was not able to capitalise on the surrender and advance on Mauberge, 
despite the unseasonably mild and dry weather. The deprivations and freezing 
conditions of the previous summer had finally caught up with both the Allied and 
French armies. Due to a lack of good forage for the horses Marlborough was obliged 
to send his troops into winter quarters at the end of October, with Boufflers doing 
likewise, signalling the end of the 1709 campaign.320  
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CHAPTER THREE: THE EXPERIENCE OF BATTLE AT MALPLAQUET 
Introduction  
The previous chapter provided a detailed analysis of the the 1709 campaign 
immediately prior to Malplaquet as well as the aftermath, while only summarising 
the major events during the battle. This chapter will provide a close-up analysis of 
individual actions that took place in order to build up a picture of the experience of 
battle, and why this particular action was the bloodiest fought during the long 
war.321 Topics to be discussed will include how the soldiers would have been armed, 
what tactics they would have used, and how different arms would have interacted 
with each other. Personal accounts will be consulted to try to convey how these men 
would have acted when engaged in combat. .  
 
The Experience of Infantry at Malplaquet 
The latter half of the seventeenth century had seen a major attempt by all Western 
European armies to standardise their infantry forces. The pikeman, a mainstay of 
European armies throughout the previous century, continued to be used during the 
Nine Years War. Over the course of the seventeenth century, however, other 
European theorists started to advocate including fewer pikemen in infantry 
formations. One of the factors that prompted this change was the increasing 
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potency of infantry firearms. 322  The value place on greater firepower resulted in a 
gradual reduction in the number of pike carrying troops, and by the time the War of 
the Spanish Succession had begun pikemen had virtually disappeared from the 
battlefield. Both the French and English had phased them out for all but ceremonial 
purposes by the winter of 1703.323 On the battlefield of Malplaquet only the short-
pikes held by sergeants in British battalions remained as a vestige of the formerly 
dominant battlefield weapon.324 However, as will be discussed later, the French 
infantry tactics used throughout the war varied only slightly from the era when the 
pike’s dominance was at its epoch as they were still very much based on shock and 
cold-steel.325 
 
Another reason why the pike disappeared from the battlefield at the turn of the 
eighteenth century was development of an effective ‘socket’ bayonet. A ‘plug’ 
bayonet had been introduced as early as 1640.326 By the 1670’s these were, 
according to Puységur, ‘straight, double edged blades a foot long with tapering 
handles also a foot long’.327 However the plug bayonet’s disadvantages were clear: 
infantry could not fire while the bayonet was attached and therefore every bayonet 
fixed reduced the firepower of the infantry unit while the method of plugging in the 
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bayonet was also inefficient, thus compromising the operational effectiveness of a 
battalion. The answer to the deficiencies of the plug bayonet was to develop a 
version of the weapon that allowed an infantryman to fire while retaining the 
capability to defend himself in close combat. The socket bayonet which was 
developed around 1687, and has been attributed to both Vauban and Mackay, 
solved these issues.328Mackay explained the advantages of the new bayonet, ‘the 
soldiers may safely keep their fire till they pour it into their breasts, and then have 
no other motion to make but to push as with a pick.’329 It did not take long for the 
socket bayonet to replace its predecessor. By 1709 almost all of the line infantry 
present at Malplaquet were armed with the socket bayonet. The most common form 
of the weapon was a 16-inch blade with a triangular cross section.330 The adoption of 
the socket bayonet certainly had a major influence in increasing the amount of 
firepower a battalion could unleash, and proved to be an effective deterrent against 
cavalry forces.  
 
In 1709 almost every infantryman would have wielded a sword in addition to his fusil 
and bayonet. In general these swords were made for function rather than beauty 
with officers carrying more personalised and ornate variants.331 During combat the 
sword was mainly utilised as a reserve to the bayonet. However, during sieges the 
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sword was used more widely and proved an effective weapon. Donald McBane, who 
began his career as a grenadier, wrote about the use of the sword when attacking a 
fortified French position in 1702, ‘His Grace made a detachment out of every 
battalion, with several pieces of cannon and hoppits, in order to attack a strong 
shottoe [chateu], a French garrison. It had a morrash of water about it. We took it in 
four hours time with sword in hand.’332 Lord Orkney described the defensive 
positions encountered at Malplaquet as being ‘nothing so much as a counterscarp 
from right to left’.333 The fighting around the French redoubts was bloody and hard 
fought. If their musket was lost, or their bayonet fixed into an opponent, troops 
would have reached for their swords. When fighting was face-to-face, whether 
climbing a breach or fighting over a redoubt, the sword could be a brutally effective 
weapon against unarmoured troops, albeit it would have lacked the range of the 
musket and bayonet combination. 
 
The firearm used by infantry had also seen major developments. Throughout the 
seventeenth century the matchlock musket had been the premier infantry firearm 
and the efficiency of the weapon slowly developed. Prior to 1650 the matchlock 
generally had to be used in conjunction with an awkward rest, later on the 
development of lighter muskets meant that it could be abandoned. This 
development, and other general improvements, meant that the rate of fire of the 
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musket improved throughout the century. Gustavus Adolphus and Maurice of 
Nassau, who fought during the early seventeenth century, believed that loading a 
musket took six times as long as firing. Accordingly they positioned their musketeers 
in ranks six deep. As the musket became more efficient, however, these ranks 
decreased. By the end of the seventeenth century most armies lined up their 
infantry only three ranks deep. The matchlock muskets had become twice as 
efficient. Despite these improvements the musket still suffered from major issues, 
largely centring on the poor performance of the match in adverse weather 
conditions.334 
 
The continued development of the flintlock eventually solved these difficulties. Early 
versions were developed at the end of the 16th century, although the flintlock did 
not supersede the matchlock as the premier battlefield infantry weapon until the 
late 17th century. Mork explained how the weapon worked, ‘To fire the flintlock the 
soldier only had to cock the tightly sprung hammer containing the flint and release it 
with the trigger. As it sprang forward it struck the steel of the battery creating sparks 
and knocking the battery forward to expose the pan, so that the sparks might ignite 
the priming powder.’335 The flintlock had numerous advantages over the matchlock: 
it was easier to load and the process of firing was reduced from 44 movements to 
only 26, additionally the rate of misfires reduced from one in four to around one in 
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three shots.336 The flintlock could also be carried or slung once loaded to be picked 
up again and fired instantly without worrying about finding and lighting a match, 
which proved a significant advantage when surprised by an opponent. The 
introduction of pre-packaged cartridges also added to these advantages. Rather than 
have to measure out his powder a musketeer could now simply bite the top off of 
the greased paper cartridge keeping the ball in his mouth, he would then pour the 
powder down the barrel, spit the ball in after it before using the remaining paper as 
a wad, which would be forced down with the ram-rod. This was certainly a more 
efficient technique than earlier, although it was not adopted by French troops until 
1738. 337   
 
The matchlock also, generally, used smaller calibre balls although the British 
persevered with the one-ounce balls they had previously used. The flintlock did 
suffer from a few disadvantages, however, and these factors in addition to cost go 
some way to explaining why the last matchlocks were only withdrawn from service 
with the French militia in 1708. Firstly, the range and accuracy of the flintlock was 
generally no better than the matchlock and in some cases the flints could easily 
come loose from the cock. Furthermore, if the flints were not the right size there 
could be difficulties as a long flint could snap and a small one might not produce a 
spark. Additionally the flint needed changing after every 10 to 12 shots. The 
continued use of the wooden ram-rod also remained a problem throughout the War 
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of the Spanish Succession.338 Eventually, however, all armies realised that the 
flintlock was the superior weapon. Adoption was slow in some units but broadly the 
Imperials adopted it en masse in 1689, the English a year later and the French just 
before the turn of the century.339 During the battle of Malplaquet infantry would 
have been almost exclusively equipped with flintlock muskets, albeit of a wide range 
of styles and calibres.  
 
During the War of the Spanish Succession armies were certainly not uniform in the 
modern sense of the word. The tactical doctrine that troops used often varied from 
unit to unit and region to region. Richard Kane’s ‘A New System of Military Discipline 
for a Battalion of Foot’ sets out the British method. In its most basic form the system 
was to engage in a series of fire fights while moving ever closer to the enemy line. A 
British battalion would advance until the enemy opened fire on them. Providing this 
had occurred within 100 paces the battalion would be ordered to fire by the colonel. 
The method they used was the much vaunted platoon fire. The battalion would be 
divided into 18 platoons for firing. These platoons would then be divided into six 
separate ‘firings’ interspersed along the line. When ready to fire upon the enemy the 
six platoons of the first firing along with the entire front rank would fire at the 
enemy, this would produce a strong wall of shot along the whole frontage. The first 
firing would then reload while the second firing would discharge their muskets. The 
third firing would included the two platoons of grenadiers on the flanks who would 
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angle their fire towards the enemy centre. A well trained battalion could complete 
this process twice in a minute.340   
 
It was possible that the opposing infantry might flee in the face of this first firing 
although generally this would only occur only if the battalion was within 50 yards of 
the enemy when they began firing or if confronted by inexperienced or demoralised 
troops. In this scenario the British would cease firing and pursue the enemy as a unit 
at their colonel’s behest.341 In the event that the enemy did not break after 
sustained fire the battalion would advance before halting at very close range to the 
enemy force and then begin to employ the system once more. The colonel would 
keep the battalion firing until the enemy broke or withdrew out of range. The cavalry 
would pursue a broken enemy as it was key to British doctrine that the infantry 
remained a cohesive unit and did not break ranks to chase a routing or withdrawing 
opponent.342  
 
Dutch tactics appear to have been extremely similar to those employed by the 
British. This is hardly surprising given the influence William III’s Dutch troops and 
generals had on rebuilding the English and Scots armies after the overthrow of 
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James II, combined with the number of English troops who had fought in Dutch 
service since the 1670s.343  
 
French infantry tactics were very different and this goes some way towards 
explaining the poor performances they often gave, especially during the early 
engagements of the War of the Spanish Succession. The French fire by ranks system 
had been admired throughout Europe in the late seventeenth century. In this system 
the battalion would stand in five ranks with the rear rank standing while the four in 
front knelt. The fifth rank would then discharge its fire and the fourth would stand, 
this would repeated until the first rank had fired at which point the four front ranks 
would once again kneel and the process would be repeated. If necessary the first 
firing could be a double volley with the rear rank standing and the fourth rank 
stooping to achieve a particularly devastating result.344  
 
The French system was effective for a period. However, once platoon fire had been 
adopted by the Dutch and British its suitability diminished. Stung by the performance 
of their infantry in the early battles of the war the French attempted to reform the 
firing method they employed. A new form of volley was developed by Villeroi in 1705 
and became standard practice in 1707. This was a poor imitation of platoon fire, 
however, with only a one in twelve muskets in a battalion involved in a firing at any 
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one time in contrast with the much heavier barrage of one in three employed by the 
British and Dutch.345 It was fortunate for the Allied troops at Malplaquet that the 
French had not developed an effective replica of the platoon fire system as it was 
proven to have been a very effective system when fighting defensively. This had 
been shown by the ease at which General Webb’s infantry held off French assaults at 
Wynendaele a year previously losing only 950 men compared to losses of 4,000 by 
the French,346 a four to one ratio compared to the approximately two to one inflicted 
by the French on the Allies at Malplaquet. 
 
Perhaps the reason why the British and Dutch were able to create and effectively 
employ a superior system was due to the difference in doctrine between the 
combatants. As has been seen the British and Dutch preferred to close on the 
enemy, stopping to deliver a barrage at ever-closer ranges. The French, in contrast, 
seemed to prefer to fire either at the last moment before an attack or not at all 
depending on the whim of the colonel who was in command. French commanders, 
rather than lay down a withering hail of fire preferred to use the charge à prest 
which relied on speed and cold-steel to break through the enemy line. Marshal 
Villars was one the advocates of this method and stated, ‘In my opinion, the best 
method for the French infantry […] is to charge with the bayonet on the end of the 
fusil.’ 347 While this tactic was clearly fairly unimaginative it was, at times, successful 
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throughout the period. Presumably this was due to the moral effect a charging mass 
of troops had on the defending infantry. De la Colonie described the fighting during 
the battle of Heyzempirne (3 March 1703) between Bavarian and Imperial troops as 
follows:  
‘the [Bavarian] infantry quickened their pace, in order to dash upon 
the enemy without firing, reserving this until they were in very 
close contact […] our infantry did not experience the same 
resistance [as the cavalry had]: they stood the first effect of the 
enemy’s fire, charged home with bayonets fixed and crushed all 
resistance.’348 
 
However, it is worth noting that at Heyzempirne the Bavarians would not have been 
facing troops using platoon fire, whereas if they had been it would have somewhat 
reduced the likelihood of the charge being successful.  
 
Robert Parker’s description of a fire-fight that took place during the battle of 
Malplaquet between the Royal Regiment of Foot of Ireland and a battalion of, 
similarly experienced, Wild Geese in French service is a much cited example of the 
superior British firing system in action.349 The description is one of the best of the 
period and is worth citing in full: 
‘We continued marching slowly on, till we came to an open in the 
wood. It was a small plain, on the opposite side of which we 
perceived a battalion of the enemy drawn up, a skirt of the wood 
being in the rear of them.  Upon this Colonel Kane, who was then 
at the head of the Regiment, having drawn us up, and formed our 
platoons, advanced gently toward them, with the six platoons of 
our first fire made ready. When we had advanced within a hundred 
paces of them, they gave us a fire of one of their ranks: whereupon 
we halted, and returned them the fire of our six platoons at once; 
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and immediately made ready the six platoons of our second fire, 
and advanced upon them again. They then gave us the fire of 
another rank, and we returned them a second fire, which made 
them shrink; however, they gave us the fire of a third rank after a 
scattering manner, and then retired into the wood in great 
disorder: on which we sent our third fire after them, and saw them 
no more.’ 350 
 
Even when faced with troops of a roughly even calibre to themselves the superiority 
of the platoon fire system was proven. This is even more evident when you look at 
the casualties sustained during the engagement, ‘We had but four men killed, and six 
wounded: and found near forty of them on the spot killed and wounded.’ It is worth 
noting, however, that Parker does not attribute the discrepancy in casualties purely 
to the superior platoon fire system. He also believed that the higher calibre of bullet 
used by the British was a major factor in determining the victor of the firefight. 351  
 
Proportionally, musketry appears to have accounted for a high number of casualties 
sustained in early-modern warfare. According to Corvisier of the veterans wounded 
at Malplaquet who were admitted to Invalides (a French military hospital) in 1715: 
71.4% of wounds were caused by firearms, 15.8%  from swords, 10% from artillery 
fire and 2.8% on account of the bayonet.352 Corvisier also looked at the admittance 
for 1762 and found: 68.8% had been wounded by small arms, 13.4% by artillery, 
14.7% by swords and 2.4% by bayonet.353 Looking at these figures on their own, it 
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would be easy to reach the opinion that musketry was far and away the most 
effective instrument of death on an early-modern battlefield. However it is worth 
noting that these figures only include men who escaped death but were sufficiently 
maimed enough to warrant entering a permanent military hospital. The data cannot 
be said to be an accurate reflection of the spread of casualties incurred on a 
battlefield. For example, a sword or bayonet wound is far more survivable than even 
an indirect hit from a cannonball and, as a result, these wounds may be over-
represented among those admitted. Additionally, it could be argued that a musket 
ball would be more likely to cause lasting damage than a stab wound and thus the 
impact of firepower could be overstated compared to those wounds caused by a 
sword or bayonet.354  
 
However, despite the superior system employed by the British and Dutch, relying on 
musketry was an inefficient way of winning a battle. Even during the Napoleonic 
wars when superior weapons and fire-systems were utilised if one side was not 
willing to break the deadlock a battle of attrition was sure to develop. It seems 
sensible that the same would apply to fighting during the War of the Spanish 
Succession. Morale was the crucial factor in combat and it is no surprise that after 
years of victories the Allied troops generally had more staying power in firefights 
than their French counterparts.355 
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The type of action fought between the Royal Regiment of Foot of Ireland and their 
countrymen in French service would have been a rarity at Malplaquet. It can perhaps 
be argued that the superior musketry of the Allies at Oudenarde had been key to 
that victory, having kept superior numbers of French infantry at bay.356 In general, 
however, Malplaquet was a much messier affair. French infantry had been largely 
used defensively on the Flanders theatre. However, in fairness French troops had 
performed effectively when attacking on other fronts.357 At Malplaquet this 
defensive posture was taken to its most extreme form. Villars appeared to have had 
one operational aim: he would block the road to Mons. Marlborough and Eugene, 
for their part wished to clear it. In attacking these defences it is likely that platoon 
fire would not have been utilised extensively across the battlefield, although it 
clearly proved effective when used by Orkney’s troops to deter the French cavalry 
counter-attack late in the day as will be seen later. Allied attacks on the redoubts 
would have been far more akin to the Franco-Bavarian tactics discussed earlier.  
 
One of the characteristics of eighteenth century warfare that the primary sources 
show is the difficulty troops had trying to hold a position that they had taken by 
storm. The Earl of Orkney described the attempt by the Dutch to take the French 
right flank:  
‘The Dutch who had not above 30 battalions, were attacking their 
retrenchments, which they found to be 3 or 4, one after another; 
but their attack was not so much in wood as ours. They beat the 
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enemy from their retrenchments, but still they regain them again, 
with such a butchering that the oldest generall alive never saw the 
like.’358  
The fact that the Dutch were able to gain the entrenchments at the first attempt is 
extraordinary in itself as they had suffered horrific casualties from enfilading artillery 
fire during their advance. Once they had reached the French close quarter fighting 
would have ensued. Visceral examples of this kind of fighting are detailed later, 
however, in short when infantry became locked in close-quarter combat order 
tended to be lost fairly rapidly and the fighting degenerated into a chaotic brawl and 
troops with forward momentum usually held the initial advantage. However, once 
they had seized their objective the enemy would often send fresh reserves into the 
mix. These more orderly troops would then benefit from the forward momentum 
the attacking forces had previously possessed, and the Allied infantry would not 
have had time to effectively form their lines to implement platoon fire in this chaotic 
situation. As a result the fighting over defensive works often became back and forth 
contests.359  
 
The fighting on the French centre-left flank, at the junction between the woods and 
the plain also showed the fluid nature of fighting. The attack in this sector was led by 
a British brigade under the Duke of Argyll, supported by another brigade of Prussians 
and Danes. John Marshall Deane was present and described the three hour action in 
detail, showing the ebb and flow of this combat over the redoubts. The initial 
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attempt to storm the entrenchments in the wood was unsuccessful, ‘At length a 
brigade of Prussians and Danes marcht in and was most shamefully beet of[f] and 
runn quite back againe out of the wood.’ Perseverance in the attack was key to 
taking a position and thus the Allies sent more troops into the wood: 
 ‘And so it fell out that the brigade of English that the Earl of 
Orkney heads was just ready, drawne up by the wood side and fit 
for service. Who, seeing the afforesayd brigade runn, was soe 
inflamed with madness that instead of being any way frightened 
there at, they by a general consent gradually wheeled into the 
wood and formed the brigade in noble order, and with a full cry 
gave a general huzzae and boldly marcht up to the second 
intrenchment in the wood.’360  
 
De La Colonie described how this British infantry was able to continue the advance in 
the face of French musketry, ‘At last the column, leaving the great battery on its left, 
changed its direction a quarter right and threw itself precipately into the wood on 
our left, making an assault upon that portion which had been breached’. The French 
then unleashed their volley, ‘It sustained the full fire of our infantry entrenched 
therein, and notwithstanding the great number killed on the spot, it continued the 
attack and penetrated into the wood [...].’361  
 
It was very rare for infantry in open terrain to come into physical contact with one 
other, as one side would normally break before the opponent made contract.362 For 
the infantry involved in the fighting over the barricades, however, this was not the 
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case. The fixed bastion gave the defenders a tangible objective to hold and troops 
tended to be far more steadfast when defending entrenchments. This resulted in 
action that was bloody, desperate and fluid in nature. Sergeant John Wilson 
described the assault on French positions in the triangle of woodland on the Allied 
right flank, ‘[We] attacked the Enemy in the wood afores’d with a great deal of 
courage and resolution but were received by the Enemy with as great bravery. Wee 
beat them from that post and they beat us back again with as great courage and 
resolution as wee had them […].’ At this point a stalemate occurred as both sides 
fought over the parapet for two hours during which, ‘there was a great effusion of 
blood on both sides; the Armys fireing at each other bayonett to bayonett. And after 
came to stabb each other with their bayonets and several came so close that they 
knocked one another’s brains out w’th the butt end of their firelocks.’363 The ferocity 
involved in fighting over a parapet or entrenchment was not unique to Malplaquet. 
De la Colonie’s description of the fighting that took place when the Allies attacked 
the Schellenberg is particularly visceral, 
 ‘The English infantry led this attack with the greatest intrepidity, 
right up to our parapet, but there they were opposed with a 
courage at least equal to their own. Rage, fury, and desperation 
were manifested by both sides […]. The little parapet which 
separated the two forces became the scene of the bloodiest 
struggle that could be conceived […]. It would be impossible to 
describe in words strong enough the details of the carnage that 
took place during this first attack, which lasted a good hour or 
more. We were all fighting hand to hand, hurling them back as they 
clutched the parapet; men were slaying, or tearing at the muzzles 
of guns and the bayonets which pierced their entrails; crushing 
under their feet their own wounded comrades, and even gouging 
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out their opponents’ eyes with their nails, when the grip was so 
close that neither could make use of their weapons.’364  
 
Deane stressed the importance of seizing and maintaining the initiative in order to 
blunt the effect of counter-attacking troops. He described the events that took place 
at Malplaquet once his brigade had marched to fill the gap left by the Prussians and 
Danes, ‘And just as they came there Monsr. Villarr, there general, was marching 
doun with 5 regiments of Irish and French to relieve those trenches. But our 
bridgade, being to[o] nimble for them, mounted the breast work and jumpt into 
there intrenchements before they could get to it.’ 365  
 
What followed was one of the most decisive points during the battle.  The French 
fired a volley into the British troops occupying the entrenchments. Rather than 
reform and trade volleys with the French, Argyll ordered his troops to unleash one 
volley at what must be assumed to be very close range, and charged at the French 
and Irish troops with sword and bayonet. Without an entrenchment to hold the five 
counter-attacking regiments were put to flight by the ferocity of this close range 
volley and charge, and Villars was hit in the knee by a musket ball, a wound that put 
him out of action for the rest of the day.  
 
The French forces then withdrew to the third entrenchment. The British rapidly 
reformed with their superior experience, drill and training giving them a distinct 
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advantage over the withdrawing French. Argyll then once more pressed the attack, 
‘our brigade followed them up so furiously that they gave them noe time to draw up 
or forme in any order’. This was clearly a key moment as by not allowing the 
retreating troops to reform Argyll ensured that the enemy could not bring the level 
of firepower that could have halted the attack and driven the British back to bear, as 
had happened to the Dutch on the Allied left flank.  
 
The British continued on to the third trench and, ‘imediately mounted thatt 
breastwork alsoe, and the enemy run like lusty fellows, throwing in some loose 
scattering shott amongst us […]. In short, we drove them cleare out of the wood, and 
there, some of our forces, being drawne up, fell upon them and broke them 
confusedly.’366 The action threatened to turn into a rout, as the French infantry were 
fleeing in disarray, but the presence of the French cavalry forced the pursuing British 
troops to halt, reform and occupy the three entrenchments they had taken. From 
which position they were able to inflict damage on the cavalry by virtue of the two 
small 2-pounder cannon present within each battalion.367  
 
Analysing the performance of the two sides who fought in the wood, Deane was 
dismissive of the French infantry he had faced, ‘the French doth really think that they 
have no business to stand against us in the field except they have eyther a ligne or 
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breastwork, a wood or wall, before them to cover them.’368 Deane was clearly proud 
of British military prowess. De La Colonie, however, held a different view of the 
action. He observed that the success of the British attack, ‘owed as much to [the 
infantry] being drunk with brandy as to martial ardour.’ The Marshal also praised the 
heroism of the common French infantryman, and felt that they were let down by, 
‘some of our best dressed troops [who] did not think proper to hold their ground’. 
Somewhat caustically he added that this was doubtless not due to their courage 
being at fault but rather due to ‘the embarrassment they might cause the State by 
the difficulty that be created in having to replace them.’ 369 
 
De la Colonie felt that had these troops stood then the Allied infantry attacking the 
triangle would have been entirely destroyed and he may have had a case. High 
casualties were sure to follow whenever infantry had to attack a strong barricade in 
the face of obstinate defence, the fighting that took place over Blenheim village (13 
August 1704) being one example of this. Lord Rowe’s attack on the village was met 
with firing at thirty metres, and the brigade suffered 33 percent casualties in the 
process.370 A further four attacks took place on the village but the defenders could 
not be dislodged, although this was not have an effect on the battle as the victory 
was secured elsewhere.371 Despite Deane’s disparaging remarks about the French 
forces he faced the fighting for the 600 yard triangle of woodland was some of the 
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most bloody experienced by Allied forces during the war, and it has been estimated 
that of the 22,000 casualties suffered by the Grand Alliance at Malplaquet 7,000 
occurred in that area.372 
Facing Artillery at Malplaquet 
Before reaching the forest to launch their attack Lottum’s twenty-two battalions had 
to withstand a torrent of artillery fire.373 Throughout the early modern era, facing 
artillery gun-fire could be one of the most hellish experiences in warfare. Gunners 
loading the cannon had options as to which projectile they could fire. If infantry were 
standing over 200 yards away then they would be targeted by round-shot. This was 
generally fired directly at the target but was much more useful in knocking down 
defences than dispatching scores of men.374 Nevertheless coming under fire from 
distant batteries could be a very stressful experience for the common infantryman. 
Chronicling the action at Donauwörth (2 July 1704) La Colonie left a graphic 
description of what it was like to come under fire from distant artillery: 
 ‘I had scarcely finished speaking when the enemy’s battery opened 
fire upon us, and raked us through and through. They concentrated 
their fire upon us, and with their first discharge carried off Count 
de la Bastide, the lieutenant of my company with whom at the 
moment I was speaking, and twelve grenadiers who fell side by side 
in the ranks, so that my coat was covered with brains and blood.’375  
 
It is unlikely that this would have truly been the first salvo, the initial few shots of a 
barrage were often used as range finders, and it often took three of these barrages 
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to successfully target the stationary infantry.376 The infantry thus would have had 
warning that a barrage was coming, which in itself must have been a nerve 
shredding experience. Once the guns established the range thirteen comrades being 
mangled by a single salvo of ten guns firing at long range would have come as even 
more of a shock. This however was just the beginning of an ordeal that was to cost 
De La Colonie, ‘five officers and eighty grenadiers killed on the spot before we had 
fired a single shot […].’377 At shorter ranges grape shot would be used. This was the 
eighteenth-century equivalent of a machine gun, as a canister containing fragments 
of metal was loaded into the barrel of the piece. Once fired, this would burst open at 
the muzzle and would launch a shower of shot at attacking infantry. Coming under 
fire from grape shot was invariably devastating. At the battle of Kolin (1757) a 
Prussian battalion lost every single one of its lieutenants under a barrage of canister 
shot.378  
 
The deployment of artillery was paramount to its success on the field. Gunners could 
be impressively accurate but if they were unable to see a target then they would not 
hit it. As Nockhern de Schorn stated:  
‘On the defensive they [gunners] sweep extensive areas of ground, 
and beat and defend the approaches and avenues along which the 
enemy must advance. There is a second maxim which is no less 
important namely to take up positions from where you may take the 
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enemy in enfilade, and in the rear so that you take them under 
oblique fire and torment them from every side.’379  
 
The French artillery at Malplaquet was positioned extremely well. Almost all of the 
batteries were placed on the flanks or in front of defensive redoubts. In order to take 
the French frontline Allied troops would need to attack these redoubts. This meant 
that almost all attacking troops would be entering clear avenues of fire, which was to 
prove particularly devastating to the 30 battalions of Dutch and Scottish troops, 
commanded by the Prince of Orange, who were tasked with routing the French left 
flank. In this section of the field a hidden French battery of 20 guns was positioned in 
such a way that it would take the advancing troops in flank. This resulted in 
horrendous casualties being suffered by the attacking troops. The battery held its fire 
until the regiments were around 100 yards from the French position. Once the cannon 
opened the effect was murderous, hundreds of officers and men fell rapidly. Chandler 
placed the casualties at 5,000 after thirty minutes, which represents a significant 
portion of the total losses suffered by the Allies over the course of the battle.380  
Despite the massive casualties the Dutch kept attacking and the elite Blue Guards 
suffered horrendously. A second attack was launched but this was no more successful, 
and once again resulted in severe casualties. It is worth noting, however, that a 
bombardment by canister shot did not automatically mean an attack would fail even 
if the fire was enfilading. The Dutch did manage to reach and briefly take the French 
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positions. On the Allied left the troops also managed to successfully assault through 
enfilading fire, as De La Colonie witnessed: 
‘They [Allied Infantry] came on at a slow pace, and by seven o’clock 
had arrived in line with the battery threatening our centre. As soon 
as this dense column appeared fourteen [French] guns were 
promptly brought up in front of our brigade almost in line with the 
Regiment de Garde Francaise. The fire of this battery was terrific and 
hardly a shot missed its mark.’  
 
The bombardment of the Allied infantry was unrelenting as they advanced but it did 
not break the assault, 
 ‘the cannon shot poured forth without a break, plunging into the 
enemy’s infantry and carried off whole ranks at a time, but a gap was 
no sooner created than it was filled again and they continued to 
advance upon us without giving us any idea of the actual point 
determined on for their attack.’ 381 
 
Long range bombardments, despite not being as physically devastating as close range 
canister fire, had a very draining effect on morale of the infantry forced to endure 
them. Keegan writing about the ‘Grand Battery’ at Waterloo stated, ‘the arrival of 
their solid cannon-balls was so frequent, the effect of the balls on human flesh so 
destructive, the apprehension of those spurred so intense that the cannonade came 
as near as near as anything suffered by the British at Waterloo to breaking their 
line.’382 Keegan’s analysis is certainly consistent with De La Colonie’s account of the 
fighting at the Schellenberg in 1704. His main frustration was that he was unable to 
act to stop his men being hit, ‘So accurate was the fire that each discharge of the 
cannon stretched some of my men on the ground. I suffered agonies at seeing these 
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brave fellows perish without a chance of defending themselves, but it was absolutely 
necessary that they should not move from their post.’383 This sense of helplessness in 
the face of long range artillery fire and the frustration of not being able to strike back 
at the enemy appears to have been the most difficult part of standing up to a barrage. 
Troops moving to engage the enemy would have believed that they could influence 
events and somehow get their revenge, but standing in the open there would have 
been no such relief. Morale and cohesion, therefore, was bound to suffer 
accordingly.384  
 
At Malplaquet, however, the effect on Orkney’s battalions in the centre was not 
devastating, ‘It was about one o’clock that my 13 battalions got up to the 
retrenchments, which we got very easily; for as we advanced, they quitted them and 
inclined to their right. All this while, from 7 o’clock, we were under the fire of their 
cannon [...].’385 Orkney’s battalions were able absorb a sustained bombardment for 
six hours before launching a successful attack. Troops with high morale such as the 
British, who had experienced notable successes throughout the war, could be 
effective even after suffering from an intense bombardment of round-shot. A further 
example of this is the behaviour of De La Colonie’s Bavarians at the Schellenberg. They 
were successful in driving Allied attacks back, despite the casualties sustained in the 
bombardment described earlier,386 and were only pushed back from the Schellenberg 
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due to a flanking attack rendering their linear position untenable.387 Clearly, however, 
round-shot was effective at dealing damage to troops from behind prepared defences. 
The troops at the Schellenberg had the advantage of being situated atop a hill, which 
would have limited the effectiveness of the Allied bombardment. However, at 
Malplaquet the French troops were positioned on flat ground and in forests. The 
defences they had prepared provided some shelter from the Allied bombardment but 
it is clear that a significant portion of damage was done to these entrenchments, which 
provided a significant boost to the troops attacking the formidable positions on the 
French left and gave them a fighting chance of capturing them. De La Colonie was once 
again active in this sector with his Bavarians and described the bombardment: ‘Next 
morning [11 September] at break of day the [Allied] battery of thirty cannon opened 
fire, and by its continuous volleys succeeded in breaching the entrenchments in the 
wood on our left, and the head of the enemy’s infantry column made its 
appearance.’388 
 
De La Colonie suggested that his stern leadership was crucial to ensuring that his 
regiment did not break under bombardment, ‘I would allow no man even to bow his 
head before the storm, fearing that the regiment would find itself in disorder when 
the time came for us to make the rapid movement that would be demanded of us.’ 389 
This method of urging the troops to remain still, rather than duck or weave, appears 
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to have been more theoretical than practical. Muir stated that it was a maxim of 
Napoleonic leadership but was never actually successful as it is human nature to duck 
and weave in the face of an incoming missile. It is entirely possible that De La Colonie 
told his troops to remain still under fire, but it is very unlikely that they did so.390 
Veteran infantry units could often tell when to expect a cannon shot, it could be seen 
as a black spot in the air or by the quivering in the air.391 De La Colonie, a veteran, 
would have known this. He would have expected his men to try and evade the cannon 
balls. By ordering his men not to duck, however, he was showing his own disdain for 
enemy fire. He hoped that they would heed the example of his own personal courage.  
 
Displays like De La Colonie’s were a feature of warfare during the period and do appear 
to have been effective in helping men to endure lengthy bombardments. Indeed three 
generals died in the Prince of Orange’s disastrous attack on the French right-flank, and 
the Prince himself was positioned in an exposed position throughout the fighting, 
much to the consternation of his staff.392  De La Colonie expressed his respect for an 
officer leading troops under fire at Malplaquet during Lottum’s advance, and 
attributed the continuation of the advance in the face of heavy fire to his leadership, 
‘I could not help noticing the officer in command, who although he seemed elderly 
was nevertheless so active that in giving his orders there was no cessation of action 
anywhere […].’393  
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This penchant for displaying personal leadership also goes some way to explaining the 
disproportionate number of generals decapitated by cannonball during battles and 
sieges a long list including such figures as the Marquis de St Ruth at Aughrim (1691) 
and the Duke of Berwick at Phillipsburg (1734). Indeed the list of higher ranking 
officers killed or wounded at Malplaquet is extensive, precisely due to the fact that 
the officer class was expected to expose themselves to danger. Orkney described the 
French losses, ‘I hear they have three general officers killed and a great many 
wounded, amongst which is the Marshal Villars, Duke de Guiche, Albergotty and many 
officers I can’t name.’ The Allies also suffered, ‘There is hardly any general that either 
is not shot in his clothes or his horse. I am sure mine had such raps that I thought he 
would have thrown me down; but it was upon an iron buckle, so my horse was saved; 
but many has had 8, 4 and 5 horses shot under them.’394 
 
As well as personal leadership it seems that a belief in providence was responsible for 
men standing firm under fire.395 John Blackadder, an extremely devout man, certainly 
believed that God was watching over his troops, 
‘They raised batteries and played upon us with their cannon. There 
was not a place in the whole line so much exposed as where our 
regiment, and two or three more stood: and we had considerable 
loss. Many a cannon-ball came very near, but He gave his angels 
charge over me. Thou art my shield and buckler. This I trusted in, and 
thought; but in the goodness of God let none of them touch me.’396 
                                                     
394 Orkney, Letters, p.321. 
395 M. Snape, The Redcoat and Religion: The Forgotten History of the British Soldier from the Age of 
Marlborough to the Eve of the First World War, (London, 2005), pp.39-42. 




 A belief in providence and the theory that every bullet had its billet was held 
extensively. It was certainly reassuring for troops to believe that God would keep them 
safe, but it did not mean that they would stand idly by while cannon pointed at them 
without proper cause. Indeed, officers throughout the period realised that even small 
movements would relieve some of the pressure on their troops. Therefore, rather 
than have battalions constantly standing in the face of fire, they would be marched 
around to some extent. This meant that soldiers would have some small relief from 
the bombardment.397 
 
The Experience of Cavalry at Malplaquet 
Armies of the period still continued to have a strong cavalry element. Cavalry often 
made up around 25-30% of a force’s total strength,398 and it remained the most 
prestigious arm throughout Marlborough’s campaigns as well as being the most 
expensive. Indeed the Marquis de Santa-Cruz estimated in the 1730s that 
maintaining 1000 cavalry cost as much as 2500 infantry.399 This section will explore 
the role played by cavalry during the battle of the Malplaquet in order to explore 
how effective it was on the battlefield, and will attempt to collate the experiences of 
soldiers from the era of the battle in order to build up a picture of what it was like to 
be a mounted soldier during the War of the Spanish succession. 
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Two distinct types of cavalry appear to have operated within the forces fighting at 
Malplaquet: heavy cavalry and dragoons (who fought as dismounted infantry in 
battle).400  The most common type of heavy cavalryman, would have been the 
cuirassier. It is difficult to find a precise description of a cuirassier’s weapons as they 
varied from squadron to squadron and army to army. The armour worn by cavalry 
units also varied.  Heavy cavalry in the French and Imperial armies retained the back 
and breast plate throughout the war, although Villars attempted to introduce a 
démi-cuirass, possibly to avoid against unnecessary retreats as it did not protect the 
back, making a cavalryman more vulnerable when in flight. This was often worn with 
leather gauntlets, a thick leather coat and leather riding boots, double folded at the 
knee to protect against sword slashes. British cavalry had abandoned the breast-
plate prior to the Nine Years War. Marlborough, however, saw the value of 
armoured cavalry and ordered his cavalry to wear the breast-plate underneath their 
redcoats in 1707. Armoured helmets had fallen out of fashion during the 
seventeenth century for the majority of forces, although Imperial armies still used 
them. The tricorne hat was extensively worn. A metal pot was often worn in the 
crown in order to defend the head from slashes.401  
 
In terms of weaponry a heavy cavalryman would be armed with either a straight 
sword ora curved sabre, the latter of which was more common amongst French 
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forces. The advantage of the sabre was that it was more effective for slashing 
downwards at infantry. Wounds inflicted by the Cuirassier’s armament, whether 
sword or sabre, appear to have been less deadly than those of musketry. During the 
Napoleonic Wars many cavalryman expressed dissatisfaction with the killing power 
of their weapons, with one British officer declaring ‘A Light Dragoon’s sabre was 
hardly capable of killing’.402 Their French counter-parts also complained about the 
effectiveness of their ‘long cumbersome swords’.403 It appears reasonable to assume 
that the killing power of such weaponry would not have suffered an extreme dip in 
quality during the century between the War of the Spanish Succession and the 
Napoleonic Wars. Indeed, one of the main reasons why cavalry caused far less 
serious wounds than musketry was due to a cavalryman having to undertake 
multiple tasks in combat as he would have to protect both himself and his horse, as 
well as the controlling his horse and ensuring that his blows hit home.404  
Additionally, a cuirassier would have been armed with two pistols. By the time of the 
War of the Spanish Succession the unreliable wheel-lock had been replaced by the 
superior flintlock. Finally a significant number of cavalrymen would have been 
equipped with a musketoon, a type of blunderbuss or a carbine.405  
 
                                                     
402 A.E. Clark-Kennedy, Attack on the Colour! The Royal Dragoons in the Peninsula and at Waterloo, 
(London, 1975), p.79 cited in Muir, Tactics and the Experience of Battle, p.108. 
403 D. Johnson, Napoleon’s Cavalry and its Leaders, (London, 1978), p.16 cited in Muir, Tactics and the 
Experience of Battle, p.109. 
404 Muir, Tactics and the Experience of Battle, pp.108-109. 
405 Chandler, The Art of Warfare, p.33. 
141 
  
Cavalry combat was often a fluid affair with squadrons charging, routing the enemy, 
but then being driven back themselves by reinforcements or by the fire of supporting 
infantry units. The charge of the Gendarmerie at Blenheim is an example of this. The 
battlefield at Blenheim was ideal cavalry terrain, ‘here was a fine plain without 
hedge or ditch; for there were but few foot to interpose, these being mostly engaged 
at the villages.’406 The Gendarmerie were seen as Tallard’s elite troops and thus he 
fully expected his eight squadrons to break through Marlborough’s five English 
squadrons before Blenheim village. The Gendarmerie advanced toward the five 
English squadrons who, wary of being caught stationary themselves moved forward 
towards the oncoming enemy. The Gendarmerie then ‘made so bold and resolute a 
charge, that they broke through our [the British] first line […].407  
 
Cavalry would often pass through each other when charging before engaging in a 
melee then reforming to repeat the process again. De la Colonie described this at 
Schmidmidel (1703), 
‘The cavalry on both sides, after having driven its way through the 
opposing forces, whilst there infantry were still engaged, retired, 
re-formed and actually met once again in the charge; but after a 
long and hard fight each side retired for a second time to their own 
part of the field, both losing a great number of men.’408  
 
Nosworthy called this ‘threading’ the enemy line and pointed out that this could not 
have occurred had cavalry charged ‘knee to knee’ as, had this been the case, the two 
                                                     
406 Chandler, Military Memoirs, p.41. 
407 Ibid., p.41. 
408 De la Colonie, Chronicles of an Old Campaigner¸ p.138. 
142 
  
bodies of horsemen would have collided,  rather than ‘threaded’, assuming one side 
did not break. It would seem then that cavalry charging during the era left gaps of a 
least a horse width between individual troopers. In terms of pace the cavalry would 
have charged at the trot often slowing down before collision in order to engage in 
individual combat, it was only when they did not slow down that this threading 
would occur. 409  
 
 Cavalry doctrine had been subject of much change in the proceeding centuries, 
especially with regard to how the pistols should be used. Falkner put forward the 
view that around one hundred years prior to Malplaquet cavalry had abandoned the 
advantages of momentum as rather than charge the enemy in a shock action cavalry 
would instead seek to engage the enemy, whether fellow horseman or infantry, with 
pistols. The most popular method of achieving this in the early-seventeenth century 
was the caracole. Cavalry would approach an enemy force several ranks deep, each 
rank would then ride up to the enemy in and fire before wheeling to the rear of the 
formation to reload. 410  The intention of this was to blow a hole in an enemy 
formation in order to charge through. It was, however, distinctly ineffective as 
cavalry using the formation would be very evenly matched and cavalry pistols were 
outperformed by infantry musketry, which had a longer range and muzzle velocity 
and thus were more powerful. Gustavus Adolphus was credited with the restoring 
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the status of cavalry as a shock force on the battlefield.411 Lynn, however, has 
pointed out that he was not the first to emphasize cold steel over firepower and that 
the French seem to have adopted such tactics from around 1600.412 There is a 
consensus in the historiography that from the 1670’s until the end of the Nine Years 
War French cavalry would have charged in with cold steel only, abandoning the 
pistol in the charge.413  
 
Nosworthy stated that after the Nine Years war the French generals, somewhat 
inexplicably given the success of the previous twenty years, became split between 
charging without use of a pistol and once again attempting to unleash a volley of 
pistol fire while on the charge. The second option he argued came at a huge cost to 
the momentum of the charge and, as a result, the Anglo-Dutch cavalry began to have 
much more success against French cuirassiers during the War of the Spanish 
Succession, citing the charge of the Gendarmerie at Blenheim as evidence of this, 
‘The Eight squadrons of Gendarmerie initially advanced as if they were going to 
charge the English; however, to the latter’s astonishment, they halted when they 
advanced to within pistol range and discharged a feeble volley. This was noticeably 
ineffective and, worse, still interfered with the momentum of the charge, nullifying 
any advantage derived from the slope.’414 Unfortunately Nosworthy does not 
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provide a source for this evidence, although Falkner seems to agree with his view. 
However, looking at both Parker’s earlier statement and Mérode-Westerloo’s 
account it would seem that Nosworthy’s analysis of the effectiveness of the French 
attack is flawed. As Mérode-Westerloo pointed out, ‘our [the French] charge went 
well and the Gendarmerie flung their first line on to their second.’ 415 The French 
charge clearly did have momentum. It was only after the initial shock that the five 
squadrons of British horsemen gained the upper-hand. This means that either the 
Gendarmerie did not engage with pistols prior to charging or firing a pistol prior to 
engaging did not have the huge negative impact on the force of a charge. On balance 
it is likely French cavalry tactics varied from unit to unit, as Lynn stated, ‘It would be 
foolish to expect uniformity during the grand siècle’.416  
 
In contrast the Anglo-Dutch cavalry are credited with being more uniform in that 
they would only use cold-steel in the charge, as General Kane attested, ‘The Duke of 
Marlborough would allow the horse but three charges of powder and ball to each 
man for a campaign, and that only for guarding their horses when at grass, and not 
to be made use of in action.’417 However, the effectiveness of this order is open to 
debate. In battle the horse would have used every advantage during a melee and it 
appears that they would have fired their pistols, as Peter Drake attested to when 
facing an Allied attack at Malplaquet, ‘Most of the front rank of the [Allied] 
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squadron, if not all, fired a volley at the same time, so that I had eleven shot fairly 
marked on my cuirass, or breastplate, and two through the skirts of my coat.’418 That 
Drake, who it must be admitted was prone to exaggeration, was able to survive so 
many hits once again casts some doubt on the killing power of the cavalry armament 
and it is not surprise that many combats were prolonged stalemates. 
 
Given the similarity in tactics and equipment used by cavalry during the era it would 
appear that the key factors in determining the outcome of an extended combat 
between two opposing bodies of horsemen would have been the quality of the 
horses that were being used by both sides, as well as the morale of the troops 
fighting. If the initial charge did not break the enemy cavalry completely, then 
combat would often devolve into a series of withdrawals, rallies and counter-
charges, which often proved exhausting for the horses involved. This stalemate could 
continue indefinitely. As De la Colonie observed during the battle of Heyzempirne: 
‘The first shock was a very sharp one, and gave one the impression that animosity 
between people of the same nation was more obstinate than if they had been 
strangers to one another.’ After the initial shock of the charge however the combat 
soon settled into a stalemate, ‘Victory hung for a long time in the balance between 
the opposing cavalry, so stubborn was the fight.’ In the end it was only the victory of 
the Bavarian infantry against their Imperial counterparts which brought an end to 
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the cavalry combat, ‘Soon afterwards the enemy’s cavalry gave way and the route 
became universal.’419  
 
Prior to the battle of Blenheim, the British cavalry in particular were in excellent 
shape, as Prince Eugene attested to when inspecting the British cavalry. He told 
Marlborough, ‘I never saw better horses, better clothes, finer belts and 
accoutrements; yet all these may be had for money; but there is a spirit in the looks 
of your men, which I never yet saw in any in my life.’’420 Confidence among the 
British was clearly high, and this would have only been enhanced following the 
successful pursuit of the Franco-Bavarian regiments holding the Schellenberg. In 
contrast Tallard’s horsemen at Blenheim had endured a much more draining march. 
French troops had fought constant skirmishes with German peasants in the Black 
Forest.421 Furthermore Tallard’s horses had suffered from a bout of glanders (a 
debilitating equine disease) on the march, a key reason why the two Franco-Bavarian 
armies had to be kept separate on the battlefield.422  
 
The British cavalry therefore clearly had an advantage. The fighting between the 
Gendarmerie and the five British squadrons, however, still took the best part of a 
morning to resolve itself. The counter-attack by the British successfully stemmed the 
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tide of the French advance, ‘and now our squadrons charge in their turn, and thus 
for some hours they charge at each other with various success, all sword in hand. At 
length the French courage began to abate, and our squadrons gained ground upon 
them, until they forced them back to the height on which they were drawn up.’ The 
British cavalry, however, could not effectively pursue the defeated Gendarmerie, as 
the ‘[French] foot interposed’. Confronted with this formed body of infantry the 
attacking horsemen were obliged to retire. 423 
 
The cavalry combat at Malplaquet followed a similar pattern to the two actions 
discussed. Given the wooded nature of the battlefield the only area that was truly 
suitable for combat was a section in the centre of the French line. The French 
expected an Allied assault on that section of the line and thus, as with the rest of the 
line, it was heavily fortified, ‘those out in the open opposite the end of the avenue 
constructed cannon-proof parapets with gaps here and there to facilitate an advance 
in times of need.’ 424 For the troops manning it, this fortification proved to be an 
effective counter to the Allied artillery. However the French cavalry, including the 
Maison du Roi, had no such protection from Marlborough’s guns and were targeted 
with fire throughout the day.425 This was not a rare scenario for cavalry, who during 
the Napoleonic period would often spend the day of a battle, ‘sitting quietly on their 
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horses or lounging beside them, perhaps under distant artillery fire waiting for 
orders to move forward.’426 
 
These strong parapets at the very centre of the French line should have been a 
difficult obstacle for Orkney’s infantry, only 13 battalions strong, to take. Had the 
French in this section stood firm it is highly likely they would have won the day. 
Certainly there would not have been so great a cavalry combat. The two bodies of 
horsemen would have simply been unable to get to grips with one another but the 
fighting on the French left flank was to open the door to massed cavalry combat. 
Despite the high casualties described earlier the Allies had been slowly winning the 
attritional fighting in the triangle of woodland. Wary of his flank being turned by the 
Allied infantry Villars was forced to reinforce the left. To do this he first sent the Wild 
Geese into the wood. De la Colonie then explained what happened, ‘By the time the 
Irish Brigade had got well into the wood it was considered to be hardly sufficient as a 
reinforcement by itself and an order come for us to follow it, although there was no 
one else left to fill our place which would be left open to the enemy.’ Perhaps trying 
to distance himself from the eventual cause of the French having to leave the field 
De la Colonie continued, 
‘When the first order was brought to the brigade-major, who 
reported it to me, I refused to obey it, and pointed out the absolute 
necessity that existed for our maintaining the position we were 
holding; but a lieutenant-general then arrived on the scene, and 
ordered us a second time to march off, so sharply that all our 
remonstrances were useless.’427 
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The movement created a gap in the centre of the French line and Orkney’s infantry 
were not slow to exploit this situation, ‘It was about one o’clock that my 13 
battalions got up to the retrenchments, which we got very easily; for as we 
advanced, they quitted them and inclined to their right.’428 De la Colonie was just as 
scathing in his description of the troops in the centre as he had been of those who 
withdrew on the left as the entire French centre gave way with barely a shot being 
fired: 
 ‘When these battalions advanced to seize our entrenchments the 
fine infantry holding our centre, who had so far not suffered from a 
single hostile shot, had every opportunity of deploying to cover the 
gap made by our empty entrenchments, but then they would have 
run still more risk of spoiling their beautiful uniforms, their most 
noticeable characteristic, and they therefore retired to find a 
quieter spot where they would be safe from any such rough 
handling.429  
 
Confronted with the elite French cavalry force the Masion du Roi, Orkney’s infantry 
wisely decided not to press their attack and instead held the entrenchments while 
providing covering fire to allow the main body of Allied horsemen to pass through.430 
Determined not to let the Allied forces exploit this gap Boufflers, who was now in 
command, charged at the head of the Maison du Roi. De La Colonie described the 
consequent action, ‘having reformed in the plain beyond, they [The Allied Cavalry] 
moved straight upon the Maison du Roi, who likewise advanced to give them battle. 
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The Scots Guards of the Queen of England, most excellent troops led the charge, 
which was a most violent one […].’431  
 
Orkney described the intensity of the initial contact, ‘Before we got 30 squadrons 
out they came down and attacked; and there was such a pelting at another that I 
never really saw the like.’432 The Allied cavalry should have held had the initial 
advantage. The Maison du Roi had been under a heavy cannonade since the morning 
whilst the Allied cavalry were comparatively untouched, due to the French artillery 
targeting Orkney’s unsheltered infantry. Orkney continued, ‘We broke through 
them, particularly four squadrons of English. Jemmy Campbell, at the head of the 
grey dragoons, behaved like an angell, broke through both lines.’  
 
If the Allied cavalry could have kept up this momentum Malplaquet could have 
proved to be an extremely decisive battle, as they would have been behind the 
French army’s line of retreat. However, as in the previous two case studies, the initial 
contact did not decide the outcome of the combat. The French cavalry were able to 
disentangle themselves, once again showing the fluid nature of cavalry combat 
during the period. The Maison du Roi reformed and charged again, and this time 
they beat back the Allied forces to such an extent that, ‘they pushed back our horse 
again so much that many of them run thro’ our entrenchments.’ 433 
                                                     
431 De la Colonie, Chronicles of an Old Campaigner, p.342. 
432 Orkney, Letters, p.319. 




The Allies kept feeding more squadrons into the combat hoping to use numbers to 
achieve the decisive outcome that they hoped would ensure a full rout of the French 
army. The Allied horsemen, however, did not manage to repeat the success of the 
initial contact, and indeed Orkney believed that they would have been driven back 
had his infantry battalions not been present in the entrenchments to prevent any 
exploitation taking place.434 Like the combats described earlier the cavalry fighting at 
Malplaquet took place over an extended period of time. The Allies passed more and 
more horsemen through the gaps in the entrenchments, and six times they were 
driven back by Boufflers only to rally once Orkney’s troops opened fire. Eventually 
Boufflers was forced back by sheer weight of numbers, and the Allied cavalry were 
able to deploy properly. However they could still not force their French counterparts 
from the field and the fighting continued for a further hour.435 Eventually, the 
superior numbers of the Allied cavalry was decisive, along with the fact they were 
able to keep committing fresh troops to the fight against the tired men and horses of 
the French cavalry. As Deane described: 
 ‘our men maynteynd ther ground until such time as the rest of our 
horse had got over the moross and made an a body and could up 
and sustaine them. The wch. they did in noble order, and gave 
them gennll. onset and broke them at a great rate [….] and forced 
them to turn tayle and runn.’  
 
Deane goes on to explain that 40 squadrons of the Allied horse were then sent to 
pursue the fleeing French forces. This pursuit carried on for three or four leagues 
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allowing the cavalry to inflict heavy losses on the retreating force, ‘giving but very 
few quarters, and made a very great slaughter’.436 It is likely that far more losses 
would have been sustained in the flight of the French cavalry than in the extended 
mêlée as men who had previously been pre-occupied with controlling their horses 
and defending themselves were presented with a clear sight of the enemy’s backs.437 
 
One of the key features of the massed cavalry combats discussed was the impact 
that the close support of infantry had in preventing a retreat turning into a rout. The 
pursuit of the Gendarmerie by the five successful British squadrons at Blenheim was 
halted by a battalion of French infantry while Orkney’s infantry occupying the 
entrenchments at Malplaquet played a key role in bolstering d’Auvergne’s cavalry 
who had suffered at the hands of the Maison du Roi. Orkney stated, ‘I realy believe 
had not ye foot been there, they would have drove our horse out the field’.438 At 
Heyzempirne the infantry had broken first and thus the entire force suffered heavy 
casualties in the retreat that followed, as the pursuing Bavarian force could get in 
among cavalry and foot soldiers alike.439  
 
The French withdrawal at Malplaquet was very well carried out and losses to the 
French infantry were not heavy, indeed they ‘marched for all the world as if we were 
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merely changing our camping ground, without any hurry and confusion.’440 Boufflers’ 
constant attacks at the head of the Maison du Roi kept any Allied cavalry pursuit at 
bay. Once the Maison du Roi broke, however, the danger of a lack of infantry 
support was immediately evident. The retreating French forces came upon a wide 
stream which slowed the retreat and there were fears that the victorious Allied 
cavalry would cause further damage to the retreating French horsemen. De la 
Colonie’s Bavarians were therefore ordered to cover the retreat, ‘I then recrossed 
the brook and posted my men in the gardens round the village, by which means I 
covered the cavalry rear-guard and prevented the enemy approaching.’  
 
When withdrawing combined arms tactics were clearly essential and the rear-guard 
of French cavalry returned the favour for the Bavarians, covering them while they 
retreated from the Allied forces. As De la Colonie explained, ‘for there were yet two 
more leagues to march before reaching Valenciennes, over open country in which 
my men would have been much exposed if the enemy had followed us up.’ 441  
 
Conclusion 
During the infantry combat at Malplaquet it is clear that the morale of the Allied 
troops, having emerged victorious over their French counterparts since 1704, was 
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key to taking the French defences on the right flank, which ultimately allowed 
Orkney’s troops to advance into the French centre with little difficulty. 
While earlier in the war the platoon fire system was key to winning victories on the 
Flanders front, the conditions at Malplaquet did not allow the Allies (with a few 
exceptions such as Kane’s regiment meeting the Wild Geese) to use this particular 
advantage as the Allied officers would have wanted to seriously limit the time that 
their forces were subject to artillery fire during the advance on the French redoubts. 
Instead the infantry combat at Malplaquet resembled a melee. Troops would have 
unleashed a volley at close range and then engaged the French with bayonet, sword 
and musket-butts during the constant flow of attacks and counter-attacks over the 
redoubts. The nature of the fighting certainly meant that the Allied infantry had lost 
their major advantage over the French, but they still emerged victorious in the 
fighting on the right flank and the advance on the left also achieved initial success. 
The reason for this appears to have been the high morale of the troops. The Allied 
infantry had emerged victorious at Blenheim, Ramilles and Oudenarde and were, 
therefore, confident in their ability to win the day. This confidence meant that they 
did not break even when faced with the formidable French defences and resolutely 
kept attacking until the French right had fallen.  The way that the Allied infantry was 
able to keep up the pressure in the face of stern resistance is the hallmark of a well-
honed veteran army. However, this came at a cost as Marlborough’s veteran infantry 
kept attacking even when other forces would have broken sustaining heavy 




The French infantry certainly put on a much improved display at Malplaquet 
compared to previous battles in the war. However, the reason for this appears clear. 
They found it easier to hold their ground against the Allied troops when defending a 
tangible objective, as indeed they regularly achieved during sieges earlier in the war 
and during the fighting in Blenheim village as early as 1704. The nature of the terrain 
and the fact that Villars had been given time to build up his defences at Malplaquet 
by Marlborough and Eugene appears to be the reason for the improved performance 
by the French troops rather than any doctrinal shift. Indeed, had the French troops 
been able to develop an effective firing system by this point in the war it is difficult 
to see how the Allies could have taken such a strong defensive position. 
 
On the French right flank too the Dutch attack was pursued with vigour. The damage 
inflicted by enfilading grape-shot, however, was incredibly devastating. Artillery 
when positioned well presented a formidable obstacle to advancing infantry. That 
the Dutch were able to press ahead in the face of this firepower twice, once again 
demonstrates the good morale of the veteran Allied army. The Artillery used at 
Malplaquet inflicted heavy losses on both forces. However, on both flanks it was not 
able to stop the Allied advance despite the heavy casualties it inflicted. Artillery was 
an important element in a combined arms strategy but was not yet powerful enough 
to halt an advance on its own. However, it was a very useful component during 
battle as demonstrated in the heavy bombardment by the Allied artillery of the 
French left flank. This bombardment significantly softened up the first line of French 
redoubts and would have reduced the difficulties faced by the infantry upon 
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reaching the positons, giving the troops a fighting chance of achieving success in the 
sector, which they eventually did at a significant cost. 
 
The performance of the French cavalry undoubtedly saved the army at Malplaquet 
once the decision to withdraw had been made. Throughout the war, despite 
differences in doctrine, which appear somewhat overstated, French and Allied 
cavalry had performed fairly equally. The main threat of a cavalry force came once 
an opponent had been routed, as they had a free rein to inflict heavy casualties on 
retreating infantry forces. At Malplaquet, however, aided by the fact that the Allied 
cavalry had to advance through gaps in the line that Orkney’s infantry had taken, the 
French cavalry performed admirably to stop the Allied forces rolling up their infantry 
thereby reducing the effectiveness of the Allied cavalry when compared to battles 
such as Blenheim or Ramillies. Indeed the French cavalry succeeded in pushing back 
their Allied counterparts several times before the fighting developed into a 
stalemate, as was common for the era. The French did have a number of 
opportunities to break this stalemate, but due to effective firing from Orkney’s 
troops manning the centre they were unable to rout Allied cavalry, thus showing the 
value of mounted units operating with close support from the infantry, and they 





The 1709 campaign has mainly been viewed through the lens of Marlborough’s 
wider career. English language works surrounding Marlborough have mainly been 
written by his admirers, who have often downplayed the battle in favour of focusing 
on the major victories of Blenheim, Ramillies and, to a lesser extent, Oudenarde. This 
thesis has attempted to readdress this imbalance of the historiography and has 
focused almost entirely on the 1709 campaign as a case study for Marlborough’s 
generalship. A wider critical reassessment of Marlborough’s military career would be 
a welcome addition to the literature as would further attempts to link the actions of 
the ‘great captains’ of the age to the effects these had on the experience of the 
common soldier during battle in order to get a multi-level view of warfare during the 
period.  
 
The early plans for the campaign do show a certain level of innovation on the part of 
Marlborough. The suggestion to launch an assault on Ypres before linking up with an 
amphibious force that had descended on Picardy was novel by the standards of the 
area, at least with such a large army. Had this plan been successfully implemented it 
could have bypassed the fortress-belt on the French frontier leaving the French 
interior open to attack. However, it would appear that the plan was rejected with 
good reasons as combined operations were inherently risky. Furthermore, 
Marlborough would have still had to induce and win a decisive battle against a large 
field army to have a free rein within the French interior and his army would have to 
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have been supplied via the Channel. The operation would have been a huge gamble 
and was perhaps too ambitious for the era given the logistical difficulties involved.  
 
While it was sensible for the Allies to reject the risky strategy of descents, one area 
in which a major operational mistake was made was the decision not to attack Ypres 
and instead to focus on Tournai. Ypres appears to have been the more strategically 
important of the two towns, positioned as it was near the Channel. The French, for 
their part, clearly felt that the Allies would attack Ypres and were certainly worried 
by the possibility that it would fall. Villars, in particular, did not appear troubled by 
the eventual decision taken to attack Tournai as he was confident it would hold out 
for a long time. The decision to attack Tournai then appears to have been the point 
at which the Allies accepted that the 1709 campaign would conform to the 
‘attritional’ siege warfare so prevalent during the era.  
 
Marlborough was certainly a gifted strategist and recognised the value of Ypres. 
However, once again he was overruled during the council. The internal politics of the 
Grand Alliance specifically over the Dutch Barrier and commercial concerns, appear 
to have been the key drivers in this decision to focus on Tournai. Coalition warfare 
certainly caused frustration amongst the Allies and it is perhaps understandable that 
Marlborough backed down in order to avoid friction between the parties, but was 
perhaps mistaken not to have taken advantage of his reputation to pursue a wider 




Once the decision was taken to besiege Tournai, Marlborough commanded the 
operation with skill and vigour. Indeed, this appears to have been his major skill as a 
general throughout his career. Marlborough had successfully outmanoeuvred 
opponents consistently throughout the war and was to do so again, even when 
facing Villars. It would, therefore, be unfair to downplay this aspect of his 
generalship. In terms of moving men from one location to another without being 
caught out by enemy forces and in bypassing strong enemy lines he was certainly 
very talented.  
 
In contrast his conduct during the siege of Tournai appears to have been less 
effective. Marlborough had not been blessed with the siege education received by 
his peers and thus left much of the organisation of his attacking forces to his Dutch 
engineers, whom he pressured into using a ‘vigorous’ approach rather than the more 
casualty limiting ‘methodical’ approach espoused by Vauban. This meant the siege of 
Tournai was perhaps unnecessarily costly to the Allies. They had incurred casualties, 
in the interests of speed, but struggled to make progress as the stout defence of the 
strong citadel dragged on in an already short campaigning season. Indeed, they were 
fortunate that the garrison ran out of food and had to surrender as they had 
struggled to make any headway against the citadel, in spite of numerous attacks. 
Overall the conduct of the siege lacked cohesion. Faced with a largely absent general 
there was discord between the officers and engineers, which had a negative effect 
on command and control. The fact that Marlborough captured every fortress he 
besieged seems to stem more from the nature of warfare during the era, as sieges 
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were generally successful, rather than from any particular genius at conducting 
sieges on his part. This runs to contrary to the view presented in the historiography, 
by Chandler in particular, that Marlborough was a master in all facets of warfare.442  
 
The battle of Malplaquet was fought to cover the siege of Mons, itself another 
relatively unimportant fortress strategically. Marlborough and Eugene’s initial plan 
seems to have been only to risk a battle if the French advanced on them. They were 
also attempting to draw Villars into a trap. However, when Villars did not take the 
bait they went on the offensive. This was the costliest mistake of the campaign. 
Mons was already besieged, the Allied force was between Villars and the town, and 
it possessed relatively secure supply lines. Moreover the siege could have been 
conducted without fighting a battle. The terrain surrounding the area was always 
going to be a benefit to a defending force due to the limited gaps through the 
forests. Marlborough must have realised this but chose to give battle anyway.  
 
One of the questions raised in the historiographical review was how far Marlborough 
deserved his reputation as a battle seeking general. The 1709 campaign provides a 
somewhat contradictory view. On the one hand it could be argued that fighting a 
battle that he did not necessarily have to engage in, at the very end of the 
campaigning season, demonstrated that he was indeed a general who pursued a 
decisive battle with vigour. However, reviewing the 1709 campaign as a whole this 
                                                     
442 D. Chandler, Marlborough as a Military Commander, (London, 2000), p.331. 
161 
  
does not appear to be the case. Marlborough vacillated throughout the year as to 
whether a battle should be fought and once his initial plan for a descent on Picardy 
was vetoed he appeared to have been content with pursuing a siege based strategy. 
Indeed, despite the historiography often presenting the Dutch as blockers, it appears 
that it was pressure from Heinsius (and to a certain extent Godolphin) that drove 
him to give battle at Malplaquet. 
 
Marlborough, therefore, does not appear to have been a purely battle seeking 
general but rather a pragmatic one who was well aware of the constraints he was 
operating under. During the early years of the war French forces were far more likely 
to give battle, as they did at Blenheim (1704) and Ramilles (1706). However, after 
these defeats Marlborough recognised that they would be reluctant to risk another 
battle and that he could not force an enemy force into a decisive encounter unless 
they also elected to fight, which Villars did at Malplaquet due to his strong defensive 
position. As a result of this Marlborough altered his strategy and focused on 
stripping France of her fortress barrier. This is not to say that he would not venture a 
battle if the opportunity presented itself, but seeking a decisive battle was not the 
cornerstone of his strategy.  
 
In terms of the conduct of the battle the advance of the Dutch Guards on the French 
right flank was a major disaster, partly due to the lack of reinforcements in the area 
as Withers' battalions had instead been selected to partake in an innovative, but 
ultimately vain, flanking move through the forests on the French left flank. The 
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Dutch suffered heavily in the first attack and were beaten back. Somewhat 
inexplicably, however, despite the small chance of success a further attack was 
launched with similar results. Marlborough as commander on the day must take the 
blame for this. Either he ordered the Prince of Orange to undertake a futile attack, or 
he struggled with command because of the size of his army and thus could not 
countermand the Prince’s orders. It is worth noting that these casualties may have 
been significantly less had Marlborough opted to attack on 10 September, before 
the French had time to strengthen their positions. 
 
The French infantry in general performed better than they had during any of the 
Marlborough’s earlier battles and the morale of the French troops certainly 
improved when holding a tangible barrier, which led to the bloody and fluid fighting 
witnessed at Malplaquet. This type of fighting meant that the contest was a fairly 
even one, as the Allied troops were unable, with one notable exception, to use their 
much vaunted platoon fire system. Instead they used the French method of 
advancing to fire at very close range before charging with bayonets in order to 
minimise the time they were exposed to enfilading artillery fire. That the Allies were 
successful in this situation, refusing to break when confronted with such strong 
French positions, had much to do with the high morale of the infantry. This force had 
been with Marlborough throughout successive campaigns, and was used to the sort 
of brutal fighting experienced at Malplaquet by virtue of the amount of sieges that 
they had successfully undertaken. The casualties suffered by the Allies were 
staggering and that they continued to attack the French positions until they were 
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taken shows the hallmarks of a veteran army. This view is supported by the example 
of Orkney’s infantry successfully advancing to take the French centre and defeat 
determined attacks from the Maison Du Roi, effectively turning the tide of the battle, 
despite having been subject to artillery fire for the majority of the day. 
 
The eventual success at on the Allied right flank had been dearly bought and judging 
from his post-battle reaction it is hard to believe Marlborough expected to incur the 
level of casualties that he did. Nevertheless, his plan had worked and the French 
were in a dangerous position with their army split in two. From this position 
Boufflers wisely withdrew, and if this had turned into a rout, the destruction of the 
French field army may have been worth the casualties that the Allies had incurred. 
However, the Maison du Roi, led in person by Boufflers, proved a match for the 
Allied cavalry. Certainly the French cavalry’s supposedly inferior doctrine of firing 
with pistols did not prove a disadvantage as they drove back the Allied cavalry time 
and time again in a long struggle. Indeed, it was at this point that platoon fire proved 
its worth as Orkney’s battalions were able to cover retreating Allied cavalry allowing 
them to rally and eventually turn the tide of the combat with the French cavalry with 
aid of fresh troops. However, the effectiveness of the French cavalry and the time 
they bought allowed the rest of the army to withdraw in an organised manner, 
limiting the casualties sustained during the retreat.  
 
Overall then Malplaquet was an extremely bloody battle fought for a relatively minor 
strategic gain in Mons. Malplaquet was a victory by the standards of the time but it 
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was incredibly damaging to the Allied forces and it is perhaps no surprise that it was 
the last major battle Marlborough undertook during the war. However had the 
battle, and the resultant capture of the town, pressured France into accepting a 
peace the action could have been viewed as a success in spite of Marlborough’s 
flawed campaign. The Duke, in the immediate aftermath of the battle, certainly 
believed that France would concede to the Allies terms of the previous year, ‘I hope 
and beleive it [Malplaquet] will be the last [battle] I shall see, for I think it impossible 
for the French to continu the warr.’443 Godolphin, for his part, seems to have agreed 
with this viewpoint, ‘I can’t help being of the opinion that this victory ought to have 
some present consequences in relation to the peace.’ Godolphin goes onto explain in 
his letter that France would be expected to agree to the same terms as had been 
demanded the previous year, including giving up Spanish towns.444  
 
Despite this positive feeling in the immediate aftermath of the battle the peace talks, 
which had been ongoing since June 1709, did not end the war. The defeat at 
Malplaquet far from shattering French morale instead restored pride in her military 
reputation and galvanised the war weary populace.445 As Pelet described the 
situation at the close of the campaign: ‘although forced to give way before the 
superiority of his foes, he [Villars] was able to stop the exploitation of their victory 
and the execution of their vast projects, by denying them entry into the kingdom, 
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and reducing them to the capture of two towns that did not belong to France.’446 
This attitude was reflected in the negotiations and no compromise was reached with 
the war dragging on until 1712 for the British, and 1714 for the other parties. It 
would perhaps be too harsh to say that the 1709 campaign reduced the chances of a 
peace however it is clear that it did not improve the Allied negotiating position. The 
cost in terms of time, lives and material had been vast for very little gain and as the 
commander of the Allied forces Marlborough must take overall responsibility for 
what was a largely failed campaign, which perhaps represented the beginning of the 
end for his distinguished military career.  
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